



Terrorists Behind Bars

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[This report provides an overview of the myriad complexities the worldwide prison system must address when managing terrorists behind bars. Among other topics, it examines why some inmates convert to radical Islam, documents efforts by incarcerated terrorists to communicate with associates on the outside and plot attacks, and maps the U.S. and European prison environments. Additionally, the report analyzes campaigns by Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Yemen, and even the U.S. military in Iraq to "reeducate" incarcerated extremists.]

Introduction

In recent months, headlines have brought news of repeated disappointments in the battle to prosecute alleged terrorists. For example, in April 2008, a judge in Miami declared another mistrial in the U.S. government's case against a group of men who purportedly planned to bomb the Sears Tower and multiple FBI offices.¹ In February 2008, the U.K. Court of Appeal overturned the convictions of five British men for "possessing large amounts of extremist material to help them prepare for training camps overseas and to carry out terrorist acts."² And, earlier this fall, in Texas, the prosecution of the Holy Land Foundation's top officials for providing material support to Hamas ended in a mistrial.³

In this context, convicting and sending a terrorist to jail is undoubtedly a significant victory; however, as terrorists enter the prison system, corrections officials are faced with numerous challenges, many of which will only be exacerbated as inmate populations surge. In fact, as the CIA has noted, "terrorists do not view prison as a major obstacle because they face similar challenges in the outside world – carrying out clandestine activity, facing a hostile security service, and creating or joining tight-knight groups to survive."⁴ And, in a telling quote, Jordanian researcher Hassan Abu Hanieh commented, "things no longer end in prison anymore. In fact, increasingly they begin there."⁵

While in prison, jihadists have caused officials fits by distributing propaganda, planning jailbreaks, continuing to exercise operational control over their organizations,

¹ Curt Anderson, "Deadlocked Jury Forces 2nd Mistrial in Miami Terrorism Case," *Associated Press*, April 15, 2008.

² "U.K. Court Quashes Conviction of Students Jailed for Downloading Terrorist Material," *Associated Press*, February 13, 2008.

³ Jason Trahan and Michael Grabell, "Judge Declares Mistrial in Holy Land Foundation Case," *The Dallas Morning News*, October 22, 2007.

⁴ Central Intelligence Agency, "Terrorists: Recruiting and Operating Behind Bars," August 20, 2002.

⁵ Hassan Fattah, "Militant Uprising at Jordanian Prison is Quelled," *The New York Times*, April 14, 2006

and even plotting attacks. They have also banded together with fellow radicals and launched mass uprisings, as evidenced by an April 2006 incident in Jordan that left 35 guards and inmates injured. What's more, when they are mixed in with the general population, they can also radicalize fellow inmates, who are particularly vulnerable to extremism because – in the words of Spanish anti-terrorism judge Baltasar Garzon – they see such a path “as a means of atonement for their previous sins.”⁶ Complicating matters, those inmates can also be radicalized by extremist imams and jihadist material, some of which is distributed en masse by Wahhabi organizations. Notably, in 2007 Senate testimony, Department of Homeland Security Chief Intelligence Officer Charles Allen asserted that radicalization behind bars was “becoming increasingly common.”⁷ The threat of radicalization behind bars is even more acute in Europe, where Muslims represent a disproportionate percentage of the inmate populations in many countries, including the Netherlands and France.

In an effort to neutralize incarcerated terrorists, a number of countries, including Saudi Arabia and Singapore, have launched “reeducation” efforts based on the assumption that “ideologically-motivated terrorism requires [a] non-conventional approach” and that jihadist beliefs “can only be de-legitimized by ideological and theological refutation.”⁸ While there is some cause for caution, overall, the results have been positive, even leading the U.S. military to adopt similar initiatives in Iraq. Discussing the results in Iraq, Major General Douglas Stone – Commander, U.S. detention facilities in Iraq – assessed that “we’re making...whole moderate compounds that didn't exist before.”⁹ Other countries have taken a far different tact, offering jihadist inmates special perks, such as conjugal visits and cooking rights, in an effort to secure their submission.

This NEFA report aims to provide a broad overview of the complexities the worldwide prison system must address, as well as of the responses of various correctional officials around the globe. Significantly, many of the issues have yet to be definitively addressed by the national security establishment. For one, how can corrections personnel in Western prisons be equipped with the language skills and contextual framework necessary to effectively detect problematic activity? How can Muslim chaplains be adequately vetted to ensure they are not preaching radical messages? Are terrorist inmates most effectively managed by isolating them or integrating them into the general population? And, as American researcher Dr. Mark Hamm asked, “can correctional officials restrict an inmate’s access to religious teachings and services without violating the inmate’s Constitutional right to freedom of religion?”¹⁰

Conversion to Islam Behind Bars – Examining Why

The list of individuals who converted to Islam while behind bars and went on to plot terrorist attacks – from shoe bomber Richard Reid to “dirty bomber” Jose Padilla to 7/21 bomber Muktar Said-Ibrahim – is well-known and does not merit further examination in this report. However, it is worth analyzing why so many inmates convert to Islam; in the United States alone, for instance, roughly 30,000-40,000 inmates convert

⁶ Renwick McLean, “Spanish Prisons Provide Pool of Recruits for Radical Islam,” *The New York Times*, October 31, 2004.

⁷ Testimony of Charles Allen, Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, Chief Intelligence Officer, Department of Homeland Security, Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, March 14, 2007.

⁸ “Religious Rehabilitation Group,” <http://www.rrg.sg/>.

⁹ “Bloggers’ Roundtable with Gen. Douglas Stone,” Federal News Service, September 18, 2007.

¹⁰ Mark S. Hamm, “Terrorist Recruitment in American Correctional Institutions,” December 2007.

to Islam each year.¹¹

For many inmates, conversion is driven by sheer pragmatism as they seek protection from the multitude of forces seeking to do them harm. Interviewed by Indiana State Criminology professor Dr. Mark Hamm for a groundbreaking December 2007 study sponsored by the U.S. Department of Justice, the President of the Islamic Division of the American Correctional Association of Chaplains argued that “most Islamic prisoners are just looking for protection...” Even National Social Movement members are converting to Islam for protection, according to a Florida security official. And a Florida gang intelligence official explained that Islam attracts so many individuals eager for that safety blanket because new inmates, particularly African-Americans, are quickly told: “Don’t mess with the Muslims. They got their stuff together.”¹²

Moreover, imprisoned Muslims enjoy a number of “special” benefits, such as halal food and Islamic literature that could encourage some to convert.¹³

But overwhelmingly, individuals convert to Islam in a quest to add meaning and direction to their lives. Disillusioned with mainstream society, these disaffected individuals are attracted to the sense of community and purpose that Islam offers. As Alain Grignard, a senior official in the antiterrorism division of the Belgian police, has commented, converts “are people searching...for a sense of solidarity.”¹⁴ And, as a chaplain at Folsom Prison in California explained, the results are often quote positive: “You can see the difference almost immediately. You see the difference in their comportment, in their tolerance of others...The recidivism rate for true conversions is 15 percent, compared to 70 percent for the general population.”¹⁵

Dr. Hamm’s interviews with converts in the U.S. prison system bolster this analysis. Mario, a former Latin Kings gang member imprisoned in Florida for armed robbery, converted to Islam after sharing a cell with a Pakistani. Mario said, “Islam has helped me settle down. I’m humbling myself before Allah now. Islam helped me learn about the world and what is going on, like with the war in Iraq...” Similarly, Akil, a former Crip gang member incarcerated in California for murder, commented: “Islam helped me set boundaries. It taught me to have respect for others. It taught me to understand the true nature of humanity. It keeps me from doing the bad things of my past.”¹⁶

While examples such as these undoubtedly indicate that prisoners can find fulfillment in their lives through Islam, former French anti-terrorism magistrate Jean-Louis Brugiere has also asserted that Islamic converts are “undeniably the toughest” and most “radical.”¹⁷ How can these two points be reconciled?

Comments from three European government officials help shed light on why converts may be drawn to radical Islam, rather than the peaceful brand others

¹¹ Mark S. Hamm, “Terrorist Recruitment in American Correctional Institutions,” December 2007.

¹² Mark S. Hamm, “Terrorist Recruitment in American Correctional Institutions,” December 2007.

¹³ Jennifer Carlile, “Islamic Radicalization of Europe’s Jails?”, *MSNBC*, July 7, 2006.

¹⁴ Craig Smith, “Police Try to Fathom Belgian’s Path to Terror,” *The New York Times*, December 6, 2005.

¹⁵ Mark S. Hamm, “Terrorist Recruitment in American Correctional Institutions,” December 2007.

¹⁶ Mark S. Hamm, “Terrorist Recruitment in American Correctional Institutions,” December 2007.

¹⁷ Elizabeth Bryant, “Judge Profiles New Terrorist Generation,” *United Press International*, October 5, 2005.

experience. Spanish anti-terrorism judge Baltasar Garzon has argued that criminals “are initially exposed to the extremist vision of Islam as a means of atonement for their previous sins.”¹⁸ Echoing Garzon, Danish Police Intelligence Service Detective Chief Inspector Hans Joergen Bonnichsen asserted in May 2005 that individuals “would rather become martyrs than miserable criminals.”¹⁹ Also in 2005, Christophe Chaboud, head of the French Interior Ministry’s Antiterrorism Coordination Unit, remarked: “Converts need to prove their commitment even more than others...The non-religious will not offer the paradise promised by the Islamists.”²⁰

Supporting this conclusion, Batool al-Toma, who heads a project in the United Kingdom to integrate Muslims, stated that some converts feel “such a huge desire to fit in and be accepted that they are ready to do just about anything.”²¹ The phenomenon may also be further explained by the fact that “someone new to Islam does not have the cultural bearings or religious grounding to resist radical interpretations of Islam.”²²

Conversion to Radical Islam Behind Bars – Examining How

In a series of Congressional testimonies, senior U.S. government officials have offered significant details on the radicalization process itself; when these details are assimilated with other open source intelligence, a clear picture of that radicalization process emerges, which is presumably generalizable across geographies.

According to 2006 Senate testimony by Donald Van Duyn, Deputy Assistant Director of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division, one way in which prison radicalization occurs is “through anti-U.S. sermons provided by contract, volunteer, or staff imams...”²³ Elaborating on the role played by radical imams, Van Duyn stated,

“Particularly for Muslim converts, but also for those born into Islam, an extremist imam can strongly influence individual belief systems by speaking from a position of authority on religious issues. Extremist imams have the potential to influence vulnerable followers at various locations of opportunity; can spot and assess individuals who respond to their messages; and can potentially guide them into increasingly extremist circles.”²⁴

2006 Senate testimony by DHS Senior Intelligence Officer Javed Ali complements Van Duyn’s revelations. Ali told the Senate that “inmates have been

¹⁸ Renwick McLean, “Spanish Prisons Provide Pool of Recruits for Radical Islam,” *The New York Times*, October 31, 2004.

¹⁹ “Extremist Muslims Fish for Criminal Immigrants,” *Politiken via BBC Monitoring*, May 4, 2005.

²⁰ Jacky Durand and Patricia Tourancheau, “Terrorist Threat is High,” *Liberation*, Translated by BBC Monitoring, October 18, 2005.

²¹ Peter Ford, “Why European Women are Turning to Islam,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, December 27, 2005.

²² Craig Smith, “Europe Fears Threat from its Converts to Islam,” *The New York Times*, July 19, 2004.

²³ Testimony of Donald Van Duyn, Deputy Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, September 19, 2006.

²⁴ Testimony of Donald Van Duyn, Deputy Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, September 19, 2006.

radicalized through...clerics, contractors, and volunteers who serve as religious authorities."²⁵

There are numerous examples of prison imams who fit this bill. In 2003, FBI official John Pistole briefed Congress on one such imam, Warith Deen Umar, the Administrative Chaplain for the New York State Department of Corrections: "A radical Muslim, Umar denied prisoners access to mainstream imams and materials. He sought to incite prisoners against America, preaching that the 9/11 hijackers should be remembered as martyrs and heroes. Umar has since been banned from ever entering a New York State prison..."²⁶ When the Umar scandal broke, New York Senator Charles Schumer (Dem.) issued a press release, revealing that "Umar has wielded tremendous influence over the 45 or so clerics or imams that currently preach within New York's prison system, almost all of whom subscribe to his brand of Wahhabi extremism."²⁷ Schumer reported the following galling incidents:



Warith Deen Umar; NY1

"After the [9/11] attacks, prison officials at the Cape Vincent corrections facility, for example, asked its religious chaplains to minister to the inmates to help soothe the inmates, including the prison's Muslim cleric. The cleric however, was reported to have said that the attacks were punishments on the wicked and that the victims deserved what they got. At the prison in Watertown, the same cleric led what seemed to be a pro-Al Qaeda rally. At the Albion Correctional Facility for Women, a similar incident occurred when the cleric there praised Osama Bin Laden as a soldier of Allah."²⁸

Moreover, an imam (reportedly still employed) at New Folsom prison in California allegedly handed out razor blades to inmates in his flock; members of that group were later charged in a conspiracy to attack U.S. military and Jewish targets in the Los Angeles area (see more below).²⁹ And, Marwan Othman El-Hindi, indicted in Ohio for plotting to kill U.S. soldiers in Iraq, served as an imam at the Toledo Correctional Institution, until he

²⁵ Testimony of Javed Ali, Senior Intelligence Officer, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Department of Homeland Security, Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, September 19, 2006.

²⁶ Testimony of John S. Pistole, Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security, October 14, 2003. Note: Disturbingly, the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General found that "BOP staff observed Umar repeatedly give sermons that violated BOP security policies but failed to terminate his contract. Several of his Contractor Progress Reports explain that he 'disparages Judaism and Christianity' and that his 'sermons are sometimes not appropriate; has been spoken to.' Despite this conduct, the same Reports provide him with 'Good' or 'Excellent' marks for the 'Quality of Goods/Services' rendered." See: Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, "A Review of the Bureau of Prisons' Selection of Muslim Religious Services Providers," April 2004.

²⁷ "Schumer Urges State to Remove Militant Clerics Right Away," Senator Charles E. Schumer Press Release, February 6, 2003.


²⁸ "Schumer Urges State to Remove Militant Clerics Right Away," Senator Charles E. Schumer Press Release, February 6, 2003.

