



Jihad Networks in Pakistan and Their Influence in Europe

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INTRODUCTION

Since the very early days of the Soviet-Afghan war of the 1980s, Pakistani territory has unquestionably served as a major base for fundamentalist Islamic clerics, schools, and militant training camps, including for Al-Qaida. In 1988, one such facility inside Pakistan, known as “Al-Sadda”, was described in the founding documents of Al-Qaida as an “open camp” from which the best “brothers” would be selected to join the new terrorist organization.¹ With the emergence of the Taliban movement in the late 1990s along the Pakistani-Afghan border, increasingly larger swaths of northwestern Pakistan have become dominated by forces sympathetic to Al-Qaida and willing to host terrorist guesthouses and training camps. Those camps are responsible for training many of the culprits involved in Europe’s most notorious terrorism cases of the last decade—from the July 7, 2005 bombings in the United Kingdom to the disrupted plots in Germany during the summer of 2007 targeting Ramstein Air Base and Frankfurt International Airport. Simply put, these camps pose a clear and present danger to the nations of the West—both as a proxy menace to NATO forces serving as peacekeepers in Afghanistan and, most importantly, as a looming terrorist threat to Europe and North America. Their existence can no longer be tolerated by any responsible regional security policy.

Indeed, the flourishing of Al-Qaida training camps in northwestern Pakistan became front page media headlines in 2005 across Europe and North America following the 7/7 bombings in London. At least two of the suicide operatives responsible for 7/7—Mohammed Siddique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer—were reported by eyewitnesses to have attended training camps at several locations in the Pakistani Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), including near the towns of Mansehra and Malakand. This much was later confirmed by Al-Qaida Deputy Commander Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri in a July 2006 video from Al-Qaida’s official As-Sahab media wing paying homage to bomber Shehzad Tanweer. According to al-Zawahiri:

“Shehzad dedicated himself to training with passion and devotion, and received, along with the martyr Siddique Khan, focused and practical instruction in the manufacture of explosives and their use at the camps of Qaida al-Jihad, those camps whose inductees don’t need to score high averages nor pass entrance exams; all they need is jealousy for their religion and Ummah and a love for Jihad and martyrdom... And that’s why Shehzad came to the bases of the Qaida al-Jihad group and spent a period of time with Muhammad Siddique. Both of them were seeking martyrdom and wished that they could carry out a martyrdom operation. They both were very insisted upon that... the goal for which they came to the bases of Qaida al-Jihad was the carrying out of a martyrdom operation... The knights of London continued to train and plan for the

¹ Government’s Response to Defendant’s Position Paper as to Sentencing Factors.” United States of America v. Enaam M. Arnaout. United States District Court Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division. Case #: 02 CR 892. Page 38.

operation, and the targets were identified with precision, so much so that even the names of the targeted stations held symbolic meaning and spiritual significance for the Crusader West.”²

The detailed training regimen at the camps in Pakistan responsible for schooling 7/7 bombers Khan and Tanweer was later described by U.K. national Salahuddin Amin during an interview with London police at Paddington Green Police Station in February 2005. Amin was among a group of British Muslims who were arrested following a law enforcement investigation into a would-be terror cell which had acquired a large quantity of ammonium nitrate in anticipation of carrying out an attack in the United Kingdom. Under questioning, Amin admitted to receiving specialized training at an Al-Qaida camp in northwestern Pakistan:

“There was like one explosives training which was only for two days and I was like requested by Omar KHYAM and his friend... that they want to get trained and then come back to the UK to do like you know... I knew they wanted to get explosive training to do something in the UK... Tariq booked a house, like rented a house for us, so we just stayed there for two days and them two did training and so did I. But we took all the notes, like you know I took notes in notebook for the training because I, it’s, you know it was so much... They taught us er... like er... to how to make explosive... It was er...like you know er.... er...fertiliser... Ammonium nitrate. And there was another one white, UREA, UREA. And there was so much other substance as well as like you know, like sulphur and... but there was, has to be a certain amount of everything which I made notes of.”³

