- Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australia):
- "Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia", 2004. (Added 3/30/08) As the Forward to this report explains, "the purpose of this White Paper is to assist readers with a deeper understanding and awareness of the nature of" "the contemporary terrorist threat posed to Australia and Australia’s interests." It addresses "this threat, its international dimensions, how it affects Australia, and the basis of the government’s sustained commitment to combat it at the international level."
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- Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (Australia):
- "Review of the Re-Listing of Al-Qa'ida and Jemaah Islamiyah as Terrorist Organizations", 2004. (Added 3/30/08) This report provides historical background on Al-Qaida and Jemaah Islamiyah.
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- Canadian Security Intelligence Service (Canada):
- Annual Report: 2006-2007 Releasing its 2006-2007 annual report, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) notes that "the threat of terrorism from extremists posed the most immediate danger to Canada and Canadians in 2006–07." Reflecting the increased prominence of the "homegrown" threat, the document reveals that "a main focus of CSIS was terrorism inspired by the ideology of al-Qaeda, and the issue of radicalization of citizens or residents of Western countries."
- "Radicalization and Jihad in the West", June 20, 2006. As the trial of the first alleged conspirator in Canada's largest terrorism plot begins, the NEFA Foundation is providing a leaked, SECRET, 2006 Canadian Security Intelligence Service report that was prepared on the heels of the disruption of that plot. The document, titled "Radicalization and Jihad in the West," explains that "radicalization occurs when Muslims reject mainstream beliefs and practices, adopting a narrow, literal, fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. Jihadization occurs when radicalized Muslims believe that violence in the defence of Islam is justified. Not everyone who becomes radicalized will move on to jihadization, but the process can occur very rapidly. The factors of radicalization include a belief in the need to defend Islam from perceived aggression by the West, influence from a spiritual leader, influence from a radicalized family member, and attending training overseas. Younger members are increasingly self-radicalizing."
- "From Radicalization to Jihadization" This SECRET 2006 Canadian Security Intelligence Service report assesses that "the phenomenon of radicalization continues...in all Western nations with significant Muslim minority populations. Western Muslims are concerned at what they see unfolding throughout the Islamic world: the invasion of Iraq, military operations in Afghanistan, the conflicts in Kashmir and Chechnya, et al. They to see these events as a series of acts aimed at Islam itself. While the vast majority will remain politically engaged over these issues, a small number will incorporate their anger into their faith and see themselves obliged to defend their Muslim brothers and sisters."
- "Sons of the Father: The Next Generation of Islamic Extremists in Canada" This SECRET 2004 Canadian Security Intelligence Service report points out that "there are a number of young men living in Canada who are the sons of known Islamic extremists and who have adopted a jihadist mentality...In most cases, these young men are the product of an upbringing by Islamic radicals who want their sons to follow in their footsteps."
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- Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (Canada):
- "'Lone Wolf' Attacks: A Developing Islamist Extremist Strategy?", June 29, 2007. (Added 6/10/08). A For Official Use Only report, authored by Canada's Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC) and dated June 2007, has become public. The report notes that "lone wolves motivated by Islamist extremism are a recent development. Islamist terrorist strategists are now advocating that Muslims take action at a grassroots level, without waiting for instructions." Moreover, "the Internet has become an important catalyst for inspiring homegrown extremists, including 'lone wolves', by providing ideological motivation, encouragement, justification, target information, and instruction on techniques, all in an anonymous environment."
- "Is Canada Next?" (Added 2/24/08) An Unclassified/For Official Use Only assessment, produced by Canada's Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC), has become public. The April 2006 document notes that "on three separate occasions AQ statements have listed priority countries, including Canada." Further, according to ITAC, "in recent years, Canada has witnessed an increased frequency of reports of suspicious behaviour by individuals videotaping or photographing locations such as subway stations, ports, tourist sites, government and financial buildings, shopping malls, and, nuclear and electrical plants. Some of these incidents may be consistent with pre-operational terrorist attack planning." The report concludes by stating, "it is clear that Canada remains a potential target for terrorist attack. Current intelligence suggests that economic and symbolic sites such as Parliament Hill, nuclear power plants, and the Toronto transit system may have been subject to reconnaissance by extremists. There are individuals and groups in Canada that are involved in fundraising, money laundering, communications or planning acts of violence in Canada and abroad. They continue to pose a national security threat to Canada."