²⁹ Mark S. Hamm, "Terrorist Recruitment in American Correctional Institutions," December 2007.

was fired for smuggling food to an inmate.³⁰ Overseas, in England, shortly after 9/11, two imams preaching in the prison system were suspended for spewing hateful rhetoric.³¹

Another channel for radicalization is “charismatic, religiously radical inmates,” according to DHS’ Javed Ali.³² This trend is driven by multiple factors, including a shortage of prison imams, overcrowding, and prisoners’ desire to exert influence. The Michigan Department of Corrections administrator explained, “no prisoner faith group...wants volunteer support. Prisoners like the power of running their own religious groups.”³³ Moreover, a U.S. law enforcement analyst pointed out that when “charismatic inmates...assert themselves as unauthorized imams...chaplains simply allow prisoners to lead the group.”³⁴

Although many of these types of interactions occur in groups, open sources report that radical indoctrination is most common on a one-on-one basis, largely due to inmate security concerns.³⁵ An example of this sort of radicalization effort allegedly occurred in a New Jersey prison, where Eljvir Duka is awaiting trial for his role in a conspiracy to attack the U.S. Army Base at Fort Dix, New Jersey. According to a prosecution filing, Duka wrote a letter to a fellow inmate in August 2007 that stated, “now you see why we were going to sacrifice all for the sake of allah in jihad...fight in the way of allah first with the mouth then with the sword...we weren’t able to finish.”³⁶



...the Lt brother now you see why we
were going to sacrifice all for the sake
of allah in jihad. the prophet said

Excerpt from letter allegedly written by Eljvir Duka; DOJ

(Duka has denied he authored the letter, and two handwriting examiners, hired by Time Magazine, “found that Duka’s writing in the sample letters does not match the writing in the note.” The federal government has not revealed the findings from its own

³⁰ For example, Marwan Othman El-Hind, indicted in Ohio for plotting to kill U.S. soldiers in Iraq, served as an Imam at the Toledo Correctional Institution, until he was fired for smuggling food to an inmate. See: Joshua Boak, “Detainee Served as Imam at Prison,” *Toledo Blade*, February 23, 2006.

³¹ Alan Cowell, “Jailed Briton; The Shadowy Trail and Shift to Islam of a Bomb Suspect,” *The New York Times*, December 29, 2001.

³² Testimony of Javed Ali, Senior Intelligence Officer, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Department of Homeland Security, Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, September 19, 2006. Note: A 2004 Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General report stated, “Numerous...BOP staff members...told us that the real threat of radicalization comes from inmates, not chaplains, contractors, or volunteers.” See: Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, “A Review of the Bureau of Prisons’ Selection of Muslim Religious Services Providers,” April 2004.

³³ Mark S. Hamm, “Terrorist Recruitment in American Correctional Institutions,” December 2007.

³⁴ Mark S. Hamm, “Terrorist Recruitment in American Correctional Institutions,” December 2007.


³⁵ Mark S. Hamm, “Terrorist Recruitment in American Correctional Institutions,” December 2007.

³⁶ U.S. v. Shnewer, (D. N.J.), No. 1:07-CR-00459-RBK, Government’s Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motions to Terminate Administrative Detention and for Alternative Relief, Filed December 11, 2007.

investigation.³⁷) The 1993 World Trade Center bombers provide another example, for, according to the Department of Justice, they “radicalized inmates” by telling “them that terrorism was part of Islam.”³⁸

A third avenue for jihadist proselytizing is, in the assessment of FBI official Donald Van Duyn, “extremist media in the form of literature and videos being circulated within the prison population...”³⁹ In 2003 Senate testimony, Senator Charles Schumer (N.Y.) spoke of imams who “flood the prisons with anti-American, pro-bin Laden videos, literature and sermon tapes.”⁴⁰ While some of this material is circulated piecemeal, there have been coordinated efforts to distribute radical literature.

2007 prosecution filings in the case against Pirouz Sedaghady (a.k.a. Pete Seda) and Soliman Al-Buthe, indicted in Oregon on multiple charges including conspiring to defraud the U.S., shed considerable light on that campaign. Both Sedaghady and al-Buthe served as officials with the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation (AHIF), a Saudi-based charity that operated in more than fifty countries throughout the world, including the U.S., and that has been named by the U.S. Treasury Department as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist. Sedaghady helped establish AHIF's office in Ashland, Oregon and is listed as the organization's Secretary in tax records.⁴¹



AHIF-U.S.' mailing address; DOJ

In a memo supporting Seda's detention prior to trial, the U.S. government confirmed prior open source reports that AHIF-U.S. distributed material to U.S. prisons which "advised prisoners that violent jihad against non-believers is an affirmative obligation for all Muslims until the entire world submits to Islamic rule."⁴² In exhibits accompanying the filing, prosecutors submitted examples of that literature. For instance, AHIF-U.S. passed out *The Noble Quran*, a Wahhabi version of the Quran replete with additional English-language content, including a 22-page appendix titled "The Call to Jihad in the Qur'an." *The Noble Quran* stated that "Jihad is an obligatory duty in Islam on every Muslim." It added that "Jihad is a great deed indeed and...it is the best thing that

³⁷ Amanda Ripley, "Playing Tricks with the Fort Dix Six?", *Time*, January 14, 2008.

³⁸ Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, "A Review of the Bureau of Prisons' Selection of Muslim Religious Services Providers," April 2004.


³⁹ Testimony of Donald Van Duyn, Deputy Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, September 19, 2006.

⁴⁰ Testimony of Charles Schumer, Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security, October 12, 2003.

⁴¹ U.S. v. Sedaghady, (D. OR.), No. CR 05-60008-01, Government's Submission of Redacted Indictment, Filed September 21, 2005.

⁴² U.S. v. Sedaghady, (D. OR.), No. CR 05-60008-01, Government's Memorandum in Support of Pretrial Detention, Filed August 21, 2007.

one can volunteer for."⁴³ AHIF-U.S. also circulated *The Islamic Guidelines for Individual and Social Reform*, which told readers "the Jihad against the disbelievers, communists and the aggressors from Jewish-Christian nations can be either by spending on Jihad or by participating in it in person."⁴⁴



^[1] (V.2:190) *Al-Jihad* (holy fighting) in Allāh's Cause (with full force of numbers and weaponry) is given the utmost importance in Islām and is one of its pillars (on which it stands). By *Jihad* Islām is established, Allāh's Word is made superior, (His Word being *Lā ilaha illallāh* which means none has the right to be worshipped but Allāh); and His religion (Islām) is propagated. By abandoning *Jihad* (may Allāh protect us from that) Islām is destroyed and the Muslims fall into an inferior position; their honour is lost, their lands are stolen, their rule and authority vanish. *Jihad* is an obligatory duty in Islām on every Muslim, and he who tries to escape from this duty, or does not in his innermost heart wish to fulfil this duty, dies with one of the qualities of a hypocrite.

Cover of and excerpts from *The Noble Quran* distributed by AHIF-U.S.; DOJ

A former AHIF-U.S. employee involved in the prison initiative noted: "We were able to forge relationships with a number of Muslim prison chaplains who willingly distributed Al Haramain's literature...to inmates. Of course, the fact that they did so doesn't necessarily mean they were radical...But I know from conversations with chaplains...that at least some of the Muslim prison chaplains were on the same page as Al Haramain ideologically and were supportive of the worldview that the group fostered."⁴⁵

(That same former employee further revealed that in addition to distributing radical Islamic literature in the prisons, AHIF-U.S. also used questionnaires to build a database that contained a goldmine of information on 15,000 prisoners.⁴⁶ Most notably, it held each prisoner's release date, as well as their intended new address.⁴⁷ The former AHIF-U.S. employee pointed out that "Al Haramain could have worked with ideologically sympathetic organizations to make sure inmates stayed in touch with radical groups after they were let out of prison" and admits that "the reason why it was never used in this manner continues to puzzle investigators."⁴⁸)

⁴³ U.S. v. Sedaghadly, (D. OR.), No. CR 05-60008-01, Government's Memorandum in Support of Pretrial Detention, Exhibit B, Filed August 21, 2007.

⁴⁴ U.S. v. Sedaghadly, (D. OR.), No. CR 05-60008-01, Government's Memorandum in Support of Pretrial Detention, Exhibit E, Filed August 21, 2007.

⁴⁵ Testimony of Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, September 19, 2006.

⁴⁶ In a filing in the Pirouz Sedaghadly case, federal prosecutors introduced a letter a prisoner wrote to AHIF-US asking that his ten dollars be "used towards helping the mujahideen in Chechnya that are being persecuted by the coalition of the kuffar, whether it be providing some food, medical help, to the families of the martyrs or weapons." The letter was seized during the February 2004 raid of AHIF-US. See: U.S. v. Sedaghadly, (D. OR.), No. CR 05-60008-01, Government's Memorandum in Support of Pretrial Detention, Exhibit F, Filed August 21, 2007.

⁴⁷ Testimony of Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, September 19, 2006.

⁴⁸ Testimony of Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, September 19, 2006. Note: Gartenstein-Ross speculated on the rationale behind AHIF-U.S.' actions. He commented, "one reason is that higher-ups at Al Haramain probably never realized the program's full potential. They wanted to spread their

Other organizations with terrorist links have also sought to mass distribute literature in the prison system. According to the U.S. government, the web sites of the Michigan-based Islamic Assembly of North America (IANA) contained “messages calculated to raise funds and recruit persons for anti-U.S. violence and jihad.”⁴⁹ In 1997, IANA announced that it planned “an ambitious project to supply 1,000 prison[s] in the US with an English Library containing: A translated copy of the Qur’an, 6 books, 12 Audio-tapes, A one-year subscription to *Al Jumuah* Magazine.”⁵⁰ A November 2000 excerpt from the Editor’s column of *Al Jumuah* provides a flavor of its ideological bent:

“The Jews’ hatred and hostility toward the Muslims is an age-old truth that is not going to change...the only way out of this dilemma is through being prepared for Jihad. Jihad is the summit of Islam, the highest of its deeds. With it, the [Muslim nation] establishes its foundation, strengthens its presence, manifests its identity, and with it, the [Muslim nation] indicates to everyone that its aims and goals are higher and nobler than those of all others. It is Allah’s destiny for this [Muslim nation] that it can only get elevated through Jihad.”⁵¹

Thus, as laid out above, three factors primarily drive radical recruitment behind bars. DHS Senior Intelligence Officer Javed Ali labels these “‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ influences” and assesses that “it is difficult to assign percentages as to which influence is greater.”⁵²

The European Prison Environment

In the years since 9/11, counterterrorism officials have repeatedly expressed concerns about European prisons, where Muslims comprise a disproportionate percentage of the inmate population.⁵³

In the Netherlands, where Muslims account for approximately twenty percent of the prison population but less than six percent of the country’s population,⁵⁴ a 2002 intelligence service (AIVD) report warned that “recruiters are remarkably active towards the existing prison population.”⁵⁵ A 2004 AIVD report echoed this conclusion, noting that “remarkable is the growing use of prisons as places of recruitment.”⁵⁶

Islamic ideology in the West, and failed to understand that prisoners were more prone to embracing Islamic radicalism than others.” A possible explanation “was resource constraints. Although Al Haramain was a massive operation, with offices around the world and an annual budget that may have reached \$50 million, the U.S. headquarters was fairly small.”

⁴⁹ U.S. Treasury Department, National Money Laundering Strategy 2003.

⁵⁰ IANA website, “The Inmate’s Library Project.”

⁵¹ Hassen Laidi, “Editor’s Note,” *Al-Jumuah*, October 29, 2000.

⁵² Testimony of Javed Ali, Senior Intelligence Officer, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Department of Homeland Security, Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, September 19, 2006.

⁵³ Craig Smith, “Islam in Jail: Europe’s Neglect Breeds Angry Radicals,” *The New York Times*, December 8, 2004. Note: The situation in the Netherlands, Spain, France, and England is described herein. Additionally, in Belgium, over fifteen percent of inmates are from Morocco and Turkey, though Moroccans and Turks only comprise two percent of the total population. See: Hassan Bousetta and Laure-Anne Bernes, “Muslims in the EU: Cities Report, Belgium,” 2007.

⁵⁴ Froukje Demant, Marcel Maussen, and Jan Rath, “Muslims in the EU – Cities Report, The Netherlands,” 2007.

⁵⁵ AIVD, “Background of Jihad Recruits in the Netherlands,” March 10, 2004.

⁵⁶ AIVD, “Recruitment for the Jihad in the Netherlands: From Incident to Trend,” March 10, 2004.

Addressing the situation in Spain during 2006 Senate testimony, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Daniel Fried noted that “police are aware of significant extremist recruitment efforts among the 7,000 Muslim prisoners in that country.”⁵⁷ Previously, Spanish anti-terrorism judge Baltasar Garzon had asserted that the “nucleus for recruitment is centered on people convicted of common crimes.”⁵⁸

In France’s prisons, sixty to seventy percent of inmates are Muslim,⁵⁹ although Muslims only comprise between five to ten percent of France’s population.⁶⁰ In his 2006 Senate testimony, Daniel Fried reported that “according to a recent study by the French Interior Ministry, radical Muslims are actively trying to convert other prisoners in approximately one of three French prisons.”⁶¹ French police intelligence has estimated that approximately 17% of those who convert to Islam in prison join extremist groups after serving their time.⁶²

France’s prison population is considered particularly vulnerable to radicalization due to the country’s republican secularism; inmates are not categorized by religion so imprisoned terrorists often live side-by-side with other inmates.⁶³ Interviewed in 2007, French General Intelligence chief Joel Bouchite admitted that prisons are one of the likeliest locations for recruitment because “they mix...those [Algerian terrorists] sentenced in 1995 - and [those imprisoned for their involvement in the] Afghan networks, with individuals arrested for commit common crimes. We have a major concern in this connection.” To support his analysis, Bouchite cited the case of Safe Bourada, an Algerian operative who served jail time for his role in the 1995 Paris metro bombings;⁶⁴ while behind bars, Bourada recruited common criminals, who converted to Islam, and assisted him in a conspiracy – detected in September 2005 – to attack targets in Paris, including the metro and the airport.⁶⁵

The situation in France’s jails is exacerbated by the fact that just seven percent of prison chaplains are Muslim.⁶⁶ In fact, in a 2004 report, the U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General noted that “the growth of Islamic radicalism in French

⁵⁷ Testimony of Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on European Affairs, April 5, 2006.

⁵⁸ Renwick McLean, “Spanish Prisons Provide Pool of Recruits for Radical Islam,” *The New York Times*, October 31, 2004.

⁵⁹ Molly Moore, “In France, Prisons Filled with Muslims,” *The Washington Post*, April 29, 2008.

Note: Some prisons outside of Paris are nearly eighty percent Muslim.

⁶⁰ CIA World Factbook 2008, France country profile.

⁶¹ Testimony of Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on European Affairs, April 5, 2006.

⁶² “Prison is Fertile Ground,” *Le Monde*, July 12, 2005.

⁶³ Jennifer Carlile, “Islamic Radicalization of Europe’s Jails?,” *MSNBC*, July 7, 2006.

⁶⁴ “French Intelligence Chiefs Identify High Level of Terror Threat,” *Liberation* via BBC Monitoring, October 8, 2007.

⁶⁵ Jamey Keaten, “Report: Suspects Caught in Anti-Terror Sweep Plotted Attacks on Paris Airport, Subway,” *Associated Press*, September 27, 2005.

