

Expert Report I: U.S. v. OUSSAMA KASSIR

Evan F. Kohlmann
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My full name is Evan Francois Kohlmann. I am an International Terrorism Consultant who specializes in tracking Al-Qaida and other contemporary terrorist movements. I hold a degree in International Politics from the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service (Georgetown University), and a Juris Doctor (professional law degree) from the University of Pennsylvania Law School. I am also the recipient of a certificate in Islamic studies from the Prince Alwaleed bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding (CMCU) at Georgetown University. I currently work as an investigator with the Nine Eleven Finding Answers (NEFA) Foundation and as an on-air analyst for NBC News in the United States. I also run an Internet website Globalterroralert.com that provides information to the general public relating to international terrorism. I am author of the book *Al-Qaida's Jihad in Europe: the Afghan-Bosnian Network* (Berg/Oxford International Press, London, 2004) which has been used as a teaching text in graduate-level terrorism courses offered at such educational institutions as Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, Princeton University, and the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).

As part of my research beginning in approximately 1997, I have traveled overseas to interview known terrorist recruiters and organizers (such as Abu Hamza al-Masri) and to attend underground conferences and rallies; I have reviewed thousands of open source documents; and, I have amassed one of the largest digital collections of terrorist multimedia and propaganda in the world. The open source documents in my collection include sworn legal affidavits, original court exhibits, video and audio recordings, text communiqués, and eyewitness testimonies. I have testified on nine occasions as an expert witness in jurisdictions beyond the United States—including the United Kingdom, Denmark, Australia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. I have additionally testified as an approved expert witness in United States federal and military courts in thirteen criminal cases; including:

- United States v. Sabri Benkhala (Eastern District of Virginia, 2004)
- United States v. Ali Timimi (Eastern District of Virginia, 2005)
- United States v. Uzair Paracha (Southern District of New York, 2005)
- United States v. Ali Asad Chandia (Eastern District of Virginia, 2006)
- United States v. Yassin Aref (Northern District of New York, 2006)
- United States v. Sabri Benkhala (Eastern District of Virginia, 2007)
- United States v. Rafiq Sabir (Southern District of New York, 2007)
- United States v. Emadeddine Muntasser (District of Massachusetts, 2007)
- United States v. Hassan Abu Jihaad (District of Connecticut, 2008)
- United States v. Mohammed Amawi et al. (Northern District of Ohio, 2008)

- United States v. Salim Hamdan (Guantanamo Bay Military Tribunal, 2008)
- United States v. Ali Hamza al-Bahlul (Guantanamo Bay Military Tribunal, 2008)
- United States v. Mohamed Shnewer et al. (District of New Jersey, 2008)

In United States v. Uzair Paracha, Federal District Judge Sidney Stein held a Daubert hearing on my qualifications as an expert witness and issued a ruling concluding: “Evan Kohlmann has sufficient education, training, and knowledge to be qualified as an expert, and... Kohlmann’s methodology—that is, his process of gathering sources, including a variety of original and secondary sources, cross-checking sources against each other, and subjecting his opinions and conclusions to peer review—is sufficiently reliable to meet the standards for admissibility of expert testimony set by the Federal Rules of Evidence.”

Likewise, in United States v. Hassan Abu Jihaad, Federal District Judge Mark Kravitz held a Daubert hearing on my qualifications as an expert witness and issued a ruling concluding, “Mr. Kohlmann is certainly qualified to provide expert testimony... Mr. Kohlmann is qualified by means of his education, training, background, and experience to testify as an expert on terrorism... Mr. Kohlmann has conducted first-hand interviews of several leaders of terrorist organizations and has reviewed reams of information about al Qaeda... and the other subjects on which he will offer testimony. Indeed... it is apparent that these subjects are Mr. Kohlmann’s life work, and he has, therefore, acquired a considerable amount of information and documentation on these subjects... Mr. Kohlmann’s work receives a considerable amount of peer review from academic scholars and others, and by all accounts, Mr. Kohlmann’s work is well regarded.”

In February 2009, I was asked by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York to prepare an expert report covering the following subject areas:

- The History and Evolution of Al-Qaida
- The Leadership, Membership, and Supporters of Al-Qaida
- Basic Al-Qaida Tradecraft (Training, Operations, Role of the Internet)
- The Islamic Media Center (IMC)
- Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET), Hezbollah, and Tablighi Jamaat

I.) The History and Evolution of Al-Qaida

Usama bin Mohammed Bin Laden is the exiled son of the wealthy and powerful Bin Laden merchant family in Saudi Arabia. During the jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan during the 1980s, Bin Laden traveled to nearby Pakistan in order to provide assistance to Afghan mujahideen (“holy warrior”) organizations. Bin Laden quickly became a top student of Shaykh Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian Muslim cleric who is overwhelmingly accepted and revered as the “godfather” of modern military jihad. During one recorded lecture, Azzam issued what has become one of his most famous dictates, endorsing the use of terrorism as part and parcel of the strategy of the mujahideen: “We are terrorists, and terror is an obligation in the book of Allah. Let the west and east know that we are terrorists and we strike fear: ‘Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power—including steeds of war—to strike terror into

(the hearts of) the enemies of Allah and your enemies’... So, Terror is an obligation in the creed of Allah.”¹

Pooling their efforts, Azzam and Bin Laden jointly founded an organization for the purpose of facilitating the arrival of Arab mujahideen recruits, known as the Makhtab-e-Khidamat al-Mujahideen (“The Mujahideen Services Office”), later named by the U.S. government as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) entity for being “the pre-cursor organization to al Qaida and the basis for its infrastructure... MK was initially created by Usama bin Laden’s mentor, Shaykh Abdullah Azzam... as an organization to fund mujahideen in the Soviet-Afghan conflict.”² Following a split in the MK leadership, in approximately September 1988, Usama Bin Laden and others established a new military organization in Pakistan that they referred to as “Al-Qaida”, or the “Solid Foundation” for the desired Islamic society. Picking up where Makhtab-e-Khidamat had left off, Al-Qaida was responsible for managing several foreign mujahideen training camps inside Pakistan and Afghanistan for the purpose of schooling recruits in terrorist and urban warfare tactics.

Since assuming the helm of Al-Qaida in 1989, Bin Laden has on numerous occasions publicly declared his intentions to strike violently at the United States, its economy, and its nationals. In August 1996, he published his first “Declaration of War” against the infidels. The document announced:

“It is now clear that those who claim that the blood of the American soldiers (the enemy occupying the land of the Muslims) should be protected are merely repeating what is imposed on them by the regime; fearing the aggression and interested in saving themselves. It is a duty now on every tribe in the Arab Peninsula to fight, Jihad, in the cause of Allah and to cleanse the land from those occupiers. Allah knows that there blood is permitted (to be spilled) and their wealth is a booty; their wealth is a booty to those who kill them... Our youths knew that the humiliation suffered by the Muslims as a result of the occupation of their sanctities can not be kicked and removed except by explosions and Jihad... Death is better than life in humiliation! Some scandals and shames will never be otherwise eradicated. My Muslim Brothers of The World: Your brothers in Palestine and in the land of the two Holy Places are calling upon your help and asking you to take part in fighting against the enemy -your enemy and their enemy- the Americans and the Israelis. They are asking you to do whatever you can, with one own means and ability, to expel the enemy, humiliated and defeated, out of the sanctities of Islam.”³

In February 1998, Usama Bin Laden convened a meeting in Afghanistan of the “World Islamic Front Against Jews and Crusaders.” Bin Laden and other Middle Eastern terrorist leaders in attendance jointly agreed that “the ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it

¹ Al-Sahab Media Productions. “State of the Ummah.” (a.k.a. “The Destruction of the U.S.S. Cole). Video recording produced in mid-2001.

² “Additional Background Information on Charities Designated Under Executive Order 13224: Makhtab al-Khidamat / Al Kifah.” United States Treasury Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI). http://www.treasury.gov/offices/enforcement/key-issues/protecting/charities_execorder_13224-i.shtml.

³ Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR) <100043.1420@CompuServe.COM>. “MSANEWS: THE LADENESE EPISTLE: DECLARATION OF WAR (I).” [MSANews](http://msanews.mynet.net). <http://msanews.mynet.net>. October 12, 1996.

in any country in which it is possible to do it.”⁴ Likewise, on May 29, 1998, Usama Bin Laden issued a second declaration entitled “The Nuclear Bomb of Islam,” under the banner of his new “World Islamic Front,” in which he stated that “it is the duty of the Muslims to prepare as much force as possible to terrorize the enemies of God.”⁵

Consequently, under the tutelage of Bin Laden and his advisors, graduates from Al-Qaida training camps have carried out numerous anti-Western terrorist attacks around the world since 1988; including, the 1991 failed bombing of U.S. troops stationed in Yemen; the 1993 World Trade Center bombing; the RPG attack on U.S. helicopters during the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu; Project Bojinka in the Philippines (a January 1995 plot to simultaneously bomb between ten and twelve U.S. commercial jets over the Pacific); the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in East Africa; the October 2000 suicide bombing attack on the U.S.S. Cole in the port of Aden, Yemen; the failed twin Al-Qaida millennium bomb plots in Jordan and Los Angeles; the September 11, 2001 suicide hijackings of four U.S. commercial jets; the October 2002 suicide bombing of the French supertanker Limburg off the coast of Yemen; and the July 7, 2005 suicide bombing attacks in London. On October 9, 1999, the U.S. government announced the official designation of Al-Qaida as a foreign terrorist organization because of its involvement in several major terrorist attacks, including the August 1998 East Africa embassy bombings. The designation made it unlawful for anyone in the United States to provide material support to Al-Qaida, froze material resources linked to Al-Qaida and held custody by U.S. financial institutions, and allowed the expulsion of any Al-Qaida members or representatives living in the United States.⁶

In 1996, after coming under increased international pressure from the United States and other nations, the nation of Sudan—then the primary base of Al-Qaida—suddenly ordered Usama Bin Laden and his associates to leave the country. Once again, Bin Laden’s attention returned to Afghanistan. While Bin Laden had been living in exile in Africa, large parts of Afghanistan had come under the control of a growing military force, the extremist Taliban militia under the lead of Mullah Mohammed Omar. In a secret memorandum to other Al-Qaida leaders, Al-Qaida’s military chief Abu Hafs al-Masri endorsed the Taliban as an attractive new ally for Al-Qaida. He explained, “The position [of Taliban leaders] towards the Arabs who fought Jihad in Afghanistan is an excellent one, a great welcome and an acknowledgment of what the Arab Mujahideen have sacrificed and their right to stay in Afghanistan as Muslims and as Mujahideen... This will be a new turning point for the benefit of the Islamic world. Our duty towards the Taliban movement is to stand behind it, support it materially and morally, especially that its regional and international enemies are working night and day to put an end to it and make it fail.”⁷ After moving to Afghanistan, Bin Laden established a strong, personal alliance with the Taliban and Mullah Omar, recognizing the latter as the official “Commander of the Believers”, or “Amir al-Mumineen.” That alliance has continued to

⁴ “Text of World Islamic Front’s Statement Urging Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders.” *Al Quds al Arabi*. Feb. 23, 1998.

⁵ Government Exhibit GX-1610T. *United States v. Usama bin Laden, et al.* S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (LBS). United States District Court, Southern District of New York.