Part I: Waziristan, Peshawar, and the Afghan Border

Though the locations of jihadi training camps inside Pakistan are spread over several provinces generally bordering Afghanistan, since 2004, the lawless region of Waziristan has become a particularly important haven for this form of terrorist activity. One Waziri tribal elder recently confirmed to a reporter from the UK’s Sunday Times, “They are now everywhere. There are Iraqis, Chinese, Uzbeks, Tajiks and Arabs. Young boys are being brought to Waziristan to be trained as suicide bombers.”⁴ In mid-2002, Pakistani troops were first deployed in North and South Waziristan in order to hunt for fugitive Taliban and Al-Qaida figures. However, the operations of the Pakistani military caused tensions with local militant leaders to grow, and in March 2004, heavy fighting broke out at a fortified compound in Azam Warsak, near the South Waziristan town of Wana. Azam Warsak has served as a base for training camps operated by a number of Al-Qaida allies, including most notably the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).

On April 10, 2004, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested naturalized U.S. citizen Mohammed Junaid Babar for allegedly providing material support to Al-Qaida, including assisting in terror plot targeting bars, train stations, and restaurants in the United Kingdom. On June 2, 2004, Babar pled guilty to five counts of conspiring to provide material support to Al-Qaida.⁵ According to documents filed by the U.S. Justice Department in his case:

“It was a part and an object of the conspiracy that Mohammed Junaid Babar, a United States citizen, agreed with others to assist al Qaeda by providing military gear to co-conspirators not named as defendants herein who transported the gear to al Qaeda associates in South Waziristan, Pakistan, and by himself traveling to South Waziristan, Pakistan, to provide military gear and money to al Qaeda associates there, to be used to

² As-Sahab Media Foundation. “The Knight’s Will of the London Blast, Part II: Shehzad Tanweer.” <http://www.alhesbah.org/showthread?t=73341>. July 7, 2006.

³ London Metropolitan Police Anti-Terrorist Branch. “Operation Crevise: Police interview with Salahuddin Amin at the Paddington Green Police Station on February 8-9, 2005.”

⁴ Hasnain, Ghulam, Miran Shah, and Dean Nelson. “Pakistan treads carefully in kingdom of the Taliban.” The Sunday Times. April 1, 2007.

⁵ “Terrorism: 2002-2005.” Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Counterterrorism Division. http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terrorism2002_2005.htm.

fight against U.S. forces in Afghanistan... It was a part and an object of the conspiracy that Mohammed Junaid Babar, a United States citizen, agreed with others to organize a jihad training camp where training in military skills, explosives, and weapons was given, agreed to provide lodging and to arrange transportation for others to and from the training camp, and agreed to purchase and attempt to purchase ammonium nitrate and aluminum powder for destructive devices and bombs to be used in attacks in the United Kingdom.”⁶

Conversely, the spread of fighting with the Pakistani army in Northern Waziristan led to an explosion of growth in terrorist training camp activity near the local hotbeds of Mir Ali and Miranshah. In May 2006, a well-known jihadi media agency in Pakistan known as “Ummah Studios” released a new video production titled “Na Pak Fouj”, documenting recent clashes with the Pakistani army in Northern Waziristan. The video included lengthy, detailed footage of a terrorist training camp situated somewhere in North Waziristan. Recruits are shown running basic calisthenics, practicing with weapons and guerilla tactics, building improvised explosive devices, and even attending classroom-style instructional sessions for more technical lessons. As masked fighters pass in front of the camera, a nasheed song plays for viewers, imploring, “Look at the people of Allah, They came out to sacrifice their lives... They came out to shed their blood... No worry for home, no worry for land, no worry for lives they have. They are wise people who live in fear of Allah... Those who fight against the infidels are the mujahideen. Their dreams have come true.” Later, an unidentified narrator explains in Urdu:

“In front of your eyes, these selected Muslim youths are preparing for jihad. Allah said, ‘Prepare to the greatest extent possible against the infidels.’ The Prophet said, ‘The power is in the shooting’—the power is in the shooting, the power is in the shooting... Today, [our enemies] are insulting the Quran. Today, they are insulting our Prophet Mohammed, and they kill Muslims wherever they want... So, according to the orders of Allah, it is our duty to prepare ourselves against the infidels and our responsibility... May Allah increase the passion for our religion among the Muslim youth, and may he grant us the strength to prepare ourselves to defend his religion.”⁷