⁶⁶ Testimony of Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on European Affairs, April 5, 2006. Note: In an April 2008 article, *The Washington Post* wrote, “the prison system has only 100 Muslim clerics for the country’s 200 prisons, compared with about 480 Catholic, 250 Protestant and 50 Jewish chaplains, even though Muslim inmates vastly outnumber prisoners of all other religions.” See: Molly Moore, “In France, Prisons Filled with Muslims,” *The Washington Post*, April 29, 2008.

prisons has been attributed in part to the control that inmates exercise over most of the institutions' religious practices."⁶⁷

Seeking to "tamp down the surge in extremist preaching behind bars," the French Council for the Muslim Faith (CFCM) named the "moderate"⁶⁸ Moroccan-born imam Moulay El Hassan El Alaoui as the first national chaplain for prisons in 2005.⁶⁹ Commenting on the announcement, French anti-terrorism judge Jean-Francois Ricard remarked, "it's indispensable that there are people who explain their religion and give a different vision than the one given by extremists. It's good that they are doing it – but there is still a lot left to do."⁷⁰

Prison and counterterrorism officials argue that there is even more "left to do" in managing the situation in England and Wales' prisons, where Muslims, who account for less than three percent of the total population,⁷¹ represent approximately eleven percent of the inmate population;⁷² that figure has doubled in the last ten years.⁷³ In November 2007, open sources reported on an internal British Ministry of Justice assessment, which forecast that in the following decade the number of terrorist inmates would skyrocket from 131 to over 1,600.⁷⁴ The overwhelming majority of these prisoners will be high-security, category A inmates.⁷⁵

Highly disturbed by this trend, Steve Gough, Vice-Chairman of the Prison Officers' Association, commented that "the radicalisation of young men is going to be our biggest problem...the whole estate is going to change because of this" influx.⁷⁶ Yet the Ministry of Justice's "National Commission Plan 2008/2009" acknowledges that there is an inadequate understanding of "the custodial behavior of this group of offenders and its potential impact on other prisoners."⁷⁷ Prison officials are also faced with a quandary because Belmarsh prison – home to many terrorist inmates – is close to capacity,⁷⁸ and

⁶⁷ Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, "A Review of the Bureau of Prisons' Selection of Muslim Religious Services Providers," April 2004.

⁶⁸ Testimony of Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on European Affairs, April 5, 2006.

⁶⁹ Jamey Keaten, "France Names Muslim Chaplain for Prisons," *Associated Press*, September 16, 2005.

⁷⁰ Jamey Keaten, "France Names Muslim Chaplain for Prisons," *Associated Press*, September 16, 2005. Note: Confirming this assessment, the State Department's April 2008 "Country Reports on Terrorism" states that in 2007 "increasing Islamic radicalization in the prison system continued to worry French officials." See: U.S. State Department, "Country Reports on Terrorism 2007," Released April 30, 2008.

⁷¹ Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook, United Kingdom country profile.

⁷² Molly Moore, "In France, Prisons Filled with Muslims," *The Washington Post*, April 29, 2008.

⁷³ Richard Ford, "Jail Imams Vetted by Security Services and Muslim Books Screened for Code," *The Times (London)*, February 26, 2007.

⁷⁴ Alan Travis, "Tenfold Rise in Terrorism Prisoners Forecast," *The Guardian*, November 8, 2007.

⁷⁵ Alan Travis, "Tenfold Rise in Terrorism Prisoners Forecast," *The Guardian*, November 8, 2007.

⁷⁶ Jamie Doward, "Terror Training in Prisons as Al-Qaeda Targets Young," *Observer*, July 15, 2007.

⁷⁷ Richard Ford, "Convicted Islamist Terrorists Exploiting Growing Prison Gang Culture," *The Times (London)*, March 31, 2008.

⁷⁸ Jamie Doward, "Terror Training in Prisons as Al-Qaeda Targets Young," *Observer*, July 15, 2007. Note: Highlighting the overcrowding problem, two men convicted of terrorist offences – Abdul Muneem Patel and Yassin Nassari – were released early. After a public outcry, the British government banned the early release of terrorists. See: Philip Johnston, "Radical Muslim Terrorist

there is currently inadequate funding to address the new environment. Additionally, Phil Wheatley, the Director General of the Prison Service, asserted in 2007 that “we regard terrorists as we regard all prisoners,” thus refusing to create a special category for them.⁷⁹ Wheatley believes that terrorists must be sprinkled throughout maximum-security prisons to avoid repeating the mistakes made in jails in Northern Ireland, where concentrated groups of IRA operatives banded together to wreak havoc.⁸⁰

While the outlook for the British prison system is cause for apprehension, the current landscape is also troubling. In 2006, Prison Officers’ Association official Steve Gough assessed that although he did not believe “al-Qaida-controlled wings” existed in British prisons, radicalization efforts were underway.⁸¹ That same year, the U.K. Home Office issued a statement noting that while “there is no evidence” prison radicalization is “widespread,” “we suspect some prisoners have covertly attempted to radicalize prisoners...during their prison sentence.”⁸² Then, in 2008, a Prison Service spokesman noted that there was an “emerging picture, based on anecdotal intelligence, that suggests terrorists may be linking into gang activities.”⁸³

Seeking to stem the tide of radicalization, U.K. authorities reportedly conduct “vigorous security checks” on imams,⁸⁴ who are now required to speak English. Authorities also translate all Arabic texts to English to ensure they do not contain inflammatory material.⁸⁵ Despite these efforts, a recent Ministry of Justice document admits that “as it stands, there is no intervention available to us to counter terrorist behaviour or to counter the threat of radicalization.”⁸⁶ And in March 2008, Colin Moses, head of the Prison Officers’ Association, urged “radical action” to stem radicalization efforts in the prison.⁸⁷

Released from Prison Early to Ease Overcrowding,” *The Daily Telegraph*, March 28, 2008 and Dominic Casciani, “Terrorist Releases Prompt U-Turn,” *BBC*, March 28, 2008.

⁷⁹ Alan Travis, “Tenfold Rise in Terrorism Prisoners Forecast,” *The Guardian*, November 8, 2007.

⁸⁰ Alan Travis, “Tenfold Rise in Terrorism Prisoners Forecast,” *The Guardian*, November 8, 2007.

Note: A January 1998 *New York Times* article provides the following description of the Maze prison facility: “Inside their wings, the prisoners are never locked into their cells, and guards cannot search their living spaces without gaining the approval of inmate leaders and telling them a day ahead of time where they intend to look...The prisoners elect their own leaders, called ‘officers commanding,’ who negotiate directly with the governor of the Maze...These officers control their autonomous areas, assigned according to membership in one of the two Catholic or four Protestant paramilitary groups. Cells can have televisions, and prisoners have access to computers, washing machines and mobile phones.” See: Warren Hoge, “Britain Urged to Crack Down on Ulster Prisoners,” *The New York Times*, January 5, 1998.

⁸¹ Alan Travis, “Prisons Failing to Tackle Terror Recruitment,” *The Guardian*, October 2, 2006.

⁸² Jennifer Carlile, “Islamic Radicalization of Europe’s Jails?,” *MSNBC*, July 7, 2006.

⁸³ Alan Travis, “Officials Warn of Terrorist Links to Prison Gangs,” *The Guardian*, March 3, 2008.

⁸⁴ Jennifer Carlile, “Islamic Radicalization of Europe’s Jails?,” *MSNBC*, July 7, 2006. Note: See: Richard Ford, “Jail Imams Vetted by Security Services and Muslim Books Screened for Code,” *The Times (London)*, February 26, 2007.

⁸⁵ Richard Ford, “Jail Imams Vetted by Security Services and Muslim Books Screened for Code,” *The Times (London)*, February 26, 2007.

⁸⁶ Alan Travis, “Officials Warn of Terrorist Links to Prison Gangs,” *The Guardian*, March 3, 2008.

⁸⁷ Eleanor Gregson, “Jailed Muslims a terrorist target,” *Sunday Sun*, March 9, 2008. Note: Additionally, the United States Institute of Peace reports that “several pilot programs are under development in collaboration between the Metropolitan Police and mosque groups. Individuals in prisons who are deemed at risk for involvement with extremist groups are identified prior to release and selected for remedial intervention. The mosque intervention group then attempts through intensive theological intervention to dissuade the individual from taking the path of

Additionally, some U.K. prisoners have become increasingly difficult to manage. According to January 2008 press reports, terrorist inmates at Belmarsh planned to hold a prison employee hostage and then kill him.⁸⁸ Moreover, in February 2008, media sources reported that a group of nearly 20 terrorist inmates imprisoned at Frankland Prison – some of whom had been transferred from Belmarsh – had recently caused three disturbances and were becoming a significant concern for prison officials. Steve Gough noted, “we are struggling to contain it. It’s having an effect on other prisoners.” He added, “they don’t want to be in Frankland; they want to be in Belmarsh with their friends. They are getting more organised and want to be together in one place, which is scary.”⁸⁹ (After complaining of a “white supremacist” culture at Frankland, both Dhiren Barot, serving a life sentence for plotting mass-casualty attacks in England and the U.S., and fertilizer bomb plotter Omar Khyam were moved to different prisons in March 2008.⁹⁰)

The U.S. Prison Environment

Like their European counterparts, U.S. officials have been outspoken in airing their fears about the prison threat; nonetheless, they have issued caveats with their warnings. DHS Chief Intelligence Officer Charles Allen pointed out that Islamic radicalization “is significantly less endemic than recruitment and violence by criminal and racist gangs in U.S. prison,”⁹¹ while Donald Van Duyn, Deputy Assistant Director of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division, asserted that “the majority of cases involving [Islamic] prison radicalization and recruitment have not manifested themselves as a threat to national security.”⁹² And DHS Senior Intelligence Officer Javed Ali commented that “current radicalization dynamics in some U.S. prison systems...do not yet present the level of operational threat...seen in other parts of the world.”⁹³

These cautious government assessments jive with comments made by Michigan’s administrative chaplain, who observed, “our prisoners are thugs. Tossing around names like ‘al-Qaeda’ and ‘Jihad’ is simply opportunistic...I see no evidence of radical prisoners.”⁹⁴ And Paul Rogers, then-President of the American Correctional Chaplains Association, told the Senate in 2003: “Regarding reports of prisons being infiltrated by

radical Islam. In other cases, mosques assume responsibility for religious education in the prisons.”
See: Jytte Klausen, “British Counter-Terrorism After the July 2005 Attacks,” *United States Institute of Peace Briefing*, February 2007.

⁸⁸ “Report: Muslim Inmates Planned Jail Kidnap,” *United Press International*, January 8, 2008.

⁸⁹ Jamie Doward and Anushka Asthana, “Al-Qaeda Threat to British Prisons,” *The Observer*, February 10, 2008.

⁹⁰ Jon Clements and Graham Brough, “Fury Over al-Qaeda Terrorists’ Prison Switch,” *The Mirror*, March 20, 2008.

⁹¹ Testimony of Charles Allen, Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, Chief Intelligence Officer, Department of Homeland Security, Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, March 14, 2007.

⁹² Testimony of Donald Van Duyn, Deputy Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, September 19, 2006.

⁹³ Testimony of Javed Ali, Senior Intelligence Officer, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Department of Homeland Security, Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, September 19, 2006.

⁹⁴ Mark S. Hamm, “Terrorist Recruitment in American Correctional Institutions,” December 2007.

terrorists or terrorist organizations via prison religious programs, these have been blown way out of proportion.”⁹⁵

Nonetheless, in September 2006 Senate testimony, Van Duyn made it clear that “radicalized inmates are of concern for a number of reasons,” including:

- “Influential inmates could...pose a risk to prison security by urging inmates under their influence to disobey prison authorities and possibly incite violence within the facility.”
- “Inmates who have acquired skills used in terrorism activities could pass them on to other prisoners.”⁹⁶

Van Duyn also assessed that “influential inmates could urge other prisoners to attend certain mosques or Islamic centers in the United States or overseas upon their release from prison that may present opportunities for the proselytizing of radical Islam.”⁹⁷ Van Duyn’s analysis meshes neatly with insights shared by NYPD Deputy Commissioner for Counterterrorism Richard Falkenrath, who told a September 2006 Senate hearing that “an imam/mosque network...guides recent parolees to particular mosques for employment, temporary housing and for some – international travel to the Middle East or South Asia for further indoctrination.”⁹⁸

Considering the potential consequences of prison radicalization, it is sobering that in February 2005 Senate testimony, FBI Director Robert Mueller commented that “prisons continue to be fertile ground for extremists...”⁹⁹ In a similar vein, a 2007 NYPD report on radicalization labeled prisons a “radicalizing cauldron.”¹⁰⁰ That same year, DHS’ Charles Allen revealed that radicalization behind bars was “becoming increasingly common.”¹⁰¹

A detailed sketch of the U.S. prison environment can be cobbled together from open sources.

⁹⁵ Testimony of Paul E. Rogers, President of the American Correctional Chaplains Association, Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security, October 12, 2003.

⁹⁶ Testimony of Donald Van Duyn, Deputy Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, September 19, 2006.

⁹⁷ Testimony of Donald Van Duyn, Deputy Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, September 19, 2006.

⁹⁸ Testimony of Richard Falkenrath, Deputy Commissioner for Counterterrorism, New York Police Department, Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, September 12, 2006.

⁹⁹ Testimony of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the Senate Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, February 16, 2005.

¹⁰⁰ New York Police Department, “Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat,” August 2007.

¹⁰¹ Testimony of Charles Allen, Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, Chief Intelligence Officer, Department of Homeland Security, Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, March 14, 2007.

Firstly, according to Van Duyn, the “ideologies that radicalized inmates appear most often to embrace include or are influenced by the Salafi form of Sunni Islam (including revisionist versions commonly known as ‘prison Islam’¹⁰²) and an extremist view of Shia Islam similar to that of the government of Iran and Lebanese Hizballah.”¹⁰³

Addressing the most frequently impacted populations, DHS’ Javed Ali reported that “radicalization within prison has occurred predominately...among the African-American inmate population¹⁰⁴ and those affiliated with gangs.”¹⁰⁵ These radicalized inmates, Van Duyn stated, “either feel discriminated against in the United States or feel that the United States oppresses minorities and Muslims overseas. The feeling of perceived oppression, combined with their limited knowledge of Islam, especially for the converts, makes this a vulnerable population for extremists looking to radicalize and recruit.”¹⁰⁶

Eager to learn even more about the prison landscape, U.S. authorities conducted a survey of approximately 3,000 state and local correctional facilities. Summarizing the key findings, Van Duyn revealed that “most cases of prison radicalization and recruitment appear to be originated by domestic extremists with few or no foreign

¹⁰² According to the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, “prison Islam...is unique to the prison environment, [and] results when inmates follow Islam without direction or analysis – inmates distort Islam to encompass prison values such as gangs and loyalty to other inmates.” And Dr. Mark Hamm notes that “the increase of Islamic populations in U.S. prisons has led various factions of the faith to compete for followers. The Nation of Islam is competing with al-Islam, Sunni, and Shiite strains of the religion. Meanwhile, a radical new ‘Prison Islam’ has emerged from the shadows. These groups are known for encompassing gang values and fierce intra-group loyalties.” See: Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, “A Review of the Bureau of Prisons’ Selection of Muslim Religious Services Providers,” April 2004 and Mark S. Hamm, “Terrorist Recruitment in American Correctional Institutions,” December 2007.