⁶ “Department of State Public Notice 3130: Office of the Coordinator For Counterterrorism; Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” *Federal Register*. Vol. 64, No. 195. October 8, 1999. Page 55112.

⁷ Government Exhibit GX-300B. *United States v. Usama bin Laden, et al.* S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (LBS). United States District Court, Southern District of New York.

hold firm even until today. In late 1999, Mullah Omar appointed Kandahar-native Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil as the Taliban's official foreign minister in order to help manage its developing international relationships.⁸

When Usama Bin Laden formed the Al-Qaida terrorist organization in Afghanistan in 1988, it was initially conceived as a loose confederation of regional Arab mujahideen movements active in Afghanistan and hailing from across the Middle East. According to the U.S. Congressional 9/11 Commission, Bin Laden "understood better than most of the volunteers the extent to which the continuation and eventual success of the jihad in Afghanistan depended on an increasingly complex, almost worldwide organization."⁹ Though Bin Laden's "affiliates" maintained their own leaderships and corporate infrastructures, they shared the same training camps as other Al-Qaida groups in Afghanistan and could be called upon to provide material resources for the benefit of Al-Qaida. According to founding Al-Qaida Shura Council member Mamdouh Mahmud Salim (a.k.a. Abu Hajer al-Iraqi), "Abu Abdullah [Bin Laden] had tendency to favor a policy of centralization... and felt obligated to assemble the Arabs in one location, train and prepare them to be a single mobilized fighting brigade."¹⁰ These "franchises" often had varying relationships with Bin Laden and his advisors. It was fairly common for veteran Arab-Afghan disciples to work interchangeably with Al-Qaida—even if they preferred to remain independent of the confines of Bin Laden's inner circle. These Al-Qaida "associate branches" included (but are not limited to) Al-Gama`at al-Islamiyya (the Egyptian Islamic Group), the Egyptian Islamic Jihad Movement, the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA), the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), Jemaah Islamiya in Indonesia.

Al-Qaida's "openness" and the perceived lack of formal hierarchy held great appeal in the minds of young jihadist recruits. In the world of Al-Qaida and the Arab-Afghans, even the most junior of operatives could potentially gain high status within the organization by either demonstrating useful skills, or else by volunteering to sacrifice themselves on behalf of the mission. In other words, Al-Qaida offered an equal opportunity at fame and recognition to nearly any sympathetic soul willing to risk death or imprisonment. When agents from the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) apprehended a junior Al-Qaida operative who helped build the suicide truck bombs used to attack two U.S. embassies in East Africa in 1998, he boasted of his own role in the plot and explained that he "was attracted to Usama Bin Ladin and the group Al Qaeda because it did not matter what nationality you were" and because Al Qaeda members did not explicitly follow "orders from a chain of command" in the same way as more traditional terrorist organizations.¹¹

Chastened by their defeat at the hands of coalition forces on the peaks of Tora Bora in December 2001, a group of high-ranking Al-Qaida commanders decided to re-think Al-Qaida's military campaign against the West based upon a more appropriately

⁸ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1810717.stm

⁹ The 9/11 Commission Report. Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. July 22, 2004. Page 55.

¹⁰ Muhammad, Basil. *Al-Ansaru l'Arab fi Afghanistan*. The Committee for Islamic Benevolence Publications; ©1991. Page 199.

¹¹ Government Exhibit GX-6 (Interview of Mohammed Sadiq Odeh by FBI Agent John Anticev). U.S. v. Usama Bin Laden, et al. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (LBS). United States District Court, Southern District of New York.

decentralized model. In 2002 and 2003, Bin Laden’s shift in strategy became noticeable following a series of dramatic kamikaze bombing attacks targeting Westerners in a host of countries, from Indonesia to Morocco. Al-Qaida’s then-official website—the Al-Neda Center for Islamic Studies and Research—published a landmark book by an Al-Qaida leader in Saudi Arabia named Shaykh Yousef al-Ayyiri acknowledging that these attacks marked a new phase in evolution for Al-Qaida. According to al-Ayyiri, “the al-Qaidah Organization has adopted a strategy in its war with the Americans based on expanding the battlefield and exhausting the enemy, who spread his interests over the globe, with successive and varied blows... Expanding the battlefield has invaluable benefits. The enemy, who needed to protect his country only, realized that he needed to protect his huge interests in every country. The more diversified and distant the areas in which operations take place, the more exhausting it becomes for the enemy, the more he needs to stretch his resources, and the more he becomes terrified.”¹²

In the wake of 9/11, mujahideen organizers in Europe who had previously encouraged others to travel to training camps in Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Chechnya began radically changing their message. Their new philosophy emphasized the individual nature and responsibility of jihad. Shaykh Anwar al-Awlaki, a Yemeni-American cleric, offered one particularly popular English-language sermon based on Yousef al-Ayyiri’s book “Constants on the Path of Jihad.” During his lecture, Al-Awlaki instructed his followers:

“Jihad does not end with the disappearance of a person. Jihad must continue regardless because it does not depend on any particular leader or individual... Jihad does not depend on any particular land. It is global. When the Muslim is in his land, he performs jihad... No borders or barriers stop it. The message cannot be conveyed without jihad. If a particular people or nation is classified as... ‘the people of war’ in the Shariah, that classification applies to them all over the earth. Islam cannot be customized to suit the conditions where you are, for instance Europe.”¹³

Likewise, at a conference in Leicester organized by the radical Al-Muhajiroun faction in October 2002, Abu Hamza al-Masri (a.k.a. Mustafa Kamel) admonished his audience, “We need to resist, we need to fight, even alone. And you can’t go now to learn in Afghanistan or Eritrea as before. Now, a war zone is a war zone. There is no need for camping, there is no facilities for camping... A lot of the skills you need for the frontline, you can learn from here... Where are you? What can you do in your area?”¹⁴ According to a widely respected Al-Qaida online theorist who goes by the pseudonym “Louis Atiyatullah”, the advantage of such a strategy is that “collective organized work is not affected by the loss of individuals, because individuals are easily replaced with others. The organization exists not on any individual; rather it operates as number of distributed

¹² Al-Neda Center for Islamic Studies and Research. “The Operation of 11 Rabi al-Awwal: The East Riyadh Operation and Our War With the United States and its Agents.” August 2003. Translated into English by the United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS).

¹³ <http://sabiluna.sitesled.com/Constants%20on%20The%20Path%20of%20Jihad.pdf>.

¹⁴ Speech given at “Iraq Today Mecca Tomorrow.” National Conference held in Leicester, United Kingdom; organized by Al-Muhajiroun, P.O. Box 349 London N9 7RR. October 27, 2002.

responsibilities where the loss of individuals is redundant. This is one of the secrets of the effectiveness of Al-Qaida and their success in group operations.”¹⁵

II.) The Leadership, Membership, and Supporters of Al-Qaida

On September 10, 1988, during the first meeting of the Al-Qaida organization along the Pakistani-Afghan border, Usama Bin Laden and the leaders of the new Al-Qaida network formed a Shura, or ‘Advisory’ Council to help manage the group. Shura Council members presided over various sub-committees responsible for carrying out specialized tasks on Al-Qaida’s behalf. The Shura Council included Usama Bin Laden, who became the amir, or leader, of the new group; Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, founder of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad Movement – a group later named by the U.S. government as a designated foreign terrorist organization¹⁶; Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri, a former Egyptian police officer who earned his combat nickname Al-Banshiri while fighting in the Panjsher Valley of Afghanistan¹⁷; and, Abu Hajer al-Iraqi, a.k.a. Mahmud Mamdouh Salim.¹⁸ Al-Qaida’s operations were divided amongst various wings, including a military committee, a security committee, a financial committee, a religious legal committee, a political committee, and a media committee.¹⁹

At the time that Al-Qaida was founded, and throughout much of its existence, aspiring new recruits were encouraged to travel to Afghanistan, seek out a foreign-run military training camp, and then offer an oath of allegiance—known as a “bayat”—to Usama Bin Laden. According to former Al-Qaida member Jamal al-Fadl, “‘bayat’ means you swear you going to agree about the agenda and about jihad, listen to the emir [commander], outstanding from any order and do—whatever work they ask you in group—you have to do it.”²⁰ However, the formal process of earning membership credentials has relaxed somewhat over time as Al-Qaida has diversified and grown from a strict physical organization into a larger ideological movement. Ahmed Omar Abu Ali—a Jordanian-American recruited in 2003 to join Al-Qaida’s local branch in Saudi Arabia—later conceded to interrogators that though there was never an “explicit” agreement that he had become “a member in the Al-Qaeda organization... this matter was understood by me by the evidence. [My recruiters had been] in Afghanistan and so

¹⁵ Atiyatullah, Louis. “The Badr Al-Riyadh Tape: A Well Organized Al-Qaida’s Media Strategy Revealed.” The Global Islamic Media Centre (GIM). 2004. Page 2.

¹⁶ The 9/11 Commission Report. Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. July 22, 2004. Page 57.

¹⁷ The 9/11 Commission Report. Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. July 22, 2004. Page 65. See also: United States v. Usama bin Laden, et al. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (LBS). United States District Court, Southern District of New York. Trial Transcript, February 15, 2001. Pages 829-830.

¹⁸ United States v. Usama bin Laden, et al. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (LBS). United States District Court, Southern District of New York. February 6, 2001. Pages 176-177. See also: The 9/11 Commission Report. Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. July 22, 2004. Page 127.

¹⁹ The 9/11 Commission Report. Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. July 22, 2004. Page 56.

²⁰ United States v. Usama bin Laden, et al. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (LBS). United States District Court, Southern District of New York. February 6, 2001. Pages 197-198.

forth.” Abu Ali added, “Sultan told me once, ‘Now, you have become one of us. You can now speak [on] behalf of Al Qaeda.’”²¹

Among the individuals who, over the years, have become notorious members, partners, and commanders of Al-Qaida include the following:

- **Ibn Shaykh al-Liby (a.k.a. Ali Abdul-Hamid al-Fakhiri)**

Though the Khalden training camp in southeastern Afghanistan was not per se an “al Qaeda facility,” camp manager Abu Zubaydah “had an agreement with Bin Ladin to conduct reciprocal recruiting efforts whereby promising trainees at the camps could be invited to join al Qaeda.”²² While Abu Zubaydah controlled which recruits reached the gates of Khalden, it was his deputy Ibn Shaykh al-Liby (also a known associate of Al-Qaida) who was actually in charge of training at Khalden and became “a fount of knowledge about people and operations at Khalden.”²³ Aside from Al-Qaida itself, Ibn Shaykh al-Liby was also connected with the activities of the allied Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). The Libyan government has issued Interpol arrest warrants for at least two individuals, Ashur Abdullah al-Shamis and Mohammed Yusuf al-Miqariyaf, who reportedly held “several meetings with Ibn-al-Shaykh al-Libi in Jalalabad, Afghanistan along with a group of extremist terrorist elements for the purpose of planning terrorist operations.”²⁴

A significant number of LIFG recruits received military training under the lead of Ibn Shaykh al-Liby at the Khalden Camp in Afghanistan—among them, accused LIFG activist Omar Deghayes. Deghayes, a Libyan living in the United Kingdom, fled his homeland in 1986 after his father was allegedly killed by members of the Qadhafi regime. After becoming a law student at a British university, Deghayes traveled abroad with a friend to Malaysia, Pakistan and eventually to Afghanistan—where he allegedly received training at the Khalden military camp in 1999.²⁵ Deghayes was later captured in Pakistan, accused of being an operative on behalf of Al-Qaida and the LIFG, and subsequently held by the U.S. government as an enemy combatant in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

- **Abu Khabab al-Masri (a.k.a. Midhat Mursi al-Sayyid Umar)**

²¹ Saudi General Directorate for Investigation interview of Ahmed Omar Abu Ali. June 11, 2003. United States v. Ahmed Omar Abu Ali. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Case No: 1:05CR53. Government Exhibit 25S.