To underline the purpose of the training offered at the camp, one of the masked recruits is shown sitting amongst his comrades and singing by himself in Urdu: “O’ infidels of the East and West, we have plans for you. We all must die, life is too short. You (Muslims) must act now, we are being oppressed. O’ soldiers of Islam, come here for jihad. O’ soldiers of Islam, come here for jihad.”⁸

Perhaps no single foreign terrorist organization has become more closely identified with terrorist training camps in Northern Waziristan over the past two years than the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), a breakaway faction of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) founded in 2002 and deemed responsible for a series of bombings in July 2004 at the U.S. and Israeli embassies in the Uzbek capital Tashkent. On May 25, 2005, the U.S. State Department announced the designation of the IJU as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT). According an official statement from the State Department, “The Islamic Jihad [Union] continues to target Americans and U.S. facilities overseas and is a dangerous threat to U.S. interests.”⁹ During a recent interview posted on the IJU’s official website, one of its foreign-born fighters Abu Yasir al-Turki proclaimed, “we are Allah’s warriors and we will fight until the only religion in the world is Islam or until we become martyrs... Our brothers before us, Ibn-ul-Khattab, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Shaykh Usama [Bin Laden], and many others whose names are unknown, these brave fighters are examples for us.”¹⁰

⁶ Indictment. United States of America v. Mohammed Junaid Babar. Case 04 Crim. 528. U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. Filed June 3, 2004.

⁷ Ummat Studios. “Na Pak Fouj.” Released: May 2006.

⁸ Ummat Studios. “Na Pak Fouj.” Released: May 2006.

⁹ Boucher, Richard. “U.S. Department of State Designates the Islamic Jihad Group Under Executive Order 13224.” U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs. Washington, DC. May 26, 2005.

¹⁰ http://sehadetvakti.com/haber_detay.php?haber_id=1907. April 14, 2008.

Consequently, the IJU's principle training camps near Mir Ali in North Waziristan have become a major mecca for European nationals (primarily of Turkish and Western descent) aspiring to become international terrorists and suicide bombers. This phenomenon has been carefully documented by the IJU through written testimonials, photographs, and high-resolution video recordings. One of those who has made frequent appearances in IJU propaganda is German-born Eric B. (a.k.a. "Abdulgaffar al-Almani"), a 20-year old German convert to Islam from Neuenkirchen in Saarland who traveled to Pakistan in 2007 and joined the IJU there. A grinning Eric B. is shown in official images released by the IJU brandishing various weapons and chatting with his comrades at a remote camp. During an official interview published by the IJU, the young German boasted, "The training of new recruits who are constantly arriving is going very well. Additionally, we have assembled a group of recruits who are ready to conduct martyrdom operations."¹¹

In September 2007, German authorities arrested three local residents in the city of Frankfurt and accused them of plotting terrorist attacks on behalf of the IJU targeting the Frankfurt International Airport and the nearby U.S.-run Ramstein Air Base. Days later, on the sixth anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, the IJU issued an official statement claiming responsibility for the failed plot, which it labeled a response to "injustice and brutal policies toward Muslims and Islam." The communiqué also suggested that other similar terrorist attacks were being prepared for targets outside of Germany: "What the three brothers intended to do is also being planned in other places in the world."¹² According to German investigators cited by the Los Angeles Times and other media sources, in March 2006, the alleged ringleader of the cell broken up in Germany, Fritz Gelowicz, and two other suspects had attended an IJU training camp near Mir Ali in North Waziristan.¹³ During an interview with the German news magazine Stern, Gelowicz acknowledged, "in Pakistan, there are many Islamic and Quranic schools." When asked why European Muslims would seek to travel to Pakistan, he suggested cryptically, "Maybe they go to study there. Maybe."¹⁴