¹⁰³ Testimony of Donald Van Duyn, Deputy Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, September 19, 2006.

¹⁰⁴ Note: African-American inmates have frequently been targeted for recruitment by Al-Fuqra. As Colorado’s Department of Law notes, “FUQRA or its members have been investigated for alleged terrorist acts including murder and arson in New York, Detroit, Philadelphia, Toronto, Denver, Los Angeles and Tucson....FUQRA is suspected of more than thirteen firebombings and, at least, as many murders within the United States.” See: John Kane and April Wall, “Identifying the Links Between White-Collar Crime and Terrorism,” National White Collar Crime Center, September 2004 and “Information Regarding Colorado’s Investigation and Prosecution of Members of Jamaat Ul Fuqra,” Colorado Department of Law, Attorney General’s Office.

¹⁰⁵ Testimony of Javed Ali, Senior Intelligence Officer, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Department of Homeland Security, Before the Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, September 19, 2006. Note: Dr. Mark Hamm, summarizing research by the federal Correctional Intelligence Initiative, stated, “there is evidence of gang crossover in the radicalization process. Gang members are radicalized on an individual basis, which may be based on individual criminal skill sets.” See: Mark S. Hamm, “Terrorist Recruitment in American Correctional Institutions,” December 2007.

¹⁰⁶ Testimony of Donald Van Duyn, Deputy Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, September 19, 2006.

connections” and that “radicalization activity levels appear to be higher in high population areas on the West Coast and in the northeastern United States.”¹⁰⁷

Insight into the situation at one “high population” West Coast prison comes from Morino, an African-American convert imprisoned for murder at Folsom who was interviewed by Dr. Mark Hamm for his December 2007 DOJ-sponsored study. Morino informed Hamm that:

“People are recruiting everyday. It’s a ripe climate for terrorism. It’s scandalous. Everybody’s glorifying Osama bin Laden. But these Muslims come to Islam with the same gang mentality they had on the streets. Same red rags, same blue rags [symbols of the Crips and Bloods]. The mentality is pure ignorance driving terrorism. There is recruiting feeding on the broken spirit and ignorance.”¹⁰⁸

“High population” areas in the U.S. appear to have more intense “radicalization activity,” such as that described by Morino, in part due to a shortage of imams. As of 2006, there were only ten imams employed full-time by the federal Bureau of Prisons,¹⁰⁹ even though there were approximately 9,600 Muslims in the federal system.¹¹⁰ The Bureau of Prisons labeled this situation a “critical shortage” in 2004.¹¹¹ In California’s maximum security prisons, according to Dr. Mark Hamm, “there is one chaplain for every 2,000 inmates.”¹¹² A chaplain at Folsom prison told Dr. Hamm, “overcrowding is the main problem here. It affects everything we do, foremost among them the way we deliver services to the Muslims.” In this environment, inmates fill the vacuum to lead religious services and, according to the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector

¹⁰⁷ Testimony of Donald Van Duyn, Deputy Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, September 19, 2006.

¹⁰⁸ Mark S. Hamm, “Terrorist Recruitment in American Correctional Institutions,” December 2007.

¹⁰⁹ Testimony of Frank J. Cilluffo, Director, Homeland Security Policy Institute, George Washington University, Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, September 19, 2006. See also: Testimony of Harley Lappin, Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, October 14, 2003.

¹¹⁰ Testimony of Harley Lappin, Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, October 14, 2003. Note: According to Lappin, “this figure does not include inmates who belong to American adaptations of Islam such as the Nation of Islam or the Moorish Science Temple.” Further, according to the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, “approximately 85 percent of BOP inmates who identify themselves as Muslim are Sunni or Nation of Islam. In contrast, less than 1 percent of the Muslim inmates – many of whom are from Middle Eastern countries – are Shiite.” Finally, according to Dr. Mark Hamm, “Finally, according to Dr. Mark Hamm, “Islam is the fastest growing religion among prisoners in America. Among those who seek faith while imprisoned in the United States, approximately 80 percent turn to Islam.” See: Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, “A Review of the Bureau of Prisons’ Selection of Muslim Religious Services Providers,” April 2004 and Mark S. Hamm, “Terrorist Recruitment in American Correctional Institutions,” December 2007.

¹¹¹ Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, “A Review of the Bureau of Prisons’ Selection of Muslim Religious Services Providers,” April 2004.

¹¹² Mark S. Hamm, “Terrorist Recruitment in American Correctional Institutions,” December 2007.

General, are “much more likely” to “espouse extremist beliefs.”¹¹³ In 2004, 193 wardens at state correctional facilities were polled and approximately half acknowledged permitting prisoners to serve as spiritual leaders.¹¹⁴ These inmate-led sessions are “subject only to intermittent supervision” by prison officials.¹¹⁵

The prison chaplaincy situation has been further complicated by controversy over the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), which served as the endorsing organization for the Bureau of Prisons from 1987 to 2001. Due to concerns about ISNA, which was identified as a member of the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood in a 2007 U.S. government court filing,¹¹⁶ the BOP stopped accepting endorsements from that organization.¹¹⁷ In a 2004 report, the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General wrote, “because the BOP currently has no national Islamic organizations willing or able to provide endorsements for its Muslim chaplain candidates, the BOP’s hiring of new Muslim chaplains is effectively frozen, resulting in a shortage of Muslim chaplains within the BOP.”¹¹⁸ To date, a new national endorsing organization still has yet to be named.

Supplementing full-time chaplains are contractors and volunteers,¹¹⁹ who, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons admitted in 2003, “are not required to meet an academic or ministerial professional level required of our chaplains.”¹²⁰ The 2004 Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General report concluded that “once contractors and certain volunteers gain access to BOP facilities, ample opportunity exists for them to deliver inappropriate and extremist messages without supervision from BOP staff members.”¹²¹ Providing an update to the situation in 2007 Congressional testimony, BOP official John Vanyur stated, “information on contractors and volunteers...is checked

¹¹³ Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, “A Review of the Bureau of Prisons’ Selection of Muslim Religious Services Providers,” April 2004. Note: One such inmate/imam, Jemahl, a convert to Islam imprisoned at New Folsom, openly acknowledged that he is “radical” and commented, “let’s go find a bomb.” See: Mark S. Hamm, “Terrorist Recruitment in American Correctional Institutions,” December 2007.

¹¹⁴ George W. Knox, “The Problem of Gangs and Security Threat Groups in American Prisons Today: Recent Research, Findings from the 2004 Prison Gang Survey,” 2005.

¹¹⁵ Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, “A Review of the Bureau of Prisons’ Selection of Muslim Religious Services Providers,” April 2004.

¹¹⁶ U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation (N.D. TX.), No. 3:04-CR-240-G, List of Unindicted Co-conspirators and/or Joint Venturers, Filed May 29, 2007.

¹¹⁷ Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, “A Review of the Bureau of Prisons’ Selection of Muslim Religious Services Providers,” April 2004.

¹¹⁸ Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, “A Review of the Bureau of Prisons’ Selection of Muslim Religious Services Providers,” April 2004.

¹¹⁹ In 2003 Senate testimony, the Bureau of Prisons’ Harley Lappin noted that, “In the BOP, 56 contractors provide services to Islamic inmates, some at more than one BOP facility. We also have 80 volunteers who assist with Islamic religious programs or studies.” See: Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, “A Review of the Bureau of Prisons’ Selection of Muslim Religious Services Providers,” April 2004.

¹²⁰ Testimony of Harley Lappin, Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, October 14, 2003.

¹²¹ Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, “A Review of the Bureau of Prisons’ Selection of Muslim Religious Services Providers,” April 2004.

against databases supported by the FBI. Moreover, over the last 4 years, we have enhanced supervision of programs and activities in our chapels.”¹²²

Although Vanyur’s testimony indicates BOP may be on the right path, the situation in the state prison system is also disconcerting. In 2006 testimony before the House of Representatives, George Washington University’s Frank J. Cilluffo remarked,

“there is no standard policy for vetting religious service providers in California prisons, leading potentially to thirty-three different policies in thirty-three different prisons. Without standard policies, it is possible for a chaplain to be removed from one prison for spreading radical ideas and inciting violence, only to find work at another prison, with officials none the wiser.”¹²³

And the head of California’s Office of Correctional Safety is quoted in Dr. Mark Hamm’s December 2007 study saying, “terrorist screening, investigation, and assessment do not exist in the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.”¹²⁴

Terrorist Attacks Planned Behind Bars

As the FBI’s Donald Van Duyn noted in 2006 Senate testimony, “charismatic elements within prison have used the call of Global Jihad as a source of inspiration to recruit others for the purpose of conducting terrorist attacks in the United States.”¹²⁵

Undoubtedly the most well-known recent example of this phenomenon is the plot initiated by members of Jam’iyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh (“JIS”; the “Authentic Assembly of Islam”), a radical, Sunni Islamic prison organization.¹²⁶ JIS was created in 1997 by Kevin James (a.k.a. Shakyh Shahaab Murshid), a U.S. national¹²⁷ who formed the network while incarcerated in California State Prison-Sacramento (New Folsom) for armed robbery.¹²⁸ According to court filings, James “preached the duty of JIS members to target for violent

¹²² Testimony of John Vanyur, Assistant Director, Correctional Programs Division, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Before the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, April 5, 2007.

¹²³ Testimony of Frank J. Cilluffo, Director, Homeland Security Institute, The George Washington University, Before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security’s Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment, September 20, 2006.

¹²⁴ Mark S. Hamm, “Terrorist Recruitment in American Correctional Institutions,” December 2007.

¹²⁵ Testimony of Donald Van Duyn, Deputy Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, September 19, 2006..

¹²⁶ U.S. v. James, (C.D. CA.), No. 05-CR-214, Indictment, Filed August 31, 2005 and Statement of Donald Van Duyn, Deputy Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, September 19, 2006, and Greg Krikorian, “New Counts for Suspects in Terror Plot,” *The Los Angeles Times*, August 24, 2005.

¹²⁷ U.S. v. James, (C.D. CA.), No. 05-CR-214, Plea Agreement for Defendant Kevin James - Attachment A, Filed December 14, 2007.

¹²⁸ U.S. v. James, (C.D. CA.), No. 05-CR-214, Indictment, Filed August 31, 2005 and Statement of Donald Van Duyn, Deputy Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, September 19, 2006, and Greg Krikorian, “New Counts for Suspects in Terror Plot,” *The Los Angeles Times*, August 24, 2005.

attack any enemies of Islam or 'infidels,' including the United States Government and Jewish and non-Jewish supporters of Israel."¹²⁹ Further, James, who was incarcerated throughout the course of the conspiracy, provided "instructions, spiritual and tactical guidance, and support" to his co-conspirators.¹³⁰

To aid his plot, James recruited former gang member Levar Washington (a.k.a. Abdur Rahman). Washington is a U.S. national who was imprisoned at California State Prison-Sacramento¹³¹ and joined JIS in November 2004. Shortly after Washington was paroled on November 29, 2004, James instructed him to "recruit five individuals without felony convictions and train them in covert operations."¹³² James also tasked Washington to "acquire two firearms with silencers" and "appoint an individual from the group...to find contacts for explosives or learn to make bombs that could be activated from a distance."¹³³

On December 14, 2007, James and Washington pled guilty in California federal court, acknowledging they conspired "to levy war against the government of the United States through terrorism..."¹³⁴ Three days later, Gregory Patterson, a third co-conspirator who was also a Muslim convert, admitted his involvement in the conspiracy.¹³⁵ According to FBI Director Robert Mueller, the men, who "viewed themselves as 'al Qaeda of California,'" planned "to attack...military recruiting stations on September 11, 2005, and then attack...synagogues on Yom Kippur."¹³⁶ The cell also considered attacking the Israeli Consulate in Los Angeles and the El Al terminal at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX).¹³⁷

Mode of Attack.

* Options :-

already discussed ← - LAX
- Consulate of Zion 6380 Wilshire Blvd Suite 1700 LA (323) 852-5500

Military Targets

Army Natl Guard - 1300 Federal Ave, LA 90025
Military Dept. - 11301 Wilshire Blvd Ste 212, LA 90075.

Army Recruiting Centers throughout the country.

Document listing possible targets discovered at Washington/Patterson's residence; DOJ

¹²⁹ U.S. v. James, (C.D. CA.), No. 05-CR-214, Plea Agreement for Defendant Kevin James - Attachment A, Filed December 14, 2007.

¹³⁰ U.S. v. James, (C.D. CA.), No. 05-CR-214, Indictment, Filed August 31, 2005.

¹³¹ Washington, who was a former member of the Rolling 60 Crips gang, served prison time for assault with a deadly weapon and robbery. See: "Possible Terror Evidence in Robbery Probe," *KNBC.com*.

¹³² U.S. v. James, (C.D. CA.), No. 05-CR-214, Indictment, Filed August 31, 2005.

¹³³ U.S. v. James, (C.D. CA.), No. 05-CR-214, Plea Agreement for Defendant Kevin James - Attachment A, Filed December 14, 2007.

¹³⁴ "Two Plead Guilty to Domestic Terrorist Charges of Conspiring to Attack Military Facilities, Jewish Targets," Department of Justice Press Release, December 14, 2007.

¹³⁵ "Third Man Pleads Guilty in Homegrown Terror Case," *Associated Press*, December 17, 2007.

¹³⁶ Remarks by Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Citizens Crime Commission, James Fox Memorial Lecture, April 26, 2006..


¹³⁷ U.S. v. James, (C.D. CA.), No. 05-CR-214, Indictment, Filed August 31, 2005.

In a press interview, John Miller, the FBI's Assistant Director of Public Affairs, remarked, "I think if you look at the JIS case, of all of the terrorist plots since 9/11, it is probably the one that operationally was closest to actually occurring." Miller added, "...they had selected targets. They had chosen dates. They had obtained weapons. They had written down plans. And they were getting very close to actualizing the plot."¹³⁸ (Note: Additional details on this conspiracy are available in the NEFA "Target: America" report "The L.A. Plot to Attack U.S. Military, Israeli Government, and Jewish Targets.")