²² The 9/11 Commission Report. Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. July 22, 2004. Page 500.

²³ Gillan, Audrey and Julian Borger. “Shoe bomb Briton named as key agent in Bin Laden’s network.” The Guardian (London). January 17, 2002.

²⁴ “Interpol Wanted Request for Muhammad Yusuf al-Miqariyaf.” Libyan Justice Ministry. <http://www.libjust.com/details6.htm>. January 5, 2002.

²⁵ “Testimony of Detainees and Documents Submitted on their behalf before the Administrative Review Boards.” U.S. Defense Department Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) and Administrative Review Board (ARB) documents released on April 3, 2006. Page 20888. http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt/ARB_Transcript_Set_8_20751-21016.pdf.

Abu Khabab, an Egyptian national, was a notorious explosives and chemical weapons expert working on behalf of Al-Qaida. Within the Derunta complex in eastern Afghanistan, Abu Khabab reputedly ran his own small camp dedicated to teaching the arts of non-conventional warfare. On July 30, 2008, Al-Qaida released a statement from senior Al-Qaida leader Mustafa Abu al-Yazid acknowledging the “martyrdom” of Abu Khabab al-Masri in a U.S. airstrike targeting a lawless region of northwestern Pakistan. According to the communiqué, the airstrike also killed Abu Mohammed Ibrahim Bin Abu al-Faraj al-Masri, the son of the former Chief Shariah Judge of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad Movement. The document further threatened, “Although Abu Khabab has departed from us, he has left behind him-by the mercy and grace of Allah-a generation of honorable young men who will cause you torment and avenge him and his brothers, with the support of Allah. Although an expert has left us, he has left in his wake-thanks to Allah-new experts who have trained under him and learned from him over the years to volunteer, to sacrifice, and to be patient and tolerant on the path of righteousness.”²⁶

- **Abu Mohammed al-Masri (a.k.a. Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah, “Saleh”)**

Abu Mohammed al-Masri, an Egyptian national, is a longtime senior member of Al-Qaida, a former training camp instructor in Afghanistan, and is among the most wanted Al-Qaida terrorist suspects currently at large. He was among those senior Al-Qaida members indicted in the Southern District of New York in 1999 as a result of his involvement in the August 1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania—personally charged with the murder of US nationals outside the United States; conspiracy to murder US nationals outside the United States; attack on a federal facility resulting in death; conspiracy to kill US nationals, to murder, to destroy buildings and property of the United States, and to destroy national defense utilities of the United States.

During sworn testimony in the subsequent trial, former Al-Qaida member Jamal al-Fadl described meeting Abu Mohammed al-Masri at the Jihad Wal training camp in Afghanistan: “He one of the people trained in the same camp with Abu Jaffar and Salem el Masry and Haydor Dosari... he give the training... He’s very good with explosives.”²⁷ Later, during the same trial, another former Al-Qaida recruit—Moroccan national L’Houssaine Kherchtou—likewise recalled meeting Abu Mohammed during his time with the group: “before he joined he had told me that he was a soccer player in Egypt and he was playing in a professional team in Egypt.”²⁸ Kherchtou claimed that the Egyptian had helped manage Al-Qaida’s media committee, and was even part of the Al-Qaida delegation which traveled to Somalia in the early 1990s in order to assist Somali militants with their confrontation against the United States: “They were working

²⁶ July 30, 2008.

²⁷ United States v. Usama bin Laden, et al. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (LBS). United States District Court, Southern District of New York. February 6, 2001. Pages 186-187.

²⁸ United States v. Usama bin Laden, et al. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (LBS). United States District Court, Southern District of New York. February 21, 2001. Page 1127.

in Somalia. They were training people of Somalia.²⁹ The U.S. government is currently offering up to a \$5 million reward for information leading to the capture and conviction of Abu Mohammed al-Masri.³⁰

- **Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (a.k.a. “Al-Mukhtar”)**

Despite claims of total deference to top Saudi commander Usama Bin Laden, Arab-Afghan mujahideen groups and individual commanders often had varying relationships with Bin Laden and his advisors. It was fairly common for veteran Arab-Afghan disciples to work interchangeably with Bin Laden and Al-Qaida—even if they preferred to remain independent of the confines of Bin Laden’s inner circle. Among the most important such “fellow travelers” employed by Bin Laden between 1993 and 2002 was Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the admitted mastermind behind the 9/11 suicide hijackings. KSM grew up in Kuwait, but his family is originally from the region of Baluchistan straddling Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran. In early 1987, he traveled to Pakistan seeking to fight in the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan. According to Azzam Publications (the Al-Qaida propaganda outlet run by Londoner Babar Ahmad):

“[I]t is well known that Khalid Ash-Sheikh Muhammad was a Mujahid known for his piety, who joined the Mujahideen in Afghanistan almost 20 years ago, along with his two brothers, Abid and Zahid Ash-Sheikh. All three brothers worked closely with Sheikh Abdullah Azzam [the founder of Al-Qaida and Bin Laden’s spiritual mentor] in the Afghan Jihad in the 1980’s and consequently, Sheikh Abdullah Azzam often mentioned these three brothers, by name, in his lectures and books. After Abid Ash-Sheikh was martyred by a land-mine in an operation on Jalalabad Airport, Sheikh Abdullah Azzam wrote about him in his book, Ushaaq-ul-Hoor (Lovers of the Paradise Maidens), as a pious man who used to complete the Quran in seven days following the way of the Companions.”³¹

Thus, for KSM, involvement in the Arab-Afghan jihad was a respected family affair. His brother Zahid was director of the Kuwaiti “Dawah Committee” underwriting the needs of the Arab-Afghan mujahideen in Pakistan. Abid worked for the Arab-Afghan propaganda magazine Al-Bunyan Al-Marsous and served as a key advisor to Afghan mujahid Sheikh Abdul Rasool Sayyaf—becoming “his shadow which never left his side.”³² In fact, according to Azzam Publications, “whenever the battle intensified, and Sheikh Sayyaf headed towards it, you would find him surrounded by his pillars which never left him: Khalid [Sheikh

²⁹ United States v. Usama bin Laden, et al. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (LBS). United States District Court, Southern District of New York. February 21, 2001. Pages 1127; 1173.

³⁰ <http://www.rewardsforjustice.net/index.cfm?page=Abdullah&language=english>

³¹ Azzam Publications. “What Sheikh Abdullah Azzam said about Khalid Ash-Sheikh Muhammad.” Azzam Publications news update carried by IslamicAwakening.com. <http://www.as-sahwah.com/discus/messages/3079/3079.html>. March 4, 2003.

³² Azzam Publications. “What Sheikh Abdullah Azzam said about Khalid Ash-Sheikh Muhammad.” Azzam Publications news update carried by IslamicAwakening.com. <http://www.as-sahwah.com/discus/messages/3079/3079.html>. March 4, 2003.

Mohammed], Abid and sometimes Zahid.”³³ Sayyaf allowed KSM to enroll in military training courses at the Al-Sadda camp. In 1988, Al-Sadda was described in the founding minutes of Al-Qaida as an “open camp” from which the best “brothers” would be selected to join the new terrorist organization.³⁴

In approximately 1999, Usama Bin Laden placed KSM in charge of managing Al-Qaida’s overseas terrorist operations. Soon thereafter, he proposed the concept behind what would eventually become the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. Interviewed by Al-Jazeera reporter Yosri Fouda in the summer of 2002, KSM freely acknowledged, “I am the head of the al Qaida military committee and Ramzi [Binalshibh] is the coordinator of the ‘Holy Tuesday’ operation.”³⁵ With regards to 9/11, he calmly explained to Fouda, “We had a large surplus of brothers willing to die as martyrs. As we studied various targets, nuclear facilities arose as a key option.”³⁶ In March 2003, KSM was captured by security forces in Pakistan and is currently being held as a detainee at the U.S. military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

- **Ramzi bin al Shibh (a.k.a. Abu Ubaidah al-Hadrami)**

Ramzi bin al Shibh is a Yemeni national and the “coordinator” of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. In September 2006, Al-Qaida’s official media wing—the As-Sahab Media Foundation—released video footage of Bin al Shibh meeting with senior Al-Qaida leaders—including Abu Hafs al-Masri and Usama Bin Laden himself—inside Afghanistan. As the footage was shown, an unidentified As-Sahab narrator explained that Bin Laden had “personally supervised all stages of” 9/11—“even keeping tabs on the stage which the team of pilots had reached, through the coordinator of the attacks, Abu Ubaidah—Ramzi bin al-Shibh.”³⁷ During an interview with Al-Jazeera journalist Yosri Fouda in the summer of 2002, bin al Shibh recounted receiving a phone call from 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta advising him of the date that the attacks would take place: “He [Atta] said, ‘Two sticks, a dash and a cake with a stick down.’ ‘What is it?’ I said, ‘Did you wake me up to tell me this puzzle?’ As it turns out, two sticks is the number 11, and a dash is a dash and a cake with a stick down is the number 9. And that was September 11.” Bin al Shibh described watching the events of 9/11 with other Al-Qaida members on television: “The brothers shouted, Allah-u-Akbar, thanks to God, and cried. Everyone thought that this was the only

³³ Azzam Publications. “What Sheikh Abdullah Azzam said about Khalid Ash-Sheikh Muhammad.”

Azzam Publications news update carried by IslamicAwakening.com. <http://www.as-sahwah.com/discus/messages/3079/3079.html>. March 4, 2003.

³⁴ Government’s Response to Defendant’s Position Paper as to Sentencing Factors.” United States of America v. Enaam M. Arnaout. United States District Court Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division. Case #: 02 CR 892. Page 38.

³⁵ Fouda, Yosri. “Top Secret: The Road to September 11.” Al-Jazeera (Qatar). First aired: September 11, 2002.

³⁶ Fouda, Yosri. “Top Secret: The Road to September 11.” Al-Jazeera (Qatar). First aired: September 11, 2002.