In mid-2007, Afghan police officers manning a checkpoint on a highway near Gardez, Afghanistan intercepted a pickup truck loaded with over 1,000 pounds of explosives. The driver, disguised as a veiled Afghan woman, turned out to be 27-year old Andre Vladimirovich Bataloff, a Muslim convert originally from Siberia. Interviewed by journalists from The New York Times, Bataloff admitted to flying from Russia to Iran, crossing over the border into Pakistan, and eventually reaching North Waziristan. The Siberian settled in the IJU stronghold of Mir Ali, where he described spending a year studying at a small local mosque. However, according to U.S. military officials familiar with the case and cited by The New York Times, Bataloff has also told interrogators that he had attended a terrorist training camp in North Waziristan, where he learned—among other things—how to fire an AK-47 assault rifle.¹⁵

On March 3, 2008, a suicide bomber drove a truck loaded with explosives into a U.S. guard post at the Sebari military compound near Khost, Afghanistan, reportedly killing two soldiers. On April 15, 2008, the IJU released an official video recording claiming responsibility for the attack, including scenes of the attack and the bomber—a 28-year old German national of Turkish origin, Cuneyt Ciftci (a.k.a. Saad Abu Furqan). The video also contains footage of Ciftci and others working together inside a terrorist guesthouse to build sophisticated explosive devices.¹⁶ Ciftci was born in Bavaria to a family of Turkish immigrants, and he later worked as a clerical bureaucrat in Germany. In April 2007, he left Germany and traveled to northwestern Pakistan after formally deregistering as a resident at his local town hall. According to German

¹¹ http://sehadetvakti.com/haber_detay.php?haber_id=1919. May 23, 2008.

¹² http://sehadetvakti.com/haber_detay.php?haber_id=1587. September 11, 2007.

¹³ Laabs, Dirk and Sebastian Rotella. "European militants now get training in Pakistan." Los Angeles Times. October 15, 2007.

¹⁴ Knobbe, Martin. "Terrorverdächtiger Fritz Gelowicz: Interview mit einem 'Gefährder.'" Stern (Germany). September 13, 2007.

¹⁵ Rohde, David. "Foreign Fighters of Harsher Bent Bolster Taliban." New York Times. October 30, 2007.

¹⁶ http://sehadetvakti.com/haber_detay.php?haber_id=1908. April 15, 2008.

media reports, Ciftci was linked to several of the IJU terrorist suspects detained along with Fritz Gelowicz in Frankfurt in September 2007.

On the same day that the IJU released the “martyrdom” will of Cuneyt Ciftci, the group also separately broadcast another video on the Internet, titled simply, “For Lal Masjid.” The video begins with approximately eight minutes of stirring images and raw footage from the 2007 siege at the Red Mosque in the Pakistani capital of Islamabad (for more on the significance of the Red Mosque, see below). The IJU video then immediately transitions to approximately seven minutes of original, high-resolution footage from an IJU terrorist training camp in Pakistan (presumably Waziristan). The video shows heavily-armed, masked militants running calisthenics exercises, practicing advanced guerilla warfare tactics, and marching under the black banner of the IJU. It also depicts teenage boys as young as thirteen practicing dismantling, cleaning, and firing automatic weapons. This training footage is then subsequently sandwiched with more angry incitement about the Red Mosque siege, followed by the blindfolded execution of alleged “government spies” and scenes from IJU guerilla attacks along the lawless Pakistani-Afghan border. It should be noted that a variety of IJU propaganda statements published during 2007 and 2008 contain still photos depicting IJU training camps in northwestern Pakistan (which bear an extremely strong resemblance to the video later released in April 2008).¹⁷

Part II: Muzaffarabad, Balakot, and the Kashmiri Frontier

Though Waziristan, Peshawar, and other areas along the Afghan-Pakistani border have become widely reputed for their role in hosting Al-Qaida terrorist training camps, the problem is not merely limited to that geographic region of Pakistan. As the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan began to fade in the late 1980s, a group of Pakistani Muslim militants decided to “take[] a leaf from the book of [the] Afghans... [and] lit the torch of Jihad movement” in their own homeland.¹⁸ During an interview with mujahideen recruiter Abu Hamza al-Masri in London, he tried to explain to me the mindset of Arab and Pakistani mujahideen volunteers at this time: “People are dedicated to the [religion]... They went to Afghanistan to defend their brothers and sisters. So, they find Afghanistan now, the destruction of war and Muslims fighting against each other.” As a result, in the aftermath of the disaster in Afghanistan, “they want[ed] to [struggle against] something that is indisputable, which is non-Muslims raping, killing, and maiming Muslims.”¹⁹ It would not be long before “Afghan”-trained mujahideen would turn their attention to another conflict close to home: the fight to control the contested Kashmir region straddling Muslim Pakistan and neighboring Hindu-dominated India.