Graphic on the front page of the "JIS Protocol"; DOJ

Particularly notable for the purposes of this examination is the fact that James authored and disseminated "throughout the California prison system"¹³⁹ an 104-page manifesto, titled the "JIS Protocol," which called for the creation of an Islamic caliphate in America. In James' view, "Muslims must be allowed to govern themselves by Shariah and if not we are being oppressed...yet we must wage the educational as well as the Organizational War or Jihad." James argued that "Jihad [is] the only true 'anti-terrorist action'[,] a defensive battle against the aggression of theological impostors led by Zionism."¹⁴⁰ Displaying a fanatical hatred of non-Muslims, James wrote that the "faithful mujahid are strictly forbidden to obey Kafirs or disbelievers, in fact they are commanded by Allah to battle against disbelievers...utilizing most strenuous effort."¹⁴¹



Excerpt from "Blueprint 2005"; DOJ

In addition to authoring the "JIS Protocol," James wrote a document titled "Blueprint 2005," in which he counseled JIS members to "endure and be more patient (than your enemy)." In the "Blueprint," he laid out a number of steps JIS members must take once they join the organization. James counseled that they should "learn Arabic" and "acquire a steady job that does not interfere with learning Arabic." To "become legitimate," members must "acquire identification, drivers license, work/school, keep regular contact with your parole agent, attempt to remove your tatoos [sic] and monitor your look. Your dress code must not bring attention...casual dress so as not to arouse 'extremist suspicion."¹⁴² Despite concerns about detection, James was eager to expand JIS' reach. The James indictment points out that he "sought to establish groups or 'cells'

¹³⁸ Transcript of Interview with John Miller, "The Enemy Within," *PBS Frontline*.

¹³⁹ Mark S. Hamm, "Terrorist Recruitment in American Correctional Institutions," December 2007.

¹⁴⁰ U.S. v. James, (C.D. CA.), No. 05-CR-214, Plea Agreement for Defendant Kevin James – Attachment A, Filed December 14, 2007.

¹⁴¹ U.S. v. James, (C.D. CA.), No. 05-CR-214, Exhibit: "JIS Protocol," Filed December 14, 2007.

¹⁴² U.S. v. James, (C.D. CA.), No. 05-CR-214, Exhibit: "Blueprint 2005," Filed December 14, 2007.

of JIS members outside of prison which could carry out violent attacks against perceived infidels..."¹⁴³

Although the JIS conspiracy is the most high-profile, prison-based, homeland-directed terrorist plot, Dr. Mark Hamm's December 2007, DOJ-sponsored, study reveals other plans that have been disrupted. Dr. Hamm reported that:

"In early 2007, gang intelligence officers in the Florida Department of Corrections uncovered a potential Islamic terrorist plot inside one of its adult institutions...In March 2006, a juvenile parole agent confiscated numerous items related to a terrorist plot during a search of a group home. Included in the evidence were plans, plot drawings, timelines, pictures, and identifiable financial resources needed to carry out a terrorist attack. Further investigation revealed that a parolee was sharing the information with inmates who remained incarcerated in the California juvenile system."¹⁴⁴

Across the Atlantic Ocean, a group of prisoners in Spain, allegedly affiliated with North African terror groups,¹⁴⁵ sent nearly 500 letters to each other in a conspiracy that developed into an alleged 2004 plot, by thirty extremists, to bomb Spain's National Court.¹⁴⁶ Known as the "Martyrs of Morocco" and led by Abderrahmane Tahiri (a.k.a. Mohamed Achraf), who was imprisoned for credit card fraud, the cell included prisoners at Topas prison in Salamanca and A Lama in Pontevedra. In a letter to his lieutenant, Tahiri wrote, "I will give you good news and it is that I have formed a group of good brothers who are ready to die at any moment for the cause of God. We are waiting to get out to go directly to work, and you with us as well. It is our duty to think and plan, we have men, weapons too, we don't lack places, just practice."¹⁴⁷

As Tahiri's influence spread, numerous inmates reached out to him with questions and updates on their state of mind. Prisoner Mohamed Boukiri asked Tahiri, "what does a mujahedin have to do before committing a suicide operation?" Another inmate, Adila Mamoun, told Tahiri, "I dreamed I was fighting at your side and they shot at us and I asked you if we were going to die as martyrs and you said yes, and just then I woke up." And communicating with Tahiri from his cell in Leon, Spain, Hoari Jera stated, "we thank God for having put jihad at the highest level, and those who prepare others to elevate the name of God and his religion will be rewarded."¹⁴⁸

¹⁴³ U.S. v. James, (C.D. CA.), No. 05-CR-214, Indictment, Filed August 31, 2005.

¹⁴⁴ Mark S. Hamm, "Terrorist Recruitment in American Correctional Institutions," December 2007.

¹⁴⁵ For instance, Abderrahmane Tahiri allegedly trained with Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb. And Abdelkarim Besmail was already in prison for his involvement with the Armed Islamic Group. See: Al Goodman, "33 Charged in Failed Spain Bombing," CNN, March 21, 2006 and Sebastian Rotella, "From Behind Bars, Waging a Verbal Jihad," *Los Angeles Times*, December 24, 2007.

¹⁴⁶ Al Goodman, "30 Accused over Madrid 'Bomb Plot,'" CNN, October 15, 2007 and Sebastian Rotella, "From Behind Bars, Waging a Verbal Jihad," *Los Angeles Times*, December 24, 2007.

¹⁴⁷ Sebastian Rotella, "From Behind Bars, Waging a Verbal Jihad," *Los Angeles Times*, December 24, 2007.

¹⁴⁸ Sebastian Rotella, "From Behind Bars, Waging a Verbal Jihad," *Los Angeles Times*, December 24, 2007.

The jihadist bluster became far more concerning when Tahiri, who was released from prison in 2002,¹⁴⁹ moved ahead with a plan to procure a ton of explosives in July 2004. Reportedly eager to deliver “the biggest blow” in Spain’s history,¹⁵⁰ Tahiri was recorded saying in a wiretapped conversation, “may God make us martyrs and liberate our prisoners from the prisons of the infidels and the tyrants.”¹⁵¹ Moreover, searches of conspirator Abdelkarim Benesmail’s prison cell turned up bomb-making instructions. Attacking officers who entered his cell, Benesmail warned, “I must kill you, sooner or later I must kill you...Kill me, I am ready to die.”¹⁵²

In February 2008, a Spanish court acquitted all the defendants of conspiring to blow up the National Court, but convicted eighteen of belonging to a terrorist organization. Two others were convicted of collaborating with that organization.¹⁵³

While the Los Angeles and Madrid conspiracies provide current examples, this trend, in fact, has a deep history. For instance, El Sayyid Nosair, imprisoned on weapons charges for his involvement in the Meir Kahane assassination, helped facilitate the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the “Day of Terror” landmark bombing plot. Similarly, Ahmad Ajaj, jailed in 1992 when he entered the U.S., assisted the plotters from his cell.¹⁵⁴ Then, in 1994, according to the CIA, “five Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) inmates in Port Said, Egypt...instructed followers to assassinate policemen and government officials...”¹⁵⁵ And in 1999/2000, Abdul Salam, the leader of the radical¹⁵⁶ South African Islamic group People Against Gangsterism and Drugs, oversaw a string of bombings from behind bars.¹⁵⁷

Communicating with Other Terrorists and the Outside World

In addition to radicalizing fellow inmates behind bars and planning attacks from their jail cells, incarcerated terrorists have caused further complications.¹⁵⁸

For one, some terrorists have continued to manage their organizations while imprisoned. A classified 2002 CIA report, leaked to the media, notes that Egyptian Colonel Abud al-Zumur, incarcerated for conspiring to assassinate Anwar Sadat,

¹⁴⁹ “Spain charges 32 over terror plot,” *BBC News*, March 21, 2006.

¹⁵⁰ “Spain Says Terrorist Plotted ‘Biggest Blow,’” *Associated Press*, October 20, 2004.

¹⁵¹ Sebastian Rotella, “From Behind Bars, Waging a Verbal Jihad,” *Los Angeles Times*, December 24, 2007.

¹⁵² Sebastian Rotella, “From Behind Bars, Waging a Verbal Jihad,” *Los Angeles Times*, December 24, 2007.

¹⁵³ “Spanish Court Convicts Terror Suspects of Reduced Charges,” *Associated Press*, February 27, 2008. **Note:** The judges wrote, “thinking up and suggesting a terrorist target does not constitute conspiracy per se.”

¹⁵⁴ Central Intelligence Agency, “Terrorists: Recruiting and Operating Behind Bars,” August 20, 2002.

¹⁵⁵ Central Intelligence Agency, “Terrorists: Recruiting and Operating Behind Bars,” August 20, 2002.

¹⁵⁶ United States Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2005,” April 30, 2006.

¹⁵⁷ Central Intelligence Agency, “Terrorists: Recruiting and Operating Behind Bars,” August 20, 2002.

¹⁵⁸ **Note:** In April 2008, a Spanish High Court Judge alleged that Imad Eddin Barakat, imprisoned for twelve years for belonging to a terrorist organization, financed terror cells from behind bars by helping to strip an associate’s real estate firm of EUR 2.4 million. **See:** “Al Qaeda Leader Financed Terror from Jail,” *Expatica*, April 28, 2008.

controlled an Egyptian Islamic Jihad faction from prison: “He smuggled out messages calling for attacks on Egyptian Government officials and sought to unite extremist groups.”¹⁵⁹ The CIA report adds that:

“leaders of HAMAS’ military arm...imprisoned since the mid-1990s, continued to play a role in running the group, according to a foreign government service. Reporting from 1995 through 1999 indicates that one leader, Salah Arurui, probably was recruiting and running cells from prison, including organizing kidnappings on the outside to gain release of inmates.”¹⁶⁰

A higher profile example can be found in the United States, where al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya (IG) leader Omar Abdel Rahman attempted to retain control over the IG, even though he was imprisoned for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the “Day of Terror” landmark bombing plot. Despite being subject to Special Administrative Measures (“SAMs”), which severely limited his ability to communicate with the outside world, Abdel Rahman was able to circumvent prison restrictions with the help of, among others, his attorney Lynne Stewart and his interpreter Mohammed Yousry.



Omar Abdel Rahman; DOJ

During prison visits, Stewart and Yousry engaged in duplicitous behavior to conceal their true intent. For example, according to the U.S. government:

“at one point, Stewart and Yousry explicitly discussed the fact that the guards were patrolling close to the prison conference room and might notice that Stewart was not involved in the conversation between Yousry and Abdel Rahman. To conceal the fact that Stewart was not participating in the meeting, among other things, Stewart instructed Yousry to make it look as if Stewart were communicating with Abdel Rahman and Yousry were merely translating, by having Yousry look periodically at Stewart and Abdel Rahman in turn, even though Yousry was in fact reading. Stewart also pretended to be participating in the conversation with Abdel Rahman by making extraneous comments such as ‘chocolate’ and ‘heart attack.’ Stewart contemporaneously observed to Yousry that she could ‘get an award for’ her acts of concealment, and Yousry agreed that Stewart should ‘get an award in acting.’”¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁹ Central Intelligence Agency, “Terrorists: Recruiting and Operating Behind Bars,” August 20, 2002.

¹⁶⁰ Central Intelligence Agency, “Terrorists: Recruiting and Operating Behind Bars,” August 20, 2002.

¹⁶¹ Department of Justice Press Release, “Superseding Indictment Adds News Charges Against Ahmed Abdel Sattar, Lynne Stewart, and Mohammed Yousry,” November 19, 2003.

Through Stewart, Yousry, and others, Abdel Rahman repeatedly conveyed critical messages to his flock. For instance, Abdel Rahman was able to communicate his lack of support for a cease-fire in Egypt and his rejection of “a proposal that the Islamic Group form a political party” there.¹⁶² (Due to their roles in creating a “communications pipeline”¹⁶³ for Abdel Rahman, Stewart, Yousry, and one-time paralegal Ahmed Abdel Sattar were convicted for providing material support to the IG in February 2005.¹⁶⁴)

On top of sending orders to the IG, Abdel Rahman also disseminated propaganda messages that had a substantive impact on other terrorists. In a message recorded in prison, Abdel Rahman told his followers, “the Sheikh is calling on you, morning and evening. Oh Muslims! Oh Muslims!...It is a duty upon all the Muslims around the world to come to free the Sheikh, and to rescue him from his jail.”¹⁶⁵ The Department of Justice notes that, in response, “a coalition of terrorists, supporters, and followers, including leaders and associates of the Islamic Group, al Qaeda, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group in the Philippines, threatened and committed acts of terrorism directed at obtaining the release of Abdel Rahman from prison.”¹⁶⁶ In the same message in which he called for his “rescue,” he added, “Muslims everywhere, dismember their nation, tear them apart, ruin their economy, provoke their corporations, destroy their embassies, attack their interests, sink their ships, and shoot down their planes, kill them on land, at sea, and in the air. Kill them wherever you find them.”¹⁶⁷ Usama Bin Laden reportedly viewed this statement as religious justification for 9/11.¹⁶⁸

Abdel Rahman is not the only imprisoned terrorist whose propaganda has significantly influenced individuals outside prison walls. Jordanian Isam Muhammad Tahir al-Barqawi (a.k.a. Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi), considered to be Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s spiritual mentor,¹⁶⁹ authored a number of books and other radical material from behind bars. The CIA reports that “some of these publications were found in Afghanistan in 2002, and the Saudi nationals convicted for bombing the Office of the Program manager/Saudi National Guard in Riyadh in 1995 claimed to have been inspired in part by Barqawi...”¹⁷⁰ West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center has labeled him “one of the most influential jihadi ideologues.”¹⁷¹

¹⁶² Department of Justice Press Release, “Superseding Indictment Adds News Charges Against Ahmed Abdel Sattar, Lynne Stewart, and Mohammed Yousry,” November 19, 2003.

¹⁶³ U.S. v. Sattar, (S.D. N.Y.), SI 02 Cr. 395 (JGK), Opinion and Order, Filed July 22, 2003.

¹⁶⁴ Department of Justice Press Release, “Statement of Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales on the Verdict in the Case of U.S. v. Abdel Abdel Sattar, Lynne Stewart, and Mohammed Yousry,” November 19, 2003.

¹⁶⁵ U.S. v. Sattar, (S.D. N.Y.), SI 02 Cr. 395 (JGK), Superseding Indictment, Filed November 19, 2003.

¹⁶⁶ Department of Justice Press Release, “Superseding Indictment Adds News Charges Against Ahmed Abdel Sattar, Lynne Stewart, and Mohammed Yousry,” November 19, 2003.

¹⁶⁷ Department of Justice Press Release, “Superseding Indictment Adds News Charges Against Ahmed Abdel Sattar, Lynne Stewart, and Mohammed Yousry,” November 19, 2003.

¹⁶⁸ “CNN Presents: In the Footsteps of bin Laden,” *CNN*, August 23, 2006.

¹⁶⁹ Mshari Al-Zayadi, “Abu Mohammed al Maqdisi: al-Zarqawi ‘Spiritual Godfather,” *Asharq Alawsat*, July 26, 2005.

¹⁷⁰ Central Intelligence Agency, “Terrorists: Recruiting and Operating Behind Bars,” August 20, 2002.

¹⁷¹ United States Military Academy, “Militant Ideology Atlas.”