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- Danish Security Intelligence Service (Denmark):
- "Assessment of the Terror Threat Against Denmark", April 2008. The Danish Security Intelligence Service released an "Assessment of the Terror Threat Against Denmark," which states that "the reprinting of the cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed has lead to a renewed negative focus on Denmark in a number of countries. There are indications that...extremists wish to carry out acts of terrorism against Denmark, Danes and Danish interests abroad. This particularly applies to Danes and Danish interests in areas where al-Qaida-related groups are active; with emphasis on countries in North Africa and the Middle East and in Pakistan and Afghanistan." The document also notes that "in Denmark, there are persons and circles that sympathize with and/or support groups that are involved in terrorist activities. Moreover, there are circles and persons in Denmark who are willing to get involved in terror-related activities."
- Annual Report 2004-2005 PET, the Danish Security Intelligence Service, writes that "on a number of previous occasions, PET has stated that in Denmark...there are persons and circles that sympathise with and/or support groups that are involved in terrorist activities." Further, "PET assesses that the current international security political situation has meant that there is a generally increased level of terrorist threat at present in the western world, including Denmark."
- Annual Report 2003 This report notes that "the Service believes that there are groups and persons in Denmark who, in their search for an identity and as a reaction against what they consider a unilateral Western fight against Muslim values, have distanced themselves from the original Muslim values and the Western societies as such. Instead they look for a meaning in a fundamentalist radicalised interpretation of Islam."
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- HM Chief Inspector of Prisons (England):
- "Report on an Unannounced Full Follow-Up Inspection of HMP Whitemoor", April 2008. Echoing themes examined in the NEFA Special Report "Terrorists Behind Bars," the Chief Inspector of Prisons in England assessed the situation at HMP Whitemoor prison and noted that staff "expressed a fear of what they saw as a rising problem of prisoner radicalisation and an increase in Muslim conversion." What's more, the report states, "There was a perception among officers that some Muslim prisoners operated as a gang and put pressures on non-Muslim prisoners to convert, and on other Muslim prisoners to conform to a strict and extreme interpretation of Islamic practice. However, there was a reluctance to engage with Muslim prisoners and challenge inappropriate behaviour. An officer on one wing said that the Muslim prisoners ‘policed themselves’ and the others in the staff group agreed."
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- "Home Office Name Hate Promoters Excluded from the UK", May 2009. The U.K. Home Office has "named and shamed" "individuals banned from the UK for stirring-up hatred." According to the Home Office, "In the period from 28 October 2008 to 31 March 2009 the Home Secretary excluded a total of 22 individuals from coming to the United Kingdom. It is not considered to be in the public interest to disclose the names of six of these individuals. The remaining 16 individuals" include Wagdy Ghoneim, who is "considered to be engaging in unacceptable behaviour by seeking to foment, justify or glory terrorist violence in furtherance of particular beliefs and to provoke others to commit terrorist acts." Abdul Ali Musa, who is "considered to be engaging in unacceptable behaviour by fomenting and glorifying terrorist violence in furtherance of his particular beliefs and seeking to provoke others to terrorist acts," was also named. (NEFA Senior Analyst Madeleine Gruen blogged on this list, pointing out that Anwar Awlaki - profiled in this NEFA Backgrounder - was noticeably missing.)
- "£12.5m Allocated to Prevent Extremism", June 2008. The U.K. Home Office announced that "new funding and information will help local authorities, schools, community groups and police tackle violent extremism." The plan will include initiatives to work "closely with young people whose criminal backgrounds have left them open to extremist views" and work "in prisons to tackle identify and stop the spread of radicalisation there."