³⁷ As-Sahab Media Foundation. “Knowledge is for Acting Upon.” <http://www.alhesbah.org/v/showthread.php?t=84585>. September 10, 2006.

operation. We said to them, ‘Wait, wait.’ Suddenly our brother Marwan was violently ramming the plane into the [World Trade Center] in an unbelievable manner! We were watching live and praying: ‘God ... aim ... aim ... aim.’”³⁸ In September 2002, bin al Shibh was captured by security forces in Pakistan and he is currently being held as a detainee at the U.S. military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

- **Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (a.k.a. Ahmed al-Khalayleh)**

Tanzim al-Qaida in Iraq (a.k.a. the Al-Qaida Organization in Iraq) was officially established on October 17, 2004.³⁹ It was formed as a continuation of a previous extremist organization known as the “Tawheed wal-Jihad Movement”, which itself was created by Jordanian national Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in response to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Zarqawi was a veteran of the jihad in Afghanistan, where he had crossed paths with Usama Bin Laden and other senior Al-Qaida and Taliban leaders. The primary purpose of Zarqawi’s organization was to overthrow the nascent Iraqi democratic government, remove the foreign occupation of Iraq, and replace them with a radical Sunni Islamist regime run by Al-Qaida. In order to achieve these goals, Tanzim al-Qaida in Iraq and its leadership have relied primarily on extreme manifestations of violence as their modus operandi—including, most notably, suicide bombings. From November 2004 until his death in June 2006, Zarqawi became a highly visible icon for second and third-generation terrorist sympathizers and recruits. In May 2004, Italian police monitored a suspected Egyptian terrorist recruiter in Milan as he played a video of Zarqawi decapitating U.S. hostage Nicholas Berg for a suicide bomber-in-training. The Egyptian excitedly crowed, “This is the policy we need to follow, the policy of the sword. Come and see our brother Abu Musab [al-Zarqawi]... This is the policy. Allahu Akhbar, Allahu Akhbar. Allahu Akhbar. Go to hell, the enemy of Allah. Kill him, kill him. Yes, like that, slaughter him well, cut his head off... Everyone must end up like this.”⁴⁰

Aside from these military figures, there is also a more expansive network of radical clerics around the world who have provided significant philosophical and material support to Al-Qaida and Usama Bin Laden. That support has taken the form of providing public endorsements, gathering financial donations, mounting recruitment drives, and even performing essential logistical tasks on behalf of the mujahideen. Among some of the most important figures within this network of clerics are the following:

- **Shaykh Omar Abdel Rahman**

For the length of their existence, Shaykh Omar Abdel Rahman (also known as the Blind Shaykh) has served as the joint spiritual leader of the two

³⁸ Fouda, Yosri. “Top Secret: The Road to September 11.” *Al-Jazeera* (Qatar). First aired: September 11, 2002.

³⁹ <http://www.ansarnet.ws/vb/showthread.php?t=17282>. October 17, 2004.

⁴⁰ <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/front/etc/rabei.html>. January 2005.

leading terrorist organizations in Egypt, the Islamic Jihad and Al-Gama`at al-Islamiyya.⁴¹ In October 1995, Rahman was convicted in U.S. federal court of seditious conspiracy for inspiring a series of terrorist plots in the New York metropolitan area, including the February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center.⁴² The Blind Shaykh is currently serving a life sentence at a maximum security federal penitentiary.

In response to the U.S. missile strikes on Al-Qaida training camps in Afghanistan in August 1998, Shaykh Omar Abdel Rahman issued a new fatwah from inside his American jail cell urging new recruits to join the cause: “Oh, Muslims everywhere! Cut the transportation of their countries, tear it apart, destroy their economy, burn their companies, eliminate their interests, sink their ships, shoot down their planes, kill them on the sea, air, or land. Kill them when you find them, take them and encircle them, paralyze their every post.”⁴³ Al-Qaida terrorist Ahmed Ressam, who was convicted for a failed bomb plot in Los Angeles on the eve of the Millennium, later recalled Abdel Rahman’s fatwah distributed widely at the Khalden and Derunta training camps in Afghanistan. According to Ressam, the flyer had Rahman’s photo on it and “it said it was a fatwah by Omar Abdel Rahman from prison. It says fight Americans and hit their interest everywhere.”⁴⁴

In September 2000, a new videotape mysteriously surfaced of Bin Laden and other terrorist leaders meeting in Afghanistan apparently for the wedding of Bin Laden’s son Saad. The tape—which was widely aired on Arabic-language satellite television networks and by ABC News in the United States—included a speech by Bin Laden himself, who and promised “to work with all our power to free our brother, Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, and all our prisoners in America, Egypt, and Riyadh.” Other speakers on the tape indicated that the time had come for Muslims to “move forward and shed blood.”⁴⁵

- **Abu Hamza al-Masri (a.k.a. Mustafa Kamel)**

Abu Hamza al-Masri is an exiled fundamentalist dissident originally from Alexandria, Egypt currently residing in the United Kingdom. Over the years, Abu Hamza has become a legendary figure in the world of jihad and the mujahideen, and is widely admired and respected by English-speaking extremists around the world. Prior to his arrest by British authorities in 2004, Abu Hamza operated an organization in the United Kingdom known as the “Supporters of Shariah” (a.k.a. SOS, Ansar al-Shareeah), which admitted on its former website to supporting “the Mujahideen... in, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kashmir, etc.,” including recruiting and

⁴¹ The 9/11 Commission Report. Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. July 22, 2004. Page 56.

⁴² The 9/11 Commission Report. Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. July 22, 2004. Page 72.

⁴³ Excerpted from the will and testament of Shaykh Omar Abdel Rahman, written in an American prison cell. *Al-Minhaj*. Page 27. <http://www.badr.com>. Dated: 1997.

⁴⁴ Direct Examination of Ahmed Ressam. United States v. Mokhtar Haouari. United States District Court Southern District of New York. Case: 00CR15. June 27-July 6, 2001. Page 552.

⁴⁵ Cooley, John. “We will free our brothers!” ABC News. September 25, 2000.

aiding “front line soldiers.”⁴⁶ During the mid-1990s, Abu Hamza maintained a close relationship with several illicit terrorist networks—including the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA), which he aided by coordinating fundraising efforts and publishing their “Al-Ansaar” Newsletter.⁴⁷ One of Abu Hamza al-Masri’s best known written works in the English-language is the book Khawaarij & Jihad, which tells the inside story behind the founding of the GIA in Algeria by mujahideen veterans returning from Afghanistan, and the group’s eventual downfall due to corruption and infighting. The book Khawaarij & Jihad includes a detailed history of the GIA’s local activities on at least three continents, and even copies of actual Arabic-language communiqués issued by the GIA in 1995 and 1996.

Abu Hamza’s own son and step-son, were convicted in 1999 in a Yemeni court for taking part in an attempted bombing conspiracy against “un-Islamic” targets in that country.⁴⁸ Also that year, the militant cleric was profiled in a British documentary by reporter Deborah Davies. One of his sermons cited in the documentary was a call for Muslims to “get training” in order to “get the [infidel] and crush his head in your arms, so you can wring his throat, so you can whip his intestines out. That’s why you are doing training... to rip the people to pieces. Forget wasting a bullet on them... cut them in half!”⁴⁹ In the same video, Abu Hamza is shown at a conference explaining a diagram for the “Muslim Anti-Aircraft Net,” a design for a floating net laced with mines intended to randomly entrap and destroy civilian passenger aircraft in Great Britain and the U.S.⁵⁰ In a later press release about the conference, SOS representatives explained that the anti-aircraft grid was:

“designed by our Brothers in Afghanistan. These nets will increase the hazard and risk to flying, and are a response to the destructive inventions of the infidel West... These nets, if mass produced, can cost less than £10, and are undetected by radar. They can be launched from any point, and move to anywhere in the world. We urge all brothers and sisters to also begin thinking of designs and techniques such as these, because the time for talking has long since passed.”⁵¹

The eccentric Abu Hamza received his nickname “Le Manchot” from injuries that have left him, among other things, with no hands and an austere metal hook in their place. Although the bearded cleric does not like discussing how those wounds occurred, French intelligence concluded that they were the result of his handling explosives in Afghanistan. In the immediate wake of the September 11th suicide hijackings, Abu Hamza offered a sermon at the Finsbury Park Mosque in London titled “The World Trade Series: The Believers vs. the

⁴⁶ <http://www.ummah.net/sos>

⁴⁷ Al-Masri, Abu Hamza. Khawaarij & Jihad. Maktabah al-Ansar Publications; Birmingham, UK. ©2000. Page 90.

⁴⁸ Carroll, Rory. “Terrorists or Tourists?” The Guardian. June 26, 1999.

⁴⁹ Davies, Deborah. “Kill or be Killed.” Dispatches. Channel 4 UK. 1999.

⁵⁰ Davies, Deborah. “Kill or be Killed.” Dispatches. Channel 4 UK. 1999.

⁵¹ Supporters of Shariah (SOS) Newsletter. Vol. 2; Issue 2. March/April 1999.

[Infidelity] of America.”⁵² To a rapt audience, he thundered, “Terrorism is a tool for everybody to get his way. And it has also been a tool for Islam... It is a tool, it is a weapon. Allah said, to terrorize the enemies of Allah and your enemies, it is a weapon, and it is a very effective weapon. And if you leave this weapon, then Allah’s destruction and wrath will be upon you.”⁵³ In February 2006, Abu Hamza al-Masri was found guilty in a UK court of six charges of soliciting to murder, two charges of using abusive language to incite racial hatred, and an additional Terrorism Act charge for his possession of the “Encyclopedia of Jihad.”

- **Shaykh Faisal al-Jamaiki**

Shaykh Abdullah al-Faisal, who comes originally from the West Indies, studied Islam and Arabic Language at Ibn Saud University in Riyadh for eight years. He was a student in Riyadh under a variety of other Sheikhs, including Abdullah Hakim Quick, Abdul Wahabb Tariri, Abdullah Tuwaijree, Sheikh Ibn Jibrn, and Nassir Amr. Since graduating in 1991, he has conducted regular prayer and Islamic discussion circles in London.⁵⁴ In February 2003, Abdullah al-Faisal was convicted in a U.K. court on charges of “soliciting to murder,” defined as “encouraging, persuading, endeavoring to persuade or proposing to any person to murder any other person.” The charges stemmed from lectures given by the militant cleric in which he openly called upon his followers to kill Americans, Jews, Hindus, and other perceived “enemies of Islam.”⁵⁵

One of the more notorious recordings attributed to Shaykh Faisal is titled, “Jihad: Aims and Objectives.” The tape features Shaykh Faisal lecturing to his audience that “jihad is here to make people come into the fold of Islam in multitudes... because who wants to take sides with weak, who wants to be with the losers? But when you have dignity, the power, you the Muslims will rule the country. You will call the shots. People will do what you say. The power is in your hands. Then people will rush into Islam in multitudes. So you are giving dawa [missionary work] here in the UK, and people are coming, but they are coming in slowly but surely. If you should conquer, you will see thousands, millions will take shahada in one day. One million will take shahada in one day! This is, this is Islamic history. So we shouldn't be doing dawa. We should be doing jihad. Ideally, we should be doing jihad, we shouldn't be doing dawa.” Faisal then continued to explain that “another aim and objective of jihad is to drive terror in the hearts of the [infidels]... to terrorize them. Did you know that we were commanded in the Qur`an with terrorism? ...another aim and objective of jihad is to kill the [infidels]... Allah [said], it is not right for a Prophet to have captives until he makes the Earth warm with blood... So when we wage jihad, no

⁵² “World Trade Series – ‘The Believers vs. the Kufr of America.’” Friday Khutba given by Abu Hamza Al-Masri at the Finsbury Park Mosque.

⁵³ “World Trade Series – ‘The Believers vs. the Kufr of America.’” Friday Khutba given by Abu Hamza Al-Masri at the Finsbury Park Mosque.

⁵⁴ Al Quds Audiovision. “Who is Sheikh Faisal?” <http://www.islamicjihad.com/sheikh/index.html>.