Tariq al-Daour; AP



Dhiren Barot; Met Police

While terrorists like Abdel Rahman and al-Barqawi traditionally communicate with the outside world through corrupt prison officials, intermediaries, or mailed letters, from time to time, incarcerated terrorists have gallingly even managed to secure access to cell phones. Perhaps most disturbing is the case of convicted jihadist webmaster Tariq al-Daour, a close associate of the infamous Irhaby007, who used a smuggled cell phone to build a jihadist website in his Belmarsh (England) prison cell.¹⁷² Further, in a November 2007 letter from prison, British terrorist Dhiren Barot acknowledged he had twice been sent into segregation on “suspicion of having a mobile phone.”¹⁷³ Then, in April 2008, a British tabloid alleged that terrorists imprisoned at Belmarsh were using smuggled phones to send messages to a radical Islamic website.¹⁷⁴ Moreover, in Belgium, convicted terrorist Nabil Trabelsi reportedly used a smuggled cell phone to communicate with Malika Aroud, who allegedly played a key role in the December 2007 plot to break Trabelsi out of prison and whose husband killed Afghan Northern Alliance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud on September 9, 2001.¹⁷⁵ Trabelsi was also interviewed on a Belgian radio show, where he told the host that he “loves” Usama Bin Laden “like a father.”¹⁷⁶

It is equally shocking that a 2002 Bali bomb plotter, jailed on death row in Bali, purportedly communicated via cell phone with extremists involved in attacks on Sulawesi Island; during the course of February 2007 searches, prison officials seized nine cell phones from incarcerated terrorists in that same prison.¹⁷⁷ A year earlier, another convicted Bali plotter reportedly talked with other extremists online by utilizing a laptop and a wireless device.¹⁷⁸ Jailed Fatah al Islam operatives, as well as Jordanian and Moroccan jihadists, have also utilized smuggled cell phones to communicate with other prisoners or individuals outside prison walls.¹⁷⁹ Finally, Abu Sayyaf terrorists imprisoned in the Philippines used cell phones to instruct associates to bring them weapons and explosives that they used in a failed 2005 jailbreak that left more than twenty dead.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷² Jamie Doward, “Terror Training in Prisons as Al-Qaeda Targets Young,” *Observer*, July 15, 2007.

¹⁷³ Dhiren Barot letter, <http://www.al-istiqaamah.com>.

¹⁷⁴ Jason Lewis, “Jailed Terrorists are Using the Internet to Contact Supporters,” *The Sunday Mail*, April 13, 2008.

¹⁷⁵ Sebastian Rotella, “14 Arrested in Belgian Jailbreak Case,” *Los Angeles Times*, December 22, 2007.

¹⁷⁶ Sebastian Rotella, “14 Arrested in Belgian Jailbreak Case,” *Los Angeles Times*, December 22, 2007.


¹⁷⁷ “Wardens Seize Bali Bombers’ Cell Phones,” *Associated Press*, February 8, 2007.

¹⁷⁸ “Wardens Seize Bali Bombers’ Cell Phones,” *Associated Press*, February 8, 2007.

¹⁷⁹ Hassan Fattah, “Militant Uprising at Jordanian Prison is Quelled,” *The New York Times*, April 14, 2006 and Michael Moss and Souad Mekhennet, “Jihadists in Jails Win Leverage over their Keepers,” *The New York Times*, December 31, 2007.

¹⁸⁰ Luz Baguioro, “Abu Sayyaf Chiefs Killed as Police Storm Prison,” *The Straits Times*, March 16, 2005.

Even when terrorist inmates communicate via approved means, prison officials must address myriad complexities; detailed insight into these complications comes from a September 2006 report by the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General that was spurred by the media's revelation that three individuals jailed in Colorado for their involvement in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing had authored "over 90 letters to Islamic extremists outside the prison between 2002 and 2004." Some¹⁸¹ of those letters were sent to members of the "Martyrs of Morocco" group charged with plotting to attack the Spanish National Court. In one such letter, 1993 World Trade Center bomber Mohammed Salameh wrote: "Oh God! Make us live with happiness, make us die as martyrs, may we be united on the Day of Judgment." In 2002, Salameh had published an article in the *Al-Ouds* newspaper, in which he declared that "Osama bin Laden is my hero of this generation."¹⁸²



February 2003 letter from Mohammed Salameh to Mohamed Achraf; NBC

Labeling the U.S. Bureau of Prison's (BOP) monitoring of terrorist inmate mail "deficient," the Inspector General revealed that:

"The BOP does not read all the mail for terrorist and other high-risk inmates on its mail monitoring lists, does not have enough proficient translators to translate inmate mail written in foreign languages,¹⁸³ and does not have sufficient staff trained in intelligence techniques to evaluate whether terrorists' communications contain suspicious content."¹⁸⁴

The Department of Justice report also "found that the BOP is unable to effectively monitor high-risk inmates' verbal communications, which include telephone calls, visits with family and friends, and cellblock conversations." Further problems are created by the fact that BOP personnel "lack...training on terrorism issues" and thus do "not always know when a communication or activity is suspicious enough to report it to the FBI." This landscape led the Inspector General to conclude that "the threat remains that terrorist

¹⁸¹ The Department of Justice report, citing media sources, puts the number at fourteen.

¹⁸² Lisa Myers, "Imprisoned Terrorists Still Advocating Terror," *MSNBC*, March 1, 2005 and Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, "The Federal Bureau of Prisons' Monitoring of Mail for High-Risk Inmates," September 2006.

¹⁸³ Commenting on a similar problem in the British prison system, Prison Officers' Association vice-chairman Steve Gough stated, "Prison staff are very good at intelligence-led surveillance but it is difficult gathering intelligence listening to people who are having conversations in languages you don't understand." See: Alan Travis, "Prisons Failing to Tackle Terror Recruitment," *The Guardian*, October 2, 2006.

¹⁸⁴ Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, "The Federal Bureau of Prisons' Monitoring of Mail for High-Risk Inmates," September 2006.

and other high-risk inmates can use mail and verbal communications to conduct terrorist or criminal activities while incarcerated.”¹⁸⁵

In April 2007 Congressional testimony, John Vanyur, the BOP’s Assistant Director, Correctional Programs Division, attempted to paint a rosier picture. According to Vanyur, “we monitor, record, and translate if necessary, all telephone communications (except attorney-client conversations) involving inmates with terrorist ties.”¹⁸⁶ And, Vanyur added, “mail is not delivered to or sent from terrorist inmates until it is read, and if necessary, translated and/or analyzed for intelligence purposes...We recently established a Counter-terrorism Unit in Martinsburg, West Virginia...The Unit also oversees telephone monitoring systemwide and has implemented mechanisms to ensure phone calls by terrorist inmates are being monitored.”¹⁸⁷

Planned and Successful Jailbreaks

According to the CIA, “several al-Qa’ida-related training manuals discuss how to arrange an escape from prison.” Those documents suggest that:

- “Outside supporters should collect information from guards by offering rides to or from the prison by sitting next to them on public transport, talking to their relatives, or inciting guards to supply information.”
- “Supporters should form teams to collect intelligence, prepare and conduct the attack, provide protection, ‘remove the enemy’, and provide backup.”¹⁸⁸

Given this context, it should come as no surprise that a number of planned jailbreaks have been detected. For instance, last year, Australian prison officials determined that a Sydney Muslim group had been paying inmates at Goulburn’s Super Max prison to convert to Islam under the tutelage of convicted murderer Bassam Hamzy and support a prison break. Corrective Services Commissioner Ron Woodham commented, “we have known for quite some time there has been conversion...in super max...At first it seemed innocent enough. We later realized they were more organized than we realized...Some of the people who have converted believe this outside network can assist them in an escape.”¹⁸⁹ The eleven-strong group of converts, called the “Super Max Jihadists,” were seen on surveillance film kissing Hamzy’s hand in a show of respect. Ron Woodham noted that Hamzy, who posted pictures of Usama Bin Laden in his cell,¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁵ Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, “The Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Monitoring of Mail for High-Risk Inmates,” September 2006.

¹⁸⁶ Testimony of John Vanyur, Assistant Director, Correctional Programs Division, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Before the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, April 5, 2007.

¹⁸⁷ Testimony of John Vanyur, Assistant Director, Correctional Programs Division, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Before the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, April 5, 2007.

¹⁸⁸ Central Intelligence Agency, “Terrorists: Recruiting and Operating Behind Bars,” August 20, 2002.

¹⁸⁹ Kate Sikora, “Muslim Prison Break Foiled,” *The Daily Telegraph*, April 23, 2007.

¹⁹⁰ Alex Mitchell, “Mastermind Recruiting Islamic Gang Inside Super Jail,” *The Sydney Morning Herald*, April 22, 2007.

“clearly” talked “the rhetoric of a terrorist.”¹⁹¹ In response to the situation, Attorney General John Hatzistergos announced plans to monitor the group 24/7: “We have to be able to control every movement and every utterance because of the threat they pose. We don’t want to see any risk to people either inside or outside the system. We simply can’t take our eye off them.”¹⁹² Additionally, Hamzy was moved to another jail.¹⁹³

Also in 2007, officials arrested fourteen individuals who were allegedly plotting to utilize firearms and explosives to break imprisoned terrorist Nizar Trabelsi¹⁹⁴ out of a Belgian jail. Although all members of the group were released due to insufficient evidence,¹⁹⁵ Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt told the media: “Armed actions could have been part of this escape attempt.”¹⁹⁶

“Armed actions” were a part of a March 2007 assault on Badush prison in Mosul, Iraq by Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) members. According to Hasham al-Hamadani, a member of the Nineveh provisional security committee, “they attacked the prison...with a large number of insurgents armed with light and medium weapons, like machine guns. They didn’t face much resistance from the guards, because they overwhelmed them.” Al-Hamadani estimated that “between 140 and 150 prisoners, including Arabs and foreign fighters,” were freed.¹⁹⁷

AQI fighters also carried out a four-hour long, April 2005 attack on Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Reportedly seeking to free an AQI commander, as well as a number of AQI associates, the insurgents utilized rockets, car bombs, and gunfire to injure more than three dozen U.S. troops. Lt. Col. Steven Boylan, a U.S. military spokesman, said that the onslaught “was one of the more concerted attacks that we’ve seen.”¹⁹⁸

The U.S. military has dealt with jailbreaks in Afghanistan¹⁹⁹ as well. Most well-known is the July 2005 escape of four detainees, including high-ranking Al-Qaida member Omar al-Faruq,²⁰⁰ from the U.S. detention center at Bagram. Open source

¹⁹¹ Frank Walker, “Drawings Link Prison Converts to Terrorism,” *Sydney Morning Herald*, May 20, 2007.

¹⁹² Alex Mitchell, “Mastermind Recruiting Islamic Gang Inside Super Jail,” *The Sydney Morning Herald*, April 22, 2007.

¹⁹³ “Australia Breaks Up Muslim Prison Gang,” *Reuters*, April 23, 2007.

¹⁹⁴ In a letter to a Belgian newspaper, Trabelsi denied there was a planned jailbreak: “I should like to know why I would want to escape, I’ve only got four more years to serve. I would like to know why I would prepare an attack on your territory, it’s not logical. See: Paul Ames, “Al-Qaida Prisoner in Belgium Denies Escape Bid or Terror Attack Planned,” *Associated Press*, December 24, 2007.

¹⁹⁵ “Belgium Frees 14 Detained in Suspected Terrorist Prison Break Plot,” *Associated Press*, December 22, 2007.

¹⁹⁶ Sebastian Rotella, “14 Arrested in Belgian Jailbreak Case,” *Los Angeles Times*, December 22, 2007.

¹⁹⁷ “Gunmen Bust 140 Prisoners from Iraqi Jail,” *Agence France Presse*, March 6, 2007.

¹⁹⁸ Ellen Knickmeyer, “Fighters Target Abu Ghraib in Major Assault,” *Washington Post*, April 3, 2005 and Ellen Knickmeyer, “Zarqawi Said to Be Behind Iraq Raid,” *Washington Post*, April 5, 2005.

¹⁹⁹ According to a February 2008 *Newsweek* report, the situation in Afghanistan’s prisons has been further complicated by the fact that “hundreds” of Taliban are buying their way out of Afghan-run jails. See: Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, “Afghan Prison Blues,” *Newsweek*, February 11, 2008.

²⁰⁰ Al-Faruq was later killed in Iraq. See: Sabrina Tavernise, “Qaeda Operative, an Escapee in ‘05, is Killed in Iraq,” *The New York Times*, September 26, 2006.

reporting, citing interviews with military officials, indicates the men picked the lock on their cell, ditched their orange uniforms, scaled a wall, and jumped into a getaway vehicle. Commenting on the escape, Col. James R. Yonts, chief spokesman for the U.S. military forces in Afghanistan, said, “based upon the findings of the investigation, it appears that the detainees had a clear understanding of the operating procedures of the guards inside the facility.” Supporting this analysis, one of the escapees, Saudi Muhammad Jafar Jamal al-Kahtani, revealed in a videotaped statement that they “studied the plan very carefully.”²⁰¹

The U.S. military has even acknowledged that it fears an attack on Guantanamo Bay; during a February 2008 press interview, Army Col. Bruce Vargo, commander of the Joint Detention Group at Guantanamo, remarked, “although we are trying to be open, security is paramount...you can attack Guantanamo if that’s what you choose to do. It’s something I think about on a day-to-day basis.”²⁰²

While the U.S. military has experience addressing jailbreaks, U.S. authorities have generally been faced with domestic plans that were more aspirational than operational. For instance, Narseal Batiste, indicted in Florida in June 2006 for his involvement in a purported plan to blow up the Sears Tower, allegedly sought to use the destruction of the Sears Tower to distract law enforcement so he could free his “Muslim brothers” from a nearby prison. Batiste wanted these prisoners to supplement his “army”²⁰³ in order to wage a “full ground war” against the United States and “kill all the devils” they could.²⁰⁴ And members of the “Day of Terror” landmark bombing conspiracy hoped to break co-conspirator El Sayyid Nosair out of prison.²⁰⁵ Further, Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, identified by the government as a founder of Al-Qa’ida, attempted to stage a jailbreak by stabbing a guard in the eye at the Metropolitan Correctional Center in November 2000; the guard was left with brain damage.²⁰⁶

Authorities in Southeast Asia have faced similar problems to those experienced in Australia, Belgium, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the U.S. In March 2005, inmates affiliated with the Al-Qa’ida-linked Abu Sayyaf group overpowered a guard at a Manila prison and killed him with his own rifle. The attempted jailbreak led to a 30-hour standoff in which 120 Abu Sayyaf members were eventually overwhelmed by 300 police special forces. Searches following the raid turned up firearms, grenades, and bombs.²⁰⁷ A year earlier, fifty-three prisoners, including numerous Abu Sayyaf operatives, escaped from a

²⁰¹ Eric Schmitt and Tim Golden, “Details Emerge on a Brazen Escape in Afghanistan,” *The New York Times*, December 4, 2005.