For Pakistani militant groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM), and Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM) who had emerged from the ashes of the Afghan war, the conflict in Kashmir was particularly convenient—both in timing and in location. The same region of Pakistan that had served as a major base for the Afghan mujahideen—the North West Frontier Province (NWFP)—now would also accommodate training camps and recruitment centers for the jihad in Kashmir. Along the eastern frontier of the NWFP bordering Pakistani-controlled Azad Kashmir, a string of towns and villages have acquired a reputation as gateways to jihad, including Mansehra, Balakot, and Muzaffarabad. JEM alone operated at least four major military training camps located in Balakot, Muzaffarabad, Hajeera, and Mansehra.²⁰ According to Pakistani researchers, the JEM facility in Balakot is “the largest military training centre of Jaish-e-Mohammed... directly under the supervision of Maulana Masood Azhar and run by Qari Shah Mansur.”²¹ Indeed, in February 2001, JEM chief Masood Azhar claimed in Dharb-i-Mumin to be expanding JEM’s activities in Balakot. He noted, “recently, a most excellent system of education and training has

¹⁷ For example, see http://sehadetvakti.com/haber_detay.php?haber_id=1203. May 31, 2007.

¹⁸ Taiba Bulletin (nadqpk@yahoo.com). “Subject: Eleven Years of Lashker-e-Taiba.” April 22, 2001. <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/muslimworldnews>.

¹⁹ Interview with Shaykh Abu Hamza al-Masri at the Finsbury Park Mosque; June 28, 2002.

²⁰ Rana, Muhammad Amir. A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan. Mashal Publishing; Lahore, Pakistan. ©2005. Pages 225-226.

²¹ Rana, Muhammad Amir. A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan. Mashal Publishing; Lahore, Pakistan. ©2005. Page 226.

been announced in Madrasah Sayyed Ahmad Shaheed rahimahullah. The students who are acquiring jihad training there will now be able to benefit from deeni and contemporary education too... I spend the first five days of every month in Madrasah Sayyed Ahmed Shaheed, Balakot punctually.”²² In a separate appeal for donations to help support the new mujahideen camps, Maulana Masood Azhar announced:

“A training centre of Jaish-i-Muhammad (Sallallahu ‘Alaihe wasallam) is being built in Balakot. The name of this training centre is Madrasah Sayyed Ahmad Shaheed Rahimahullahu Ta’ala. A masjid, large water tanks, a ground for physical training, and rooms for the mujahideen are being constructed on its premises. Some women have sent their jewellery for the construction of the mosque and the other buildings. Just think, what felicity and good fortune, what blessings these women have acquired in exchange for their lifeless gold! How many will be the mujahideen, the future [martyrs] offering [prayers] in this masjid, how countless will be the Ibn-e-Qasim and Salahuddin produced, how numerous Afaq Shaheeds [referring to the past example of a JEM suicide commando] will acquire training in this ground - in the ‘ajr’ of all of them these Muslim women will have a share.”²³

During interrogation by agents from the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Lodi, California resident Hamid Hayat—one of the foreign recruits who allegedly received training at the Sayyed Ahmed Shaheed camp—explained, “they don’t tell you, like, we’re going to send you to this country or that country, like that or something like that.”²⁴ Nonetheless, according to Hayat, the acknowledged purpose of receiving training at the camp was to learn how to attack and “kill any, like, any country working against Muslims.” During the subsequent federal trial of Hamid Hayat, Eric Benn—a satellite image analyst with the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, testified that the Sayyed Ahmed Shaheed camp is “relatively remote and austere... blends into the surroundings, and is based on relatively minimal furnishings. The structures aren’t big and elaborate, they’re small and rustic... They make do with what they have. And there is no real need, in a setting such as this, to set up big, open firing ranges with lanes for firing down.”