⁵⁵ <http://www.guardian.co.uk/race/story/0,11374,902009,00.html>.

captives, we don't take captives. We don't have money to feed them. It is a waste of money. And we can't be bothered to transport them, they are an extra burden. No captives, we just kill them and wash our hands from the problem." On the same tape, Faisal suggested that oppressed Muslims join the jihad by committing bank robberies, specifically in Switzerland, and "so, if you are suffering from poverty, wage jihad and you will see the wealth coming in your hands."⁵⁶

III.) Basic Al-Qaida Tradecraft

In order to successfully complete its military operations against the United States, a new generation of Al-Qaida footsoldiers would need to be trained and indoctrinated. Starting in 1988, Al-Qaida-linked mujahideen factions established a host of jihad training camps in Muslim "hot spots" such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chechnya, and the Philippines. Inside Afghanistan, between 1988 and 2001, Al-Qaida and affiliated jihadist movements built a host of military training camps. Though not all of these camps were officially controlled by Al-Qaida, likeminded training camp managers had agreements with Bin Laden to conduct reciprocal recruiting efforts and exchange programs.⁵⁷

- The Al-Farouq camp was a widely-known facility west of Kandahar in southern Afghanistan where new jihadist recruits could receive basic training. At least seven Saudi nationals who later served as suicide hijackers in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks received their "basic training" at Al-Farouq. According to the Congressional 9/11 Commission, "[t]his particular camp appears to have been the preferred location for vetting and training the potential muscle hijackers because of its proximity to Bin Ladin and senior al Qaeda leadership."⁵⁸ Recruits at Al-Farouq were given regular lectures by Usama Bin Laden and other Al-Qaida commanders outlining Al-Qaida's desire for a military confrontation with the United States.
- Closer to the heart of Taliban power, Tarnak Farms—a key Al-Qaida compound consisting of roughly 80 concrete or mud-brick buildings surrounded by a 10-foot wall—was located in an isolated area on the outskirts of the Kandahar airport.⁵⁹
- The Khalden Camp, run under the watchful eye of Al-Qaida associate Ibn Shaykh al-Liby, consisted of approximately 100 men divided into cells of between six and fourteen recruits each. The Khalden regimen included training in rocket launchers and the fabrication of explosives. Cells were taught to exist and operate independently of any central command structure. According to captured Al-

⁵⁶ Faisal, Shaykh Abdullah. "Jihad: Its Aims and Objectives." Audiocassette obtained from Al-Quds Audiovisions. <http://www.islamicjihad.com>.

⁵⁷ The 9/11 Commission Report. Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. July 22, 2004. Page 500.

⁵⁸ The 9/11 Commission Report. Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. July 22, 2004. Page 234.

⁵⁹ The 9/11 Commission Report. Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. July 22, 2004. Pages 111-112.

Qaida operatives, students at Khalden learned “how to blow up the infrastructure of a country”, including public utilities, airports, railroads, hotels, and large corporations—“we were speaking about America as an enemy of Islam.”⁶⁰

- Located northwest of Jalalabad, the Derunta Complex consisted of several smaller camps run by a collection of Al-Qaida members and associates, including, Abu Musab al-Suri (a.k.a. Mustafa Setmariam Nasar) and Abu Khabab al-Masri (a.k.a. Midhat Mursi). According to militants who enrolled in courses at Derunta, the training lasted for approximately thirty days and included everything from instruction on small arms to explosives and the use of toxic chemicals. Advanced classes were held at Derunta demonstrating the use of poisons, including experiments with cyanide on dogs. The purpose of the chemical training offered at Derunta was to prepare for the assassination of prominent world leaders and intelligence agents.⁶¹

Prior to reaching the training camps themselves, prospective recruits would first be evaluated and registered at mujahideen-run guesthouses along the route. Former Al-Qaida member Jamal al-Fadl later recounted his own journey to Peshawar, Pakistan in order to enroll at a jihadi training camp in Afghanistan:

“We went to the hotel for two days and somebody come, he give us a little lecture about what going inside the war and about jihad and about [Al-Qaida]... He tell us about [Al-Qaida], if you go inside what you have to do, and what going on inside Afghanistan. And you have to go inside the guesthouse first to put all your stuff. And when you go to the guesthouse, you go to take your passport, your documents, your money and [they] save it for you... when you go inside... We went after that, we went to the guesthouse and we give them -- each one, he gives them his stuff and they put it in envelope and they give you nickname... Nickname mean when you go for training or you go inside Afghanistan you not going to use your true name, you going to use a nickname for that and you choose your nickname... They say for security.”⁶²

The typical form for such a nickname, or “Kunya”, begins with “Abu” (or “Father of”) and ends with a tribal or regional name that identifies the bearer’s geographic origin. For instance, the name of Al-Qaida’s former military chief Abu Hafis al-Masri means “Father of Hafis from Egypt.” The names are chosen for a multitude of reasons. Literally speaking, if a mujahid has a son named Omar, he may call himself Abu Omar (meaning “Father of Omar”). If a mujahid has no children, he may name himself in honor of the Sahaba, or the faithful companions of the Prophet Mohammed. For example, Abu Bakr [al something] adopted the kunya of the first successor as caliph to the Prophet Mohammed. Alternatively, other mujahideen recruits—such as Usama Bin Laden’s cousin Abu Zubair al-Madani (from Medina, Saudi Arabia)—have named themselves in honor of fallen comrades from the Afghan jihad. Still others have instead fashioned their

⁶⁰ Cross-examination of Ahmed Ressam. United States v. Mokhtar Haouari. United States District Court Southern District of New York. Case: 00CR15. June 27-July 6, 2001. *Page 626*.

⁶¹ Cross-examination of Ahmed Ressam. United States v. Mokhtar Haouari. United States District Court Southern District of New York. Case: 00CR15. June 27-July 6, 2001. *Page 626*.

⁶² United States v. Usama bin Laden, et al. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (LBS). United States District Court, Southern District of New York. February 6, 2001. Pages 170-171.

own *nomme-de-guerre* based upon simple Arabic-language expressions, such as Al-Qaida Shura Council member Saif al-Adel – whose name literally means in Arabic “Sword of Justice.” For reasons of operational security, it is not uncommon for one individual to use several such pseudonyms interchangeably.

According to a document recovered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) from the computer of Usama Bin Laden’s personal secretary Wadih el-Hage, the prototypical Al-Qaida terrorist cell is divided into four specialized subgroups: the Headquarters group (*Qeyada*), the Information group (*Ma’loomat*), the Preparation group (*Tajheez*), and the Execution group (*Tanfееz*). Each group, even the Headquarters group, is ideally supposed to know as little as possible about other groups within its cell.⁶³ The groups communicate strictly with the HQ group, and even then solely through the use of anonymous dropboxes in order to prevent detection by law enforcement authorities. The “Headquarters group” is the local executive command authority that “leads and organizes operations in one sector”, consisting of “very well trained persons, [who] have experience in the work of the other groups, [and are] capable of working by themselves to plan for operations from scratch.” The “Information group” specializes in surveillance, espionage, communication, and electronic intelligence. The “Preparation group” is responsible for arranging “weapons, documents, money, safe houses, transportation, logistics, and so on.” Finally, the “Execution group” represents the offensive power of a given Al-Qaida terrorist cell.⁶⁴

For those recruits who have been unable to reach training camps at mujahideen frontlines in places like Chechnya, Afghanistan, or Iraq—or for those who merely need a refresher course—a variety of jihadi or mujahideen organizations have setup temporary basic training camps in countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States. In December 1992, Afghan jihad veteran Rodney Clement Hampton-El visited the Saudi embassy in Washington D.C. in order to solicit contributions to setup mujahideen training camps for preparing recruits headed to the jihad in Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to co-conspirator Siddig Ali, “we told them, ‘Brothers, [we] want to establish a camp here.’”⁶⁵ Between December 1992 and January 1993, Siddig Ali, Hampton-El, and their would-be squad of “ten or twelve” American mujahideen retreated a makeshift camp in rural New Bloomfield, Pennsylvania, where they were educated in the “firing of semi-automatic assault rifles, commando style shooting exercises, intense physical fitness training, hand-to-hand combat techniques, martial arts instruction, pepper mace training, and mock nighttime assaults on a nearby electric power substation.” The men were protected and armed by a sympathetic U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services Officer—a Muslim convert himself—who was told that “they wanted the paramilitary training so they could fight as mercenaries in Bosnia.”⁶⁶ Siddig Ali boasted

⁶³ United States of America v. Usama bin Laden et al. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (LBS). United States District Court, Southern District of New York. Government Exhibit GX-355.

⁶⁴ United States of America v. Usama bin Laden et al. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (LBS). United States District Court, Southern District of New York. Government Exhibit GX-355.

⁶⁵ FBI Transcript of conversation between Emad Salem and Siddig Ibrahim Siddig Ali. United States v. Omar Ahmad Ali Abdel Rahman et al. S3 93 Cr. 181(MBM). Government Exhibit 641-1T. Page 19; 28-29.

⁶⁶ “PRESS RELEASE.” Statement by U.S. Attorney David M. Barasch on the conditional plea of Kelvin E. Smith. U.S. Department of Justice; Office of the United States Attorney for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. September 30, 1998.

to his friends of what had transpired during the months spent in New Bloomfield: “So the people were dropping out. I mean, the people that were out of shape. [We had] a strict instructor, brother. He applies, he applies, he applies the doctrine, which is the Marines’ program on these people... [b]ut what a team, oh my God... [t]hey become one of the best brothers.”⁶⁷ In another wiretapped conversation, Siddig clarified, “we are supposed to train people—training, train/people... troops.”⁶⁸

On February 26, 2008, following a four-month criminal trial, five men were found guilty in a British court of participating in terrorist training inside the borders of the United Kingdom. The men were known adherents of the Finsbury Park Mosque in London, and were close associates of Abu Hamza’s top deputy at the mosque Atilla Ahmet. At the time of their arrest, the men were found in possession of video clips recorded with a mobile phone showing members of the group engaged in a makeshift terrorist training course in the New Forest region in late April and early May 2006. The footage included members of the group shown “crawling in a line on their stomachs... Upon the instruction of Hamid shouting, ‘Off you go’, appears to show the others how to do a forward roll and pick up a stick from the ground before doing a further two forward rolls.”⁶⁹ According to the London Metropolitan Police Service, these training sessions actually took place on a repeated series of occasions throughout the spring and summer of 2006. Recruits “were instructed to leopard crawl through a swampy patch, taught how to raise off the ground whilst holding a gun. They also had races on their knees, frog walking with a man on their backs, sit ups and press ups. They had to jump over a 4 foot fence and figure out the fastest way of getting everyone over in case they were being chased or shot at. Hamid said that he had been running training camps for 7 years and that... this was not designed to just be running around in the woods having fun, but that training was in preparation for something similar to jihad. He said that he wanted them to be focused and make it as real as possible... He was proud to tell the others that they were learning manoeuvres whilst camping.”⁷⁰

Alternatively, Al-Qaida and other mujahideen organizations have also worked to document the various lessons within their training regimen into formal, written manuscripts—perhaps most notably, the so-called “Encyclopedia of Jihad.” The second “electronic printing” of the Encyclopedia, released in 2003, opens with a question that has been asked by many would-be mujahideen unable to reach the training camps: “how can we undertake the duty of Jihad, when we are in this condition of weakness, division and powerlessness?” The Encyclopedia duly responds, “The answer to the previous question is that fulfilling the duty of Jihad comes through preparation.”⁷¹ Such training

⁶⁷ FBI Transcript of conversation between Emad Salem and Siddig Ibrahim Siddig Ali. United States v. Omar Ahmad Ali Abdel Rahman et al. S3 93 Cr. 181(MBM). Government Exhibit 641-1T. *Pages 19-21.*

⁶⁸ FBI Transcript of conversation between Emad Salem and Siddig Ibrahim Siddig Ali. United States v. Omar Ahmad Ali Abdel Rahman et al. S3 93 Cr. 181(MBM). Government Exhibit 309-T. May 19, 1993. *Pages 13-14.*

⁶⁹ London Metropolitan Police Service; Directorate of Public Affairs. “R v. Hamid and others: Training and meetings.” Operation Overamp. February 2008.