²⁰² Andrew Selsky, “AP Confirms Secret Camp Inside Gitmo,” *Associated Press*, February 6, 2008.

²⁰³ Laura Wides-Munoz, “Prosecutor: Suspect Also Sought to Free Muslim Prisoners,” *Associated Press*, July 1, 2006.

²⁰⁴ U.S. v. Batiste, (S.D. FL.), 06-CR-20373, Government’s Motion for Pretrial Detention, Filed June 29, 2006.

²⁰⁵ Larry Neumeister, “Stiff Sentences in Terror Bombing Trial,” *Associated Press*, January 17, 1996.

²⁰⁶ Benjamin Weiser, “Terrorism Suspect, Expressing Regret, Says He Stabbed Jail Guard to Seize Keys,” *The New York Times*, September 11, 2002. Note: Salim claimed he wanted the guard’s keys so he could access a room where his lawyers were waiting and attack them.

²⁰⁷ Luz Baguioro, “Abu Sayyaf Chiefs Killed as Police Storm Prison,” *The Straits Times*, March 16, 2005.

jail in the southern Philippines.²⁰⁸ And in 2002, two Abu Sayyaf members slipped out of Camp Bagong Diwa prison outside of Manila by dressing as Muslim women.²⁰⁹

Yemen has not been immune to these woes either. In February 2006, twenty-three terrorists imprisoned at the headquarters of Yemen's intelligence agency (the Political Security Organization), including some jailed for their involvement in the attacks on the U.S.S. Cole and the Limburg, managed to escape by tunneling to a next-door mosque.²¹⁰ Twelve Yemeni prison officers were jailed in connection with this escape.²¹¹ In 2003, U.S.S. Cole plotter Jamal al-Badawi and nine other jihadists escaped from the maximum security Al Mansourah prison.²¹²

And in April 2008, nine individuals imprisoned for their involvement in the 2003 Casablanca bombings tunneled out of the Kenitra prison in Morocco.²¹³

Targeting Terrorists for Attack Behind Bars

When mixed with the general population, terrorists can not only radicalize fellow inmates, but can also become prime targets for attacks. In July 2007, Dhiren Barot, serving a life sentence for plotting mass-casualty attacks in England and the U.S., was assaulted by other inmates, who threw boiling water and boiling oil on him.²¹⁴ In a letter from prison, Barot labeled his injuries "quite debilitating" and reported that ten percent of his body "suffered deep horrific 2nd and 3rd degree burns." Blasting the "trailer park trash that descended on" him, Barot also castigated prison officials for placing him "amongst the piranhas."²¹⁵

With Barot's attorney warning prison officials that they were failing to exercise sufficient "duty of care" in ensuring the well-being of incarcerated terrorists,²¹⁶ additional threats have come to light in England. According to press reports, convicted 7/21 bomber Hussain Osman was targeted in prison, with a fire being lit in his cell.²¹⁷ Also in July 2007, fertilizer bomb plotter Omar Khaym frantically sought a transfer to a different prison when faced with death threats. Khaym's lawyer told the media, "we have been pressing as a matter of urgency for him to be moved before something happens...He already feared for his life but this attack on Barot is solid evidence of the manner of

²⁰⁸ Luz Baguioro, "Jailbreak Shows Frailties of Manila's War on Terror," *The Straits Times*, April 13, 2004.

²⁰⁹ Luz Baguioro, "Abu Sayyaf Prisoners Escape from Manila Jail," *The Straits Times*, October 15, 2002.

²¹⁰ "23 Terrorist Escape Yemen Prison," *CBS News*, February 6, 2006.

²¹¹ Ahmed Al-Haj, "Military Court has Convicted 12 Yemeni Prison Warders of Aiding Escape of al-Qaida Prisoners," *Associated Press*, July 14, 2006. Note: Yemeni officials claim they thwarted two other jail-break attempts by imprisoned terrorists in February 2006. See: Tarek Al-Issawi, "Yemeni Authorities Thwart Two Prison Escape Attempts by al-Qaida Suspects," *Associated Press*, March 1, 2006.

²¹² "Cole Bomb Suspects in Jailbreak," *CNN*, April 11, 2003.

²¹³ "Nine Casablanca Bombing Convicts Tunnel out of Prison: Official," *Agence France Presse*, April 7, 2008.

²¹⁴ Michael Holden, "'Dirty Bomber' Barot Attacked in Jail," *Reuters*, July 16, 2007.

²¹⁵ Dhiren Barot letter, <http://www.al-istiqamah.com>.

²¹⁶ "Muslim Terrorists being Picked on in British Prisons, Says Lawyer," *The Daily Mail*, July 31, 2007.

²¹⁷ "Muslim Terrorists being Picked on in British Prisons, Says Lawyer," *The Daily Mail*, July 31, 2007.

death threat my client faces.”²¹⁸ Notably, in January 2008, Khaym was charged with throwing boiling water on another inmate.²¹⁹

While the bulk of reports pertaining to this issue originate in England, inmates in other countries have developed similar concerns. According to a court filing in Canada, Mahmoud Jaballah, identified as a member of Egyptian Al Jihad, was involved in an “altercation with other offenders” in March 2004. Since then, he has remained in segregation; although “he can choose to leave segregation to go back into general population...he has expressed concerns about being harmed again if returned there.”²²⁰ Reflecting Jaballah’s experience, a classified January 2007 report from Canada’s Integrated Threat Assessment Center, leaked to the media, noted that many incarcerated terrorists in Canada are jailed in isolation “more often for their protection...”²²¹

“Reeducation” Campaigns

In an effort to “reeducate” incarcerated extremists, a number of countries, including Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Singapore, Indonesia,²²² and Malaysia, have launched “deradicalization” programs. In many instances, these programs have met with considerable success, though they are not without their critics.

Arguably the most extensive “reeducation” program exists in Saudi Arabia, where it was conceived in 2004. Over the life of the project, approximately 2,000 prisoners, described as “terrorist sympathizers” rather than those “with blood on their hands,” have received counseling.²²³

In this initiative, Muslim clerics and psychiatrists/psychologists are the driving force and they work gradually, over the course of months, to achieve their goal. As Turki Otayan, a psychologist involved in the program explained, “we have to deal with the minds and the emotional passions of the extremists. Fixing minds is like fixing a building with 60 floors. It’s not easy.”²²⁴

At the start of the process, counselors strive to establish a rapport with their target. Dr. Adil al-Abd al-Jabbar, a member of the Interior Ministry’s Counseling Committee, commented, “I am...very careful to convey to the young detainees a very important idea that this session is not an interrogation but a debate and a dialogue.”²²⁵

²¹⁸ Graham Brough and Jon Clements, “Bomber Death Threat,” *The Daily Mirror*, July 20, 2007.

²¹⁹ “Bomb Plotter Charged with Scalding Fellow Inmate,” *The Argus*, January 31, 2008.

²²⁰ The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and the Solicitor General of Canada v. Mohamed Zeki Mahjboub, *Reasons for Order and Order*, November 25, 2005.

²²¹ Fabrice De Pierreboug, “Radical Islam Spread in Prisons: Report,” *Sun Media*, December 4, 2007.

²²² According to a November 2007 International Crisis Group study, Indonesia has successfully persuaded “about two dozen members of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and a few members of other jihadi organisations to cooperate with the police.” See: International Crisis Group, “Deradicalization and Indonesian Prisons,” November 19, 2007.

²²³ Christopher Boucek, “Extremist Reeducation and Rehabilitation in Saudi Arabia,” *Terrorism Monitor* (The Jamestown Foundation), August 16, 2007.

²²⁴ Jeffrey Fleishman, “Saudi Arabia Tries to Rehab Radical Minds,” *Los Angeles Times*, December 21, 2007.

²²⁵ Open Source Center, “Saudi Report on Emergence of Terrorism, Extremism.”

General Yousef Manour, an Interior Ministry spokesman, echoed this assessment, noting, “we start building trust between us and them...There’s no need for handcuffs.”²²⁶

The counselors then seek to show the detainees that they have improperly interpreted Islamic doctrine. Counseling Committee member Sheikh ‘Abd Al-Muhsin Al-‘Obikan noted that he provides “an answer based on *shari‘a* texts from the Koran, from the Sunnah, and from religious scholars, to convince them.”²²⁷ And Dr. Adil al-Abd al-Jabbar added, “we used to explain to them the sound rules of jihad in Islamic jurisprudence, and we were astounded at their poor grasp of shari‘ah and its rules on this matter...They misunderstood issues pertaining to jihad in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other Muslim lands.”²²⁸ To complement the individualized “reeducation” sessions, the Counseling Committee also offers religious classes.²²⁹ Family assistance is also provided in an effort to prevent radicals from exploiting the needs of a familial unit that may have lost its breadwinner.²³⁰

Reflecting their commitment to this program, the Saudis are building five “specialized” jails to aid the “reeducation” process. These prisons boast a lecture hall, classrooms, and an intercom system intended to facilitate dialogue.²³¹

To date, nearly 700 hundred prisoners have been released through the program, which is also used to counsel Saudis released from Guantanamo Bay.²³² Upon their release, former detainees are given job help, stipends, and other assistance.²³³ They also remain under surveillance²³⁴ and must regularly check-in with the government.²³⁵

According to an August 2007 report by a researcher at Princeton University who tracks the initiative, only nine released prisoners have been rearrested, representing an impressively low recidivism rate.²³⁶ And interviews with select successfully “reeducated” former detainees support this optimistic analysis. For example, Mohammed Fozan, a wanna-be jihadist webmaster detained while attempting to travel to Iraq, remarked, “when I adopted that radical way of thinking, it was without analysis. I just took it because I felt a responsibility for all those Iraqis dying...You could say the government

²²⁶ Jeffrey Fleishman, “Saudi Arabia Tries to Rehab Radical Minds,” *Los Angeles Times*, December 21, 2007.

²²⁷ Y. Yehoushua, “Reeducation of Extremists in Saudi Arabia,” *MEMRI*, January 18, 2006.

²²⁸ Open Source Center, “Saudi Report on Emergence of Terrorism, Extremism.”

²²⁹ Y. Yehoushua, “Reeducation of Extremists in Saudi Arabia,” *MEMRI*, January 18, 2006.

²³⁰ Christopher Boucek, “Extremist Reeducation and Rehabilitation in Saudi Arabia,” *Terrorism Monitor* (The Jamestown Foundation), August 16, 2007.

²³¹ Christopher Boucek, “Jailing Jihadis: Saudi Arabia’s Special Terrorist Prisons,” *Terrorism Monitor* (The Jamestown Foundation), January 24, 2008.

²³² Christopher Boucek, “Extremist Reeducation and Rehabilitation in Saudi Arabia,” *Terrorism Monitor* (The Jamestown Foundation), August 16, 2007.

²³³ Christopher Boucek, “Extremist Reeducation and Rehabilitation in Saudi Arabia,” *Terrorism Monitor* (The Jamestown Foundation), August 16, 2007.

²³⁴ David Ottaway, “Saudi Effort Draws on Radical Clerics to Combat Lure of Al-Qaeda,” *The Washington Post*, May 7, 2006.

²³⁵ Christopher Boucek, “Extremist Reeducation and Rehabilitation in Saudi Arabia,” *Terrorism Monitor* (The Jamestown Foundation), August 16, 2007.

²³⁶ Christopher Boucek, “Extremist Reeducation and Rehabilitation in Saudi Arabia,” *Terrorism Monitor* (The Jamestown Foundation), August 16, 2007.

cleaned the hard drive of my mind. There were bad viruses and things in there.”²³⁷ Another former detainee admitted that “after lengthy discussion, I became convinced that my ideology was nothing but mere lies.”²³⁸ Despite this data, others are more cynical about the program’s efficacy. For instance, Saudi lawyer Mohsen al-Awajy mused, “I’m afraid about 85 to 90 percent of those who claim they are changing their minds as a result of this dialogue might not be truthful.”²³⁹

Further evidence backing the select use of “reeducation” programs is derived from the experience of ultra-security conscious Singapore, which officially formed its Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) in 2003. The RRG works in tandem with twenty-one imams, known as Religious Rehabilitation Counselors (RRC). A presentation posted on the RRG’s website explains that “ideologically-motivated terrorism requires [a] non-conventional approach,” and Jemaah Islamiyah’s “ideology can only be de-legitimized by ideological and theological refutation.”²⁴⁰ Mohammed bin Ali, a cleric involved in the program, added, “no one is born a terrorist...It’s indoctrination...and we’re trying to bring them back to normalcy.”²⁴¹

Like the Saudis, the Singaporeans recognize that “rehabilitation is a complex and long term process.”²⁴² Mirroring the Saudi initiative, Singapore’s program similarly places significant emphasis on interacting with detainees’ families. As the RRG presentation notes, personnel seek to ensure that family members “are able to cope with the situation emotionally, socially and economically” because it is critical to “break the vicious cycle of violence that inevitably run[s] in families.”²⁴³

Counselors have participated in over 600 sessions with detained JI members, as well as those placed under a Restriction Order (RO).²⁴⁴ Those efforts have yielded fruit as forty-four of the seventy-three individuals arrested in terrorism investigations since December 2001 have been released (though they are subject to monitoring); seven others were released without any restrictions.²⁴⁵ As recently as January 2008, Singapore announced the release on ROs of JI detainees who had scouted Western targets, including the U.S. Embassy and the British High Commission; according to the Singaporean government, these individuals had “responded positively to rehabilitation, including religious counseling.”²⁴⁶

Seeking to learn from Singapore’s successes, U.S. military officials in Iraq have been briefed by members of the RRG. And, in a highly revealing September 2007 online

²³⁷ Jeffrey Fleishman, “Saudi Arabia Tries to Rehab Radical Minds,” *Los Angeles Times*, December 21, 2007.

²³⁸ Y. Yehoushua, “Reeducation of Extremists in Saudi Arabia,” *MEMRI*, January 18, 2006.

²³⁹ David Ottaway, “Saudi Effort Draws on Radical Clerics to Combat Lure of Al-Qaeda,” *The Washington Post*, May 7, 2006.

²⁴⁰ “Religious Rehabilitation Group,” <http://www.rrg.sg/>.

²⁴¹ Simon Montlake, “U.S. Tries Rehab for Religious Extremists,” *Christian Science Monitor*, October 9, 2007.

²⁴² “Religious Rehabilitation Group,” <http://www.rrg.sg/>.

²⁴³ “Religious Rehabilitation Group,” <http://www.rrg.sg/>.

²⁴⁴ “Religious Rehabilitation Group,” <http://www.rrg.sg/>.

²⁴⁵ Zachary Abuza, “Arrests and Releases in Singapore: Two Trends Worth Noting,” *Counterterrorism Blog*, January 25, 2008.