Similarly, the towns of Balakot and Muzaffarabad have also been major hubs for activity for Lashkar-e-Taiba. In 1999, a London-based mujahideen support group calling itself the “Global Jihad Fund” openly advertised “jihad training” courses “currently... being done in Muzaffarabad in Pakistan. It is on[ly] for 21 days and is of beginners level. It is organised by Lashkar-e-Toiba... Then there are special courses.”²⁵ The LET and its political wing Jama`at-ud-Dawa (JUD) similarly acknowledge operating at least three separate militant training camps near Muzaffarabad: Moaskar Ummul Qura, Moaskar Aqsa, and Moaskar Abdullah Bin Masood. One of the former instructors at the LET’s Moaskar Ummul Qura camp (until his “martyrdom” in 2000) was a Pakistani national known as “Abdul Malik Abu Anas Shaheed.” According to the LET, “there is not a single person in Pakistan who is associated with Jihad [who] does not know his name... [his] very personality filled people’s hearts with respect and he trained thousands of Mujahideen to wage Jihad... As he spent ten years in Saudi Arabia and learnt the better part of the Quran there, he had accent and pronunciation like Arabs. His voice had great impact.”²⁶

The European nationals who have received instruction at this grouping of terrorist training camps run primarily by JEM and LET can hardly be lumped together as “mere amateurs.” These men include the suicide bombers (and a variety of their fanatical cohorts) who were responsible for carrying out the July 7, 2005 suicide bombings in London. In the Spring of 2007,

²² Azhar, Maulana Masood. “Organizing Central Office of Jaish-i-Muhammad (sallallahu `alaihe wa sallam).” *Dharb-i-Mumin*. Vol. 2; Issue 36. January 26-February 2, 2001. <http://www.dharb-i-mumin.com>.

²³ “The Fortunate Woman.” *Dharb-i-Mumin*. Vol.2; Issue 8. November 8, 2000. As reprinted at <http://www.jamiat.org.za/isinfo/fwoman.html>.

²⁴ *United States v. Hamid Hayat*, Trial Transcript, Pages 3702-3703.

²⁵ “Briton sends Email to Launch Jihad in Kashmir.” *The Asian Age*. November 1, 1999.

²⁶ Jama`at-ud-Dawa Pakistan. “Teacher of Mujahideen: Abu Anas Shaheed.” <http://www.jamatdawa.org/english/articles/jihad/abuans.htm>. June 2003.

British police arrested four men during a security sweep codenamed “Operation Theseus”—Waheed Ali, Mohammed Shakil, Sadeer Saleem, and Khalid Khaliq—and accused them of complicity in the bombings and possession of terrorist propaganda materials. Two of the men were arrested at Manchester Airport while attempting to board a flight to Pakistan. During their subsequent trial, prosecutors released several eye-opening pieces of evidence, including police surveillance footage of the two 7/7 bombers Khan and Tanweer, along with several of the “Operation Theseus” defendants, during a suspected reconnaissance trip to London in March 2004 in anticipation of their planned suicide attack. Other video footage released by British prosecutors shows bomber Mohammed Siddique introducing his infant daughter to fellow bomber Shehzad Tanweer and “Operation Theseus” defendants as her “uncles.”

During the course of investigating “Theseus”, U.K. counterterrorism police recovered a host of terrorist propaganda documents at various locations in central England, including one titled “An Appeal to Pakistanis All Over the World. To: Pakistanis in Pakistan, America, Britain, Canada, Australia.” The document urges, “an appeal has been made for Pakistanis all over the World to make arrangements to travel to Pakistan, then Afghanistan, to render assistance to the Muslims of Afghanistan and defend the Islamic land of Afghanistan from destruction. Why is this appeal being made to Pakistanis alone? Because it is likely that they are the only ones able to travel to Pakistan without any immigration difficulties... Therefore, the responsibility rests heavily on your shoulders.”²⁷ Police also seized home video recordings of several defendants traveling in restive regions of Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province—straight through Muzaffarabad, Mansehra, and Balakot. The men visit an Islamic school in the town of Dhirkot sponsored by the now-shuttered Al-Qaida charity Global Relief Foundation (GRF), where they were pleased to discover murals of AK-47 rifles adorning the walls, and books about ‘Guerilla Warfare’ on the shelves of the poorly-stocked library.” On December 14, 2001, the Department of Treasury froze the assets of Global Relief Foundation (“GRF”) as a result of their financial support of Al-Qaida.²⁸ On October 18, 2002, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) listed GRF as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist.”²⁹ According to the Treasury Department, “Global Relief Foundation, has connections to, has provided support for, and has provided assistance to Usama Bin Ladin, the al Qaida Network, and other known terrorist groups.”³⁰ According to the Treasury Department, high-ranking al Qaeda financier Mohammed Zouaydi, who was arrested in April 2002 in Spain, had given more than \$200,000 to GRF.³¹