⁷⁰ London Metropolitan Police Service; Directorate of Public Affairs. “R v. Hamid and others: Timeline 2004-Present.” Operation Overamp. February 2008.

⁷¹ Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban); Services Office, Camps and Fronts Command. “The Encyclopedia of Jihad.” Second Electronic Printing; 1424 (2004).

manuals instruct readers on how to fabricate explosives, create a suicide bomb vest, shoot down civilian aircraft, and assassinate prominent world leaders.

By 2003, amidst a global law enforcement clampdown on suspected terrorists, the constantly-evolving Internet was virtually the only means of communication with the necessary reach and ability to transmit such illicit material. The Internet also offered Al-Qaida a unique medium through which it could safely interface with potential operatives without immediately compromising both the recruits and recruiters (as had happened previously when using fax machines and satellite telephones). As FBI Director Robert Mueller recently acknowledged during a speech before an audience at the Council on Foreign Relations, “the information age means you don’t need training camps to become a terrorist; all you need is an Internet connection. The web is terrorism’s new frontier, offering both persuasive inspiration and practical instruction.”⁷² In fact, these “homegrown” terrorist cells come at essentially zero cost to Al-Qaida. They are often fanatically loyal to the public orders of Al-Qaida military commanders like Usama Bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Moreover, they are already placed in (and are familiar with) far-off countries which are prime targets for Al-Qaida terrorist attacks. Rather than struggling as an organization to infiltrate U.S. homeland security with highly-trained human operatives who can be easily thwarted, Al-Qaida can instead spread uncontrolled like an ideological movement—brainwashing sympathetic fanatics around the world who, if properly motivated, might stand at a chance of achieving deadly results all on their own. By abandoning the strict hierarchical system favored early on by Bin Laden and adopting a more flexible and decentralized approach, Al-Qaida has been granted access to a much greater range of potential “undiscovered young talent” who can be mobilized into action using cheap and reasonably secure technologies like the Internet.

Beyond mere written propaganda and explicit training manuals, influential Al-Qaida commanders have also used the Internet in other ways designed to incite sympathetic individuals to form “homegrown” terrorist networks—most notably, with sophisticated digital video recordings (which are often subtitled in English to specifically reach a Western audience). In a recent public report on homegrown radicalization, the New York Police Department warned of extremist organizations serving as “indoctrination accelerants” by “us[ing]... the English language as well as the internet [to] amplify[y] their message and... resonate with 2nd and 3rd generation Muslims in the West, many of whom speak or read little, if any Arabic.” According to the NYPD, the use of such tactics by a terrorist organization allows it to “successfully recruit, indoctrinate, and train aspiring extremists.”⁷³

IV.) The Islamic Media Center (IMC)

In approximately 2001, a new virtual organization began appearing on the Internet known as the “Islamic Media Center” (a.k.a. Markaz al-Islami al-Ilami). The “Islamic Media Center” (IMC) is a “second tier” jihadi online support group, dedicated to re-

⁷² Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Prepared Remarks by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Robert S. Mueller III. September 28, 2007. http://www.cfr.org/publication/14323/prepared_remarks_by_the_fbis_robert_mueller.html.

⁷³ New York Police Department (NYPD). “Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat.” Prepared by Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt. NYPD Intelligence Division. Page 72.

publishing terrorist propaganda and glorifying the cause of the mujahideen. The IMC is labeled as “second tier” here because it does not appear to have access to newly created original video recordings from current conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Rather, the IMC instead seems to be focused on recycling previously unseen material from older original jihadi video recordings and documents generally created prior to 9/11. As many of these materials are actually quite rare and valuable—and were first disseminated long before the era of the Internet—it would be logical to conclude that the individuals behind the IMC have been privy to the personal libraries of veterans of past mujahideen conflicts that took place during the 1980s and 1990s. For example, consider the July 2004 IMC release of older stock footage of Iraqi Al-Qaida leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The instructions accompanying the recording explained, “the Islamic Media Center is pleased to present to you a video of Zarqawi, may Allah protect him, in cooperation with the Supporters of Shariah.”⁷⁴ Also attached was a Photoshopped image advertising the video as a joint production of the IMC and “Supporters of Shariah” (SOS). SOS is the logistical organization of Abu Hamza al-Masri in London, and is responsible for duplicating and distributing radical sermons by Abu Hamza and a variety of other Salafi-Jihadi clerics and military commanders.

Over the length of its existence, the IMC has perhaps become most infamous for distributing a massive, highly detailed archive of Arabic-language terrorist training manuals over the Internet, many of which have become classic documents in the online world of the mujahideen. The manuals—most of which were originally in printed form and digitally scanned by the IMC—cover an extremely expansive array of topics—everything from plastic explosives, to sniper tactics, chemical weapons, remote detonators, urban warfare techniques, and car bombs. These manuals have been accompanied by painstakingly-detailed color charts created entirely custom by the IMC, which were eventually traded like prized possessions over Arabic and English-language jihadi discussion forums on the Internet.⁷⁵ The various documents produced and released by the IMC are easily the most prolific, detailed, and valuable Arabic-language mujahideen training manuals available on the Internet. Even today, they continue to re-surface on a regular basis on locations spread across the web—and the logo of the IMC has become synonymous with do-it-yourself jihadi instructional guides.⁷⁶

Among the more interesting examples of this phenomena from the IMC are the “Mujahideen Poisons Handbook” and the “Mujahideen Explosives Handbook” by an author who identifies himself only as “Abdel-Aziz.” The “Explosives Handbook” contains a personal foreword from “Abdel Aziz”:

“This book is a copy of my notes during an explosives course with certain ‘terrorist groups’ or ‘freedom fighters’ depending on which side of the fence you sit on. I have not bothered to clean it up as a published book should be, but it is left in a rather messy form, as my notes were at the time. As I was learning from people whose first language was not English, some of the names of chemicals, properties etc. are wrong. Also, do not expect to get the best yields from these mixtures. On the positive side, you can be confident that all the explosive mixtures have been tested and do actually work very adequately. After finishing the course, I moved onto another unit for different training,

⁷⁴ <http://www.qal3ah.net>. July 29, 2004.

⁷⁵ E.g. <http://www.geocities.com/uddat0005/zadalmuheben001.jpg>.

⁷⁶ <http://www.al-faloja.info/vb/showthread.php?t=36021>. November 24, 2008.

where I met the original developer of this course. He informed me that it was several years old, completely out of date and I needed to be updated, which I have been in the process of ever since. For you, I would suggest, that you start with this book if you have nothing else. It will definitely allow you to blow the roof off, but perhaps with less efficiency than a rocket scientist.”⁷⁷

Likewise, the “Poisons Handbook” offers a similar introduction from “Abdel Aziz”:

“This file is dedicated to Breather. May Allah reward him every time it is used in his path and may he help him in his difficulties. ameen. To the Mujahideen of Afghanistan—who lit the flame of jihad in the hearts of every sincere Muslim throughout the world... This book is a copy of Breather’s notes with additions from myself, as we both did the same course. Notes are taken from a poisons course with certain ‘terrorist groups’ or ‘freedom fighters’ depending on which side of the fence you sit on. I have not bothered to clean it up as a published book should be, but it is left in a rather messy form, as my notes were at the time. As I was learning from people whose first language was not English, some of the names of chemicals, properties etc. are wrong. Warning: Be very careful when preparing poisons. It is much, much more dangerous than preparing explosives! I know several Mujahids whose bodies are finished due to poor protection etc. On the positive side, you can be confident that the poisons have actually been tried and tested (successfully, he he!). If you wish to contact me, I can be reached via O.P.M. (Org. for Preparation of Mujahideen).”⁷⁸

The IMC even published a “training course for beginners in the underground mujahideen camps... a special jihadi course, 5 days for initial beginners in the jihadi movement, written by brother Abu al-Khansaa.”⁷⁹ The author explained, “I have written a basic briefing on the method for preparing an underground training camp, in order to graduate groups of brothers who previously lacked any experience in the work of jihad.”⁸⁰ He specified that the camp should be located “very far from the cities, and be located in a mountainous region—meaning totally isolated”:

“The camp must be 30 meters in length and 10 in width, and outside of it must be left to its natural way, and the camp must be chosen in a place thick with trees as it is hard to observe from above, and to be in the bottom of an isolated mountain or valley near a water source... This quick course is necessary to create a beginner mujahid who can move freely in the context of light operations like patrolling, travelling, and killing—meaning that any candidate seeking to become a mujahid doesn’t require much beyond security procedures, lessons in maps, weapons, and other topics that will allow him to move around the battlefield. And if Afghanistan’s camps were open, then it would be better to travel there—but times are tough, so it is inevitable that the camps would be shifted elsewhere—and that the [courses] would be shortened to one week for training all the members, as time is tight for the brothers, and... this type of camp will allow brothers in various countries to open and close one very quickly without raising anyone’s attention or suspicions.”⁸¹

⁷⁷ <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/mojahedoon/files/abdelaziz01.zip>.

⁷⁸ <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/mojahedoon/files/abdelaziz02.zip>.