²⁴⁶ Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs Press Release, “Further Releases, Issuance of Restriction Orders & Detentions under the Internal Security Act,” January 24, 2008.

chat, Marine Major General Douglas Stone, Commander, U.S. detention facilities in Iraq, revealed that the U.S. is employing a “reeducation” program for thousands of Iraqi detainees, utilizing Imams and psychiatrists/psychologists. Stone noted that their “religious enlightenment courses are really up and running now,” and they are operating “in the battlefield of the mind right now.”²⁴⁷

According to Stone, the results have been quite startling, as the military is discovering that they can “knock the edge off” detainees’ “understanding or frankly their misunderstanding of the Koran...” Reflecting the success of the initiative, Stone assessed that “we’re making...whole moderate compounds that didn’t exist before.” He shared a particularly notable incident:

“Now, I’ll tell you something that has never happened, in my recollection, in detention and happened on September the 2nd of this year. We had a compound of moderates, for the first time, overtake Takfirist extremists. It’s never happened before. Found them, identified them, threw them up against the fence, and shaved the frickin’ beards off of them. That – I mean, that is historic. I mean, I think – I mean – and I could give you another two or three like that. But I mean, when you’re in my business and you see something like that happen, you just go, ‘You’re kidding me!’”²⁴⁸

Even more impressive is the fact that since the program was launched, only 21 of the 8,000 detainees who have been released have returned to prison, as of April 2008.²⁴⁹ Historically, 6.4% of freed Iraqi detainees have been recidivists.²⁵⁰

Although the experiences of Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and the U.S. military in Iraq are cause for optimism, Yemen’s history with “reeducation” provides a more sobering perspective on the issue. The program, overseen by Judge Hamoud Abdulhamid al-Hitar, was initially received with great fanfare, as al-Hitar was twice invited to England to brief senior British officials;²⁵¹ following one trip, al-Hitar, who claims a 98% success rate,²⁵² commented that he had “total confidence” that “this method can be applied in the UK.”²⁵³

Much of the program’s luster began to fade when interviews were conducted with Nasser al-Bahri, a former bodyguard for Usama Bin Laden and one of the initiative’s most lauded success stories. According to al-Bahri, detainees manipulated the system to gain their freedom: “The Yemeni Mujahideen in prison know al-Hitar is the way for them

²⁴⁷ “Bloggers’ Roundtable with Gen. Douglas Stone,” Federal News Service, September 18, 2007.

²⁴⁸ “Bloggers’ Roundtable with Gen. Douglas Stone,” Federal News Service, September 18, 2007.

Note: According to Judith Miller, who visited a “reeducation” facility in April 2008, “Al-Qaida and Takfiri detainees are...housed in special trailers in separate compounds.” Stone told Miller that “empowering the moderates and isolating extremists has been key for us.” Miller also reports on the “military’s effort to involve detainees’ families in their rehabilitation through frequent visits, letters, and cell-phone contact.” See: Judith Miller, “Anti-Jihad U,” *City Journal*, May 2, 2008.

²⁴⁹ Judith Miller, “Anti-Jihad U,” *City Journal*, May 2, 2008.

²⁵⁰ “Bloggers’ Roundtable with Gen. Douglas Stone,” Federal News Service, September 18, 2007.

²⁵¹ Tim Whewell, “Yemeni Anti-Terror Scheme in Doubt,” *BBC*, October 11, 2005.

²⁵² Craig Whitlock, “Probe of USS Cole Bombing Unravels,” *The Washington Post*, May 4, 2008.

²⁵³ Brian Whitaker, “Treat the Cause, Not the Symptoms,” *The Guardian*, March 2, 2004.

to get released, so they ingratiate themselves with him.”²⁵⁴ Thus, the counseling, which did not include “long or complex dialogue,”²⁵⁵ “changed their behavior, not their thoughts.”²⁵⁶ Instead of truly seeking to rehabilitate prisoners, al-Hitar purportedly was more committed to ensuring the jihadists steered clear of targeting Yemen. As al-Bahri pointed out, “they can fight in Western lands, but it’s not allowed in our country.”²⁵⁷

Al-Bahri’s views are also eye-opening, as he remains supportive of Al-Qaida’s goals and admires Yemenis who wage jihad against U.S. troops in Iraq. Significantly, al-Bahri further revealed that two graduates of al-Hitar’s program traveled to fight in Iraq.²⁵⁸ Al-Hitar responded by commenting that “Iraq was not part of the dialogue program.”²⁵⁹ Taking these developments into consideration, a 2007 State Department report evaluated that the program had achieved only “limited success.”²⁶⁰

Clearly, given the overall success of “reeducation” programs in a number of countries, including Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and Iraq, there is reason for considerable hope about the efficacy of this strategy. Nonetheless, the pitfalls highlighted by Yemen’s experience make it certain that a healthy level of skepticism is still necessary.

Preferential Treatment

Some prison officials have sought to appease terrorist inmates by offering them preferential treatment.

For example, in Morocco, militant inmates jailed at Oukacha Prison, including the “father of Moroccan jihadists” Ahmed Rafiki, enjoy perks that were awarded after the men launched a 28-day hunger strike. Abdelati Belghazi, head of the Zaki prison, explained, “they started with hunger strikes...The media and [human rights] organizations started to get involved, and because we wanted them to stop, we had to give them some of the things that they have requested. And then they started to feel much stronger because they saw that they received what they wanted. They requested more and more.”²⁶¹

Despite being convicted for encouraging Moroccans to battle U.S. troops in Afghanistan, Rafiki has access to two radios, a television, a private garden, and a private

²⁵⁴ Tim Whewell, “Yemeni Anti-Terror Scheme in Doubt,” *BBC News*, October 11, 2005.

²⁵⁵ Tim Whewell, “Yemeni Anti-Terror Scheme in Doubt,” *BBC News*, October 11, 2005.

²⁵⁶ Robert F. Worth, “Yemen’s Deals with Jihadists Unsettle the U.S.,” *The New York Times*, January 28, 2008.

²⁵⁷ Tim Whewell, “Yemeni Anti-Terror Scheme in Doubt,” *BBC News*, October 11, 2005.

²⁵⁸ Robert F. Worth, “Yemen’s Deals with Jihadists Unsettle the U.S.,” *The New York Times*, January 28, 2008.

²⁵⁹ Craig Whitlock, “Probe of USS Cole Bombing Unravels,” *The Washington Post*, May 4, 2008.

²⁶⁰ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2006: Yemen,” March 6, 2007. Note: In April 2008, the State Department released its “Country Reports on Terrorism 2007,” which stated that “the [Yemeni] government considers this program to have a very high success rate, but this has not been independently corroborated.”

See: U.S. State Department, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2007,” Released April 30, 2008.

²⁶¹ Michael Moss and Souad Mekhennet, “Jihadists in Jails Win Leverage over their Keepers,” *The New York Times*, December 31, 2007.

bath. He and fellow radicals also enjoy exclusive access to conjugal rooms, more prison cell space,²⁶² and a channel for filing complaints.²⁶³

Similarly, the treatment of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) members convicted for their role in the Bali nightclub bombings has infuriated victims' families. In September 2007, Brig. Gen. Surya Dharma, head of Indonesia's anti-terrorism unit, hosted a party at his home, which was attended by a number of Bali plotters who were temporarily released for the event. Dharma explained, "we approach the terrorists with a pure heart. We are all Muslims. We make them our brothers, not our enemy."²⁶⁴ Two months later, alleged JI leader Abu Bakar Bashir was allowed to attend a party behind bars for three Bali bombers, who were awaiting news of their execution date.²⁶⁵



Bali bomb plotter Muklhas (l) w/ Abu Bakar Bashir; Reuters

Jordanian prison officials have also offered some imprisoned jihadists considerable latitude, though their generosity has not always been rewarded with docility. Islamists jailed at the high-security Qafqafa prison were permitted to cook their own meals and enjoyed significant freedom. As Jordanian researcher Hassan Abu Hanieh explained, "they control the world inside the prisons." However, protesting cell searches, those inmates launched an uprising in April 2006 that resulted in injuries to nearly 35 guards and inmates. (A month prior, inmates at Juweideh prison protested the impending execution of two Al-Qaida members by taking a prison official hostage, setting off a 14-hour standoff. According to open source reporting, "during that uprising, inmates at Swaqa prison, about 60 miles south of Amman, and at Qafqafa prison also rose in solidarity, pointing to cooperation between groups in different prisons.")²⁶⁶

The Al-Qaida Manual Offers Advice on Operating in Prison

A training manual seized during a 1996 raid of an Al-Qaida member's residence provides guidance to operatives about how they should behave behind bars. Operatives are counseled to "complain...of mistreatment" and "take advantage of visits to

²⁶² According to *The New York Times*, the men are housed 3 prisoners/cell vs. the traditional 22 prisoners/cell. See: Michael Moss and Souad Mekhennet, "Jihadists in Jails Win Leverage over their Keepers," *The New York Times*, December 31, 2007.

²⁶³ Michael Moss and Souad Mekhennet, "Jihadists in Jails Win Leverage over their Keepers," *The New York Times*, December 31, 2007.


²⁶⁴ Chris Brummitt, "Indonesia Says 'Soft Approach' Yields Dividends in Southeast Asia's War on Terror," *Associated Press*, October 11, 2007.

²⁶⁵ "Outrage over Bali Bombers' Prison Party," *Sydney Morning Herald*, December 18, 2007. Note: For more on the Bali bombers' life behind bars, see "Even in Prison, Three Bali Bombers Preach Hatred," *The Gulf Times*, April 18, 2008.

²⁶⁶ Hassan Fattah, "Militant Uprising at Jordanian Prison is Quelled," *The New York Times*, April 14, 2006. Note: This report adds that "almost every prison in Jordan is now controlled by an informal emir among the Islamist prisoners, who can decide much of the future of inmates, oversees prayers and searches for recruits."

communicate with brothers outside prison...” The manual further advises prisoners to “unite vis a vis the prison officers” and notes that “a hunger strike...is a tactic that can either succeed or fail.”²⁶⁷

The manual also contains a diagram labeled “Organization of Barracks Net” that describes ten “informal positions and their responsibilities.” Examples include “greeters to meet and instruct new arrivals and to help them resist authorities when they are most vulnerable” and “morale officer to organize leisure time...”²⁶⁸



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“Organization of Barracks Net”; CIA

According to the CIA, “detainees...at camp X-Ray [Guantanamo Bay] created this structure and took on these roles.”²⁶⁹ The U.S Department of Defense has similarly asserted that prisoners at Guantanamo Bay have employed tactics dictated by the Al-Qaida manual, as Army Col. John Hadjis, Chief of Staff for Joint Task Force Guantanamo, revealed that many “follow the al Qaeda SOP [standard operating procedures] to the T.”²⁷⁰

Moreover, Australian Corrective Services Commissioner Ron Woodham told the media that Australian inmates were also following instructions in the Al-Qaida training manual. Woodham said, “there were hunger strikes and organized complaints about

²⁶⁷ Al-Qaida Training Manual, “Prisons and Detention Centers.”

²⁶⁸ Al-Qaida Training Manual, “Prisons and Detention Centers.”

²⁶⁹ Central Intelligence Agency, “Terrorists: Recruiting and Operating Behind Bars,” August 20, 2002.

²⁷⁰ Donna Miles, “Al Qaeda Manual Drives Detainee Behavior at Guantanamo Bay,” *Armed Forces Press Service*, June 29, 2005.

their treatment. We have detected the leadership in groups across our maximum security jails [and] have moved in to segregate them and split them up.”²⁷¹

Conclusion

Officials undoubtedly face a daunting challenge when responding to the multitude of issues posed by the prison system.

One of the most vital choices authorities must make is how to organize terrorist inmates. While some countries, such as France, have integrated radicals into the general population, a number of other countries, including the Netherlands and Turkey, have isolated jihadists.²⁷²

However, the U.S. experience with prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, where Navy Commander Kris Winter reported his personnel were “in danger every day,”²⁷³ make some wary of implementing the latter strategy. In one instance, prison guards at Guantanamo, who reportedly endure attacks on a “daily basis,”²⁷⁴ were lured into a cell at Camp 4 by a fake suicide attempt and assaulted by detainees wielding broken light bulbs. And, at Camp 1, detainees were discovered dismantling sink faucets to create stabbing weapons; in the same camp, on June 10, 2006, three detainees committed suicide, a coordinated action Navy Rear Adm. Harry Harris labeled “an act of asymmetric warfare against us.”²⁷⁵ King’s College’s Dr. Peter Neumann also astutely points out that if terrorist inmates are concentrated in a correctional facility in a European country, propagandists would have a field day, labeling such a prison “a European Guantanamo.”²⁷⁶

If jihadists are permitted to comingle with other inmates, it is critically important, as the CIA argues, to “identify early the terrorists leaders and individuals with valuable specialized skills, such as lawyers and imams, and take action to impede their contact with fellow inmates...” Radicalizing influences can further be tempered by moderate imams, who are thoroughly vetted by authorities.²⁷⁷ Careful monitoring of inmate-led religious sessions and one-on-one contacts is also a necessity.

In this equation, a significant burden falls on prison authorities, who must provide appropriate training for their staff and engage in “regular intelligence exchanges on terrorist group activities inside and outside the prison system.”²⁷⁸ Additionally, given

²⁷¹ Heath Gilmore, “Inmates Studying al-Qaeda Manual,” *Sydney Morning Herald*, December 2, 2007.

²⁷² Mark Rice-Oxley, “British Target Prisons as Terror Incubators,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, March 21, 2008.

²⁷³ “Officers Say U.S. Soldiers ‘Abused’ by al Qaeda Inmates,” *Insight Magazine*, December 12, 2006.

²⁷⁴ “Officers Say U.S. Soldiers ‘Abused’ by al Qaeda Inmates,” *Insight Magazine*, December 12, 2006.

²⁷⁵ “U.S. Military Adopting Tougher Stance on Detainees at Guantanamo Bay,” *Associated Press*, September 23, 2006.

²⁷⁶ Mark Rice-Oxley, “British Target Prisons as Terror Incubators,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, March 21, 2008.

²⁷⁷ Central Intelligence Agency, “Terrorists: Recruiting and Operating Behind Bars,” August 20, 2002.

²⁷⁸ Central Intelligence Agency, “Terrorists: Recruiting and Operating Behind Bars,” August 20, 2002.

the seeming success of “reeducation” efforts in Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and Iraq, they should provide resources to evaluate the applicability of these programs to their specific environment.

However, as the CIA highlights, even if most of these initiatives are enacted successfully, “it may be possible only to mitigate, not prevent, terrorist use of prisons...” because inmate populations cannot be monitored and regulated at all times.²⁷⁹

²⁷⁹ Central Intelligence Agency, “Terrorists: Recruiting and Operating Behind Bars,” August 20, 2002 and Mark S. Hamm, “Terrorist Recruitment in American Correctional Institutions,” December 2007.