Part III: Conclusions

As the Pakistani government continues to sway back and forth between confrontation and negotiation with local Islamic militants in Waziristan and the NWFP, the time bomb of the terrorist training camps continues to tick away. While it certainly is wise to show care and respect in our relationship with Pakistan, especially in the vein of avoiding needless armed confrontation, there is also a substantial, perhaps unacceptable risk in simply doing nothing about this problem. From studying the trajectories of these various terrorists and would-be terrorists, it becomes readily apparent how likely it is that any European national who received instruction at a terrorist training camp in northwestern Pakistan (and particularly Waziristan) between 2005 and 2007 would ultimately end up serving as a suicide bomber—either in Pakistan, Afghanistan, or in a major European country. On its own website, the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) has meticulously

²⁷ Operation Theseus. Exhibit WJ-264. \PAKIAPPEAL.htm

²⁸ U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control. Executive Order 13224 blocking Terrorist Property and a summary of the Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, Terrorism List Governments Sanctions Regulations, and Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations. February 26, 2003.

²⁹ U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control. Executive Order 13224 blocking Terrorist Property and a summary of the Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, Terrorism List Governments Sanctions Regulations, and Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations. February 26, 2003.

³⁰ “Treasury Department Statement Regarding the Designation of the Global Relief Foundation.” United States Treasury Department Office Of Public Affairs. October 18, 2002.

³¹ “Treasury Department Statement Regarding the Designation of the Global Relief Foundation.” United States Treasury Department Office Of Public Affairs. October 18, 2002.

documented the involvement of recruits of Turkish and Central Asian descent (many of whom are European nationals) in an astonishing wave of suicide bombings in Pakistan and Afghanistan that have taken place between 2006 and 2008—not to mention, the failed suicide plots in Frankfurt, Germany.³²

Indeed, prevailing evidence suggests that European recruits have actually been discouraged by terrorist training camp managers from participating as ordinary fighters in conventional local military operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan. During his 2005 interview with London police, Salahuddin Amin admitted that he had learned as much from an associate he had trained with at an Al-Qaida camp in northwestern Pakistan: “he wrote me a letter and said that the Chief has said that we have enough people here, you know who are fighting... So the best thing would be to go back and keep sending money and equipment and if they really want to do something then go back and you can do something there... You know like er... any sort of operation or whatever they’re gonna do or like you know cause any damage, come and do it in the UK.”³³

It would perhaps be comforting to believe that this problem is limited to Britain, or Canada, or Australia—but that would not be accurate. In January 2008, Spanish authorities arrested 10 terrorist suspects on charges that they were “planning to carry out a series of suicide attacks” on public transportation in Barcelona. According to a ruling from Judge Ismael Moreno, the suspects “had achieved human operational capacity and were very close to achieving full technical capacity with explosives, with the aim of using those explosives for a jihadi terrorist attack.” Moreno also indicated that three suspected suicide bombers involved with the cell had traveled from Pakistan to Barcelona between October 2007 and January 2008 in the wake of another Pakistani national (allegedly, an explosive expert) who had just returned after spending an unexplained period of five-months inside Pakistan.³⁴ In this case, Spanish authorities were very fortunate to break up the Barcelona terror plot with the critical assistance of an inside informant. Next time, we may not be so lucky.

³² <http://www.sehadetvakti.com>.

³³ London Metropolitan Police Anti-Terrorist Branch. “Operation Crevice: Police interview with Salahuddin Amin at the Paddington Green Police Station on February 8-9, 2005.”

³⁴ Goodman, Al. “Suspects ‘planned Spanish suicide attacks.’” [CNN](http://www.cnn.com). January 24, 2008.