⁷⁹ <http://www.geocities.com/tadrebatfialjihad10/muaskar.zip>

⁸⁰ <http://www.geocities.com/tadrebatfialjihad10/muaskar.zip>

⁸¹ <http://www.geocities.com/tadrebatfialjihad10/muaskar.zip>

Abu al-Khansaa, the author, boasted, “praise be to Allah, we have established many camps in our countries with brother Abu Khadija, and we greatly benefited from them, because it allowed the brothers to avoid traveling for a long time... The 48-hour course and the 72-hour course [were] written by Abu Khadija, so thanks to him... I wish to publish this course and inscribe [the lessons] in a small booklet which others can benefit from... Thanks to Abu Khadija and Brother Abu ad-Dardaa who gave a lot of help, and thanks to brother Abu Ghareeb from the Office of Preparation who gave advice, and thanks to everyone else who worked on it.”⁸²

Aside from terrorist training manuals, the IMC was also actively engaged in distributing original documents from known terrorist organizations, and video sermons by prominent jihadi clerics. A report published by a Swedish Air Force Major in June 2001 accused the IMC of operating the first known Internet homepage for the GIA in Algeria, with an entire sub-section dedicated solely to “Terrorism.”⁸³ On another temporary web domain, the IMC distributed copies of a lengthy book titled “The Restoration of the Publication of the Believers,” written by Al-Qaida’s Deputy Commander Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri. Curiously, when it was published by the IMC on the web, Zawahiri’s book still carried a printed watermark on the cover from 1996 identifying it as the property of “Muslimska Forsamlingen i Brandbergen, Jungfrugaten 413 N.B.” in the town of Haninge, Sweden.⁸⁴ Another document released separately on the web by the IMC—an original Arabic-language communiqué from the GIA—likewise features the stamp of a nearby postal address in Haninge: “M.A. Box 3027, 136 03, Haninge, Sweden.”⁸⁵ According to the U.S. Treasury Department, Box 3027 in Haninge is the former address of Moroccan national Mohamed Moumou (a.k.a. Abu Qaswarah), who has been blacklisted by the U.S. government as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist.⁸⁶ The Treasury Department has further alleged the following:

“Mohamed Moumou’s extremist activities date back to the mid-1990’s, when he traveled to Afghanistan to participate in the al Qaida-run Khalden terrorist training camp. A Moroccan national with Swedish citizenship, Moumou was the uncontested leader of an extremist group centered around the Brandbergen Mosque in Stockholm, Sweden. Moumou’s leadership derives from connections to senior al Qaida leaders, some of whom he had met in Afghanistan and Pakistan in the late-1990s. Moumou reportedly served, at some time in the past, as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s representative in Europe for issues related to chemical and biological weapons. Moreover, Moumou reportedly maintains ties to al-Zarqawi’s inner circle in Iraq.”⁸⁷

On October 21, 2008, Al-Qaida’s “Islamic State of Iraq” released an audio recording from its top commander Abu Omar al-Baghdadi announcing the “martyrdom” of

⁸² <http://www.geocities.com/tadrebafialjihad10/muaskar.zip>

⁸³ <http://www.zyworld.com/gia/gia.htm>. July 2001. See also: Holmstrom, Mj. Conny.

“Terroristorganisationer på Internet, en möjlighet eller realitet?” Forsvarshogskolan C-uppsats. June 19, 2001. Page 70.

http://www.annalindhbiblioteket.se/publikationer/uppsatser/2001/chp9901/holmstrom_1064.pdf.

⁸⁴ <http://www.geocities.com/doktorayman/ayman.zip>. December 2004.

⁸⁵ <http://qital.8m.com/antar.html>.

⁸⁶ <http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp191.htm>.

⁸⁷ <http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp191.htm>.

Mohamed Moumou. According to al-Baghdadi, at the time of his death, Momou was considered “one of the great figures of the [Islamic] State [of Iraq], one of its great and zealous builders... Abu Qaswarah died as a martyr, this is how we reckon him... after a long journey in the path of Jihad which began in the training camps of Afghanistan... Abu Qaswarah threw away his Swedish citizenship in the dustbin, its glittering crumbs something which many run after. He did not incline to his European wife, or his five children as beautiful as the full moon, rather he parted with them though he loved them much.”⁸⁸

Under the slogan of “Mujahideen Media Support”, the IMC distributed a series of video recordings of sermons given by extreme Salafi clerics known for their support of Al-Qaida—particularly Shaykh Omar Abdel Rahman, Abu Qatada al-Falastini, and Abu Hamza al-Masri. One such recording was of a Friday khutbah from early 2000 delivered by Abu Hamza at the Finsbury Park Mosque in London titled, “Shuhada [Martyrdom] Operations.” Marked with both the logos of the IMC and Abu Hamza’s “Supporters of Shariah” organization, the video opens with several minutes of footage of Al-Qaida recruits practicing with firearms at the Al-Farouq training camp near Kandahar, Afghanistan. Afterwards, Abu Hamza appears and begins to discuss a suicide bombing attack carried out by a young Muslim girl targeting a Russian military base in Chechnya:

“Allah said, it is martyrdom. It is an operation for people, the best people to become martyrs. The best kind of martyrs. They are not only the front of the front. They are at the front where nobody else goes. They are amongst the enemies. They go wherever the first row of the fighters of the mujahideen, they cannot even go themselves. Allah (SWT) encouraged these operations. Allah (SWT) encouraged these operations in the Quran, and asked the believers to go and do it... So, Allah (SWT) is encouraging us to do such operations, because this is the only way that the kaffirs will be terrorized. And we have seen it all in Lebanon. How come America went out of Lebanon? Because of this suicide. A handful of people have forced America to change a key policy—which to protect peace and democracy—they have to run... Even if what you are doing, that you are not going to kill a single kafir. But still, they will never forget such a scene. They will never forget that these people, they have the potential, they can come without any shield, without any protection. Just because they have a hope, they could kill us. These kind of people, you cannot fight them. Because this is how we make reasons for fear in the hearts of the enemies... This kind of method—this kind is more accurate than a laser guided bomb. This is a laser guided mujahid. This is a mujahid which is guided by the belief of Allah. A mujahid which is attracted not by a laser beam—but [who] is attracted by jannah, attracted by paradise.”⁸⁹

Rather than operating one single Internet website, the IMC instead created a host of temporary sites spread across various free web providers—such as Geocities.com, Yahoo.com, 8m.com, 8k.com, and i8.com. Links to relevant training manuals and videos would then be distributed virally over Arabic-language chat rooms, e-mail lists, and discussion forums. One of the IMC’s websites—uddat.8k.com—even made visitors the offer to “EMAIL US FOR CD.”⁹⁰ There were a multitude of reasons for choosing this

⁸⁸ <http://www.alhesbah.net/v/showthread?t=196195>. October 21, 2008.

⁸⁹ Islamic Media Center (IMC). “Mujahideen Media Support: Shuhada Operations By Shaykh Abu Hamza (soswrite@hotmail.com).” Video Recording 31:46 in Length.

⁹⁰ <http://uddat.8k.com>.

approach over operating a single, static website. In order to host a dot-com domain, the IMC would have most likely needed a major credit card—which can easily be traced by law enforcement. On the other hand, free web providers like Geocities and Yahoo usually require little more than an e-mail address to get started with a new hosting account. Yet, prior to 2005, free accounts offered by services like Geocities also typically had strict size and bandwidth limits—severely impeding the ability of a single website to reach a large audience. By spreading the file burden over a series of free web hosting accounts, the IMC increased its overall bandwidth capabilities and ensured that even were one or two of its accounts to be disabled, there would still be a redundant network of others remaining online in order to continue serving would-be mujahideen. The various web domains that have been operated by the IMC include, but are not limited to:

- <http://www.mii.faihw.com>
- <http://www.qital.8m.com>
- <http://www.uddat.8k.com>
- <http://www.alqqa3qa3.8m.com>
- <http://www.uddat-english.8k.com>
- <http://www.zubeiddah1417.i8.com>

Visitors to the domain [uddat.8k.com](http://www.uddat.8k.com) were immediately instructed to move forward on to [alqqa3qa3.8m.com](http://www.alqqa3qa3.8m.com): “CLICK ON ENTER FOR DAWNLOAD FILES.”⁹¹ Among the files listed for “dawnload” there included: “BN LADEN.zip”; “COMANDO.zip”; “Guns02.zip”; “MUGAHEDDEN TERROR HANDBOOK.zip”; “TERROR BOOK.zip”; “abu hamza2.zip”; and, “mugahedden book.zip”.

Aside from its outposts on the web, the IMC was also known for operating at least two e-mail addresses: khadija1417@hotmail.com and zubeiddah1417@hotmail.com. In 2004, the IMC distributed an undated communiqué advising the following:

“Our e-mail address khadija1417@hotmail.com is considered abandoned as we have lost control to enter it... Thus, we have decided to change to a new address, and so the tyrants have tried to use this account for their own aims, such as spreading doubts and lies... We have been targeted in a big way by intelligence and media factions... the Islamic Media Center loudly declares that, by Allah, even if they toss us to the wolves for them to eat us, we shall never abandon our work until we met our ends. We are being as careful as possible with the name of our address... The Center was established 14 years ago, and has published amazing things in the online world, including tutorials, productions, and videos, even when the Internet was still new.”

The communiqué was signed by “Abu al-Khansaa al-Shami”—or the “Father of al-Khansaa” from “Greater Syria” (a region that encompasses present-day Syria, Lebanon and Jordan).

Approximately a year later, in December 2005, the IMC released yet another communiqué regarding its contact e-mail address. The statement declared the following:

⁹¹ <http://uddat.8k.com/contact.html>. October 2002.

“The Islamic Media Center announces as of December 2, 2005 its address zubeiddah1417@hotmail.com is closed completely, and as of this moment, we do not have any relation—neither near or far—with this address, so we ask the brothers to avoid dealing with anyone using this e-mail, as the account has been badly hacked. Also, the Center has decided to close all media links starting today until further notice because of the security difficulties the brothers are having at the Center... Allah willing, our work will resume after security measures are put in place in order to protect the safety of the brothers, which we will announce later, Allah-willing. And this statement is not to be considered a discouragement or anything else, but every time has its own special circumstances, and our situation has become tremendously hard and uncomfortable... We also warn anyone who dares to misuse the insignia of the Center or those who attempt to fool with us from among the hypocrites and intelligence service... martyrdom is better for us than your foul prisons, and Allah will bear witness to what I am saying... We thank the brothers who work at the Center and the media brothers.”

As before, the IMC statement was once again signed by Abu al-Khansaa al-Shami.

V.) Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET), Hezbollah, and Tablighi Jamaat

• Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET)

In the late 1980s, a group of Pakistani Muslim militants decided to “take[] a leaf from the book of [the] Afghans... [and] lit the torch of Jihad movement.”⁹² This new movement—which became eventually known as Lashkar-e-Taiba (a.k.a. “The Army of the Pure”, “The Army of Madinah”)—was comprised of both intellectual and military components. Markaz al-Dawa wal Irshad (MDI), the political wing of the LET, was established first in 1986 for the purpose of “organi[zing] the Pakistanis participating in Afghan Jihad on one platform.”⁹³ Shortly thereafter, efforts were commenced by the eager supporters of Markaz al-Dawa active in Afghanistan to establish a parallel military wing. One of these men was a young Pakistani commander “fired with the zeal of Jihad” known as Abu Waleed Zaki-ur-Rahman Lakhvi. During the mid-1980s, Abu Waleed managed to arrange a personal meeting with an unnamed senior leader of mujahideen forces in Afghanistan, and decided to join their ranks. He quickly proved himself in battle and was appointed as the commander in charge of several Pakistani mujahideen units in Afghanistan based at various camps including Markaz Makkah and Markaz Medina. According to knowledgeable sources, Abu Waleed “had [the] full co-operation of Arab Mujahideen who taught him the intricacies of Jihad and Qital [combat].”⁹⁴ Between August 1987 and January 1990, Abu Waleed helped oversee mujahideen operations at the Kabul frontline and kept in communication with both Arab and local mujahideen units based in nearby Nurestan.⁹⁵

⁹² Taiba Bulletin (nadqpk@yahoo.com). “Subject: Eleven Years of Lashker-e-Taiba.” April 22, 2001. <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/muslimworldnews>.

⁹³ <http://web.archive.org/web/20000311154008/http://www.dawacenter.com/introduction/introduction.html>. March 11, 2000.

⁹⁴ Taiba Bulletin (nadqpk@yahoo.com). “Subject: Eleven Years of Lashker-e-Taiba.” April 22, 2001. <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/muslimworldnews>.

⁹⁵ Taiba Bulletin (nadqpk@yahoo.com). “Subject: Eleven Years of Lashker-e-Taiba.” April 22, 2001. <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/muslimworldnews>.

However, the major turning point for the LET came in 1990, when Abu Waleed and a group of Pakistani clerics and Islamists converged in Kunar province of Afghanistan—which had been declared an “independent Islamic Emirate” by Sheikh Jamil-ur-Rahman, a distinguished local Pashtun mujahideen commander from the anti-Soviet jihad. On February 22, 1990, Abu Waleed, cleric Hafiz Mohammed Saeed from the Ahl-e-Hadith movement in Pakistan, and several other colleagues “laid the foundation” for the LeT military wing with the joint establishment of their Camp Tango training facility in Kunar. Soon, according to later accounts published by Lashkar-e-Taiba, the volunteers who were trained at Camp Tango under the supervision of Abu Waleed and Hafiz Mohammed Saeed “were fighting at different fronts—among them, Abdur Rauf Janbaz from Okara, Nazir Abu Bakr from Bahawalpur, Muhammad Aslam from Karachi, Khalid Saif from Lahore and Muhammad Qasim Sajid from Faisalabad embraced martyrdom.”⁹⁶ The LET armed wing quickly developed and, with the assistance of its sister Markaz al-Dawa, constructed a second military training camp in the Paktia province of Afghanistan south of Kabul.⁹⁷

In order to serve the developing conflict with India in Kashmir, LET created four principle military training camps on Pakistani territory near Muzaffarabad: Al-Massada, Moaskar al-Aqsa, Ibn Taimiyya, and Abdullah bin Massoud. LET also opened an official recruitment office in Lahore and made use of the sprawling Markaz al-Dawa wal Irshad-run religious university in the town of Muridke. Moreover, LET continued to operate at least one “advanced” military training camp for its recruits inside of Afghanistan. LET representative Abdullah Muntazir later explained the training camp system in a Taiba press release: “in our Jihad camp we impart training for 3 weeks in which newcomers are introduced to the Klashnikov up to the Missile... Following this there comes the ‘Special Tour’ comprising of 3 months in which they are trained for Guerilla war and mine blast, fighting and firing the missiles and rockets.”⁹⁸ Those who displayed a high level of skill might qualify for more advanced courses “in making remote control bombs and missiles” at LeT camps both in Pakistan and Afghanistan.⁹⁹

Since the inception of its military wing in 1990, Lashkar-e-Taiba has participated in countless guerilla attacks on Indian soldiers, bombings of civilian and military targets in Jammu-Kashmir, and terrorist assaults on civilian targets in India proper, including a December 2000 attack on the Red Ford complex in Delhi, the Indian national capital. Red Fort is considered a geographic landmark, featuring a museum and hosting thousands of tourists each year. According to LET sources, a two-man Lashkar fidayeen (“suicide commando”) unit forced its way into Red Fort, opening fire indiscriminately inside the ancient, Mughal-built structure. The fidayeen squad reportedly killed two people and seriously wounded another—the senior commander of LET Hafiz Muhammad Saeed later declared that the Red Fort attack was “a symbolic activity” intended to force

⁹⁶ Taiba Bulletin (nadqpk@yahoo.com). “Subject: Eleven Years of Lashker-e-Taiba.” April 22, 2001. <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/muslimworldnews>.

⁹⁷ <http://web.archive.org/web/20000311154008/http://www.dawacenter.com/introduction/introduction.html>. March 11, 2000.

⁹⁸ From: “Abu Omar” (markazdawa@hotmail.com) [216.252.245.4]. “Subject: TAIBA BULLETIN 11-07-2000.” Newsgroup posting on taiba_bulletin@egroups.com. July 11, 2000.

⁹⁹ From: “Abu Omar” (markazdawa@hotmail.com) [216.252.245.4]. “Subject: TAIBA BULLETIN 11-07-2000.” Newsgroup posting on taiba_bulletin@egroups.com. July 11, 2000.

India into withdrawing from Kashmir.¹⁰⁰ In December 2001, the U.S. State Department officially named Lashkar-e-Tayyiba as a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). In his public statement on the designation, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell accused Lashkar of “seek[ing] to assault democracy, undermine peace and stability in South Asia, and destroy relations between India and Pakistan.”¹⁰¹

LET has consistently demonstrated public support for Al-Qaida and the Taliban in Afghanistan. On September 15, 2001, the group issued a statement warning “LASHKAR-E-TAIBA WILL NOT LEAVE AFGHAN BRETHREN IN THE LURCH.THEY WILL SACRIFICE THEIR LIVES ALONG WITH OTHER MUSLIMS AGAINST AMERICA AND OTHER DISBELIEVERS IN CASE THEY ATTACK AFGHANISTAN.” According to the statement, an LET spokesman threatened that members of the group “will sacrifice their lives along with other Muslims against America and other disbelievers in case they attack Afghanistan. Lashkar-e Tabia is intended to uphold the flag of Islam by jihad in the battlefield.”¹⁰²

LET has surfaced as the prime suspect in the November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India. Indian police have identified the sole surviving perpetrator as 21-year old Pakistani national Mohammed Ajmal Kasab, who allegedly spent 18 months training at various camps run by LET. Likewise, Indian authorities have reportedly found the names of several high-ranking LET members in the satellite phone used by one of the Mumbai perpetrators, with evidence that calls were placed to certain senior Lashkar leadership figures. Given the rather prophetic past language from LET leaders, perhaps it is no surprise that LET has surfaced as a prime suspect in the Mumbai attacks. In October 2000, when asked about the hijacking of a Saudi commercial airliner and the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen, Hafiz Mohammed Saeed responded, “Mujahideen Lashkar-e-Taiba does not favour to undertake these operations, as such-like activities are mostly advantageous to America. The real jihad in fact, is to target the Jews points and to kill them in their own homes.”¹⁰³

In November and December 2008, I spoke on several occasions with LET representative Abdullah Muntazir, and he insisted to me that the group was not involved in the Mumbai attacks. During our interviews, I confronted Muntazir with the cover from the latest issue of a JUD propaganda magazine, emblazoned with a depiction of the U.S. Capitol torn apart by a bolt of lightning and the U.S. and Israeli flags in flames. He explained it was simply a matter of “perspective”: “If you see the covers of Time and Newsweek a few weeks ago, you will also see such kind of images... If Time or Newsweek publishes such kind of titles, they are not Al-Qaida. But if a Muslim organization publishes such kind of titles, they will say that this is Al-Qaida, they want to threaten the American public, they want to... terrorize... You have the right of freedom of speech, but we... with such kind of things, we are perceived as Al-Qaida-related

¹⁰⁰ From: “Abu Omar” (markazdawa@hotmail.com) [203.135.14.210]. “Subject: TAIBA BULLETIN 23-12-2000.” Newsgroup posting on taiba_bulletin@egroups.com. December 24, 2000.

¹⁰¹ U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman. “Statement by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell: Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” <http://usembassy-australia.state.gov/hyper/2001/1226/epf302.htm>. December 26, 2001.

¹⁰² From: nadqpk@yahoo.com. “Subject: Lashker-e-Tabia will sacrifice their lives with other Muslims against America.” September 26, 2001. <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/muslimworldnews>.

¹⁰³ From: “Abu Omar” (markazdawa@hotmail.com) [216.252.245.4]. “Subject: TAIBA BULLETIN 17-10-2000.” Newsgroup posting on taiba_bulletin@egroups.com. October 17, 2000.

people.” I then showed Muntazir links to MP3 audio files hosted on the JUD Internet website. The Urdu-language propaganda songs feature lyrics such as, “we declare a revolt against those who are friends of America; against those who reside in Pakistan but help America... against those who have become frightened of participating in jihad; against those who promote democracy on the orders of America.” Another song on the website calls upon Pakistani Muslims, “we will fight the Americans face-to-face. Muslims know how to protect their honor in every era, and we will show this to the American President Bill Clinton. Our swords will be drenched with the blood of the infidels and our flag will fly over America—and that day is coming.” Repeating back the lyrics slowly, Abdullah Muntazir stammered, “This kind of song is on our website? In Urdu?” He hesitated and asked, “When did you hear this? Honestly speaking, I don’t have knowledge about that, I will look into the matter. I can’t comment on that.”

- **Hezbollah**

Hezbollah (“The Party of God”) is paramilitary political movement based in southern Lebanon whose membership is based on a shared adherence to conservative Shiite Muslim sectarian beliefs. Hezbollah has also drawn support among ordinary Shiites and even some non-Muslim Lebanese for its tough confrontational stance with the neighboring state of Israel. Hezbollah’s aggressive posture and occasional rocket attacks have caused the Israelis to launch massive raids into southern Lebanon—but they have also significantly increased the prestige of the organization. The U.S. State Department has blacklisted Hezbollah as a Designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO)—according to State, Hizballah “is known to have been involved in numerous anti-U.S. and anti-Israeli terrorist attacks and prior to September 11, 2001, was responsible for more American deaths than any other terrorist group... Hizballah’s terrorist attacks have included the suicide truck bombings of the U.S. Embassy and U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983, and the U.S. Embassy annex in Beirut in 1984, and the 1985 hijacking of TWA flight 847, during which a U.S. Navy diver was murdered. Elements of the group were responsible for the kidnapping, detention, and murder of Americans and other Westerners in Lebanon in the 1980s. Hizballah also was implicated in the attacks on the Israeli Embassy in Argentina in 1992 and the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA) in Buenos Aires in 1994. In 2000, Hizballah operatives captured three Israeli soldiers in the Sheba’a Farms area and kidnapped an Israeli non-combatant.”¹⁰⁴

Despite Hezbollah’s antipathy towards Israel and the United States, its Shiite orientation and close relationship with Iran have caused it to be spurned by most Sunni Muslim extremists. Hezbollah is routinely condemned in public speeches delivered by Al-Qaida leaders such as Usama Bin Laden, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. Yet, on rare occasions, Hezbollah and Al-Qaida have still managed to put aside their troublesome differences and briefly work together. Ali Mohammed (a.k.a. Abu Mohammed al-Amriki), an Al-Qaida operative and Bin Laden bodyguard, testified in federal court, “I was aware of certain contacts between al Qaeda and Al-Jihad [Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ)] organization on one side, and Iran and Hezbollah [sic] on the other.”¹⁰⁵ Mohammed further testified that between 1992 and 1993 Hezbollah had

¹⁰⁴ <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2007/103714.htm>

¹⁰⁵ S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (LBS) United States v. Ali Mohammed. New York: October 20, 2000, p. 28.

provided explosives training for Al-Qaida and Al-Jihad, and that Iran had directly supplied Al-Jihad with weapons.¹⁰⁶ According to Ali Mohammed, Iran also used Hezbollah during this same time period as an intermediary to supply Bin Laden's operatives with explosives that were disguised to look like rocks.¹⁰⁷

- **Tablighi Jamaat**

Tablighi Jamaat is a non-violent, non-political Muslim missionary organization which holds frequent conferences in Pakistan and elsewhere. Due to the conservative religious practices, agreeable nature, and peculiar travel habits of the Tablighi, the group has on several occasions unwittingly served as a cover for would-be mujahideen seeking to enter Pakistan and Afghanistan without arousing the suspicion of intelligence agencies.

¹⁰⁶ S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (LBS) United States v. Ali Mohammed. New York: October 20, 2000, p. 28.

¹⁰⁷ S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (LBS) United States v. Ali Mohammed. New York: October 20, 2000, p. 28.