- "The Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners in England - Part 1", June 2008. The U.K. Home Office provides this guide because "action at a local level is...essential to stop people becoming or supporting terrorists or violent extremists." According to the report, "delivering an effective Prevent response requires the active participation of a wide range of other partners, including representatives from the education sector, children’s and youth services, the Youth Justice Board through Youth Offending Teams and the secure estate, probation services, prisons and the UK Border Agency."
- "The Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners in England - Part 2", June 2008. This section notes, "No grievance justifies terrorism. But if a grievance is both well founded and legitimately expressed, we must be ready to address it. At a local level experiences of racism, perceptions of inequality and community conflict, and the experience of other forms of criminality can all create grievances that may be exploited by apologists for terrorism. Other perceived grievances may relate to the accessibility of services, perceived media hostility, stigmatising Muslim communities (eg through antiterrorism legislation) and to Islamophobia and extreme far-right activity."
- "Preventing Extremism - A Strategy for Delivery", June 2008. As the Home Office explains, "this short booklet aims to explain our work to counter violent extremism for all those who are actively interested in this endeavour, from those working in our communities to resist the messages of extremists to members of the public who understand the importance of facing this challenge together."
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- Independent Police Complaints Commission (England):
- "Investigation into the Shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes at Stockwell Underground Station on 22 July 2005", January 2006. The Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) examined the fatal shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes by Metropolitan Police Service officers following the 7/7 suicide bombings and the failed 7/21 follow-on attack. The IPCC assesses that "no material has been seen or assembled by the IPCC to suggest that this tragedy was the result of any deliberate act designed to endanger the life of any innocent third party or indeed to kill such an individual. All those involved at both command and operational level were intent upon protecting the general public from a perceived threat of illegal lethal force."
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- Intelligence and Security Committee (England):
- "Review of the Intelligence on the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005", May 2009. This report addresses the unanswered questions relating to the intelligence on the 7/7 bombers, particularly those arising out of the investigation of the 2004 fertiliser bomb (CREVICE) plot.
- "Prime Minister's Response to the ISC Review of the Intelligence on the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005", May 2009.
- "Report into Rendition", July 2007. This report considers whether the UK security and intelligence Agencies had any knowledge of, and/or involvement in, rendition operations, and also the Agencies' overall policy for intelligence sharing with foreign liaison services.
- "Government Response to the ISC Report into Rendition", July 2007.
- "Intelligence and Security Committee Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005", May 2006. This report examines intelligence and security matters relevant to the July terrorist attacks, focusing in particular on: whether any intelligence which may have helped prevent the attacks was missed or overlooked; why the threat level to the UK was lowered prior to the attacks and what impact this had; and what lessons were learned from these attacks, and how these lessons are being applied.
- "Government Response to the ISC Inquiry re: Intelligence and Security Committee Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005", May 2006.
- "The Handling of Detainees by UK Intelligence Personnel in Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay and Iraq ", March 2005. This report covers the contact between detainees and the SIS, Security Service, both military and civilian DIS staff and military intelligence personnel in Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay and Iraq.
- "Government Response to the ISC Inquiry re: the Handling of Detainees by UK Intelligence Personnel in Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay and Iraq ", April 2005.
- "Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction – Intelligence and Assessments", September 2003. This report examines whether the available intelligence, which informed the decision to invade Iraq, was adequate and properly assessed and whether it was accurately reflected in Government publications.
- "Government Response to the ISC Inquiry on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction – Intelligence and Assessments", February 2004.
- "Inquiry into Intelligence, Assessments and Advice Prior to the Terrorist Bombings on Bali 12 October 2002", December 2002. The Intelligence and Security Committee concluded that "on the available intelligence there was no action that the UK or its allies could have taken to prevent the attacks."
- "Government Response to the ISC Inquiry into Intelligence, Assessments and Advice Prior to the Terrorist Bombings on Bali 12 October 2002", February 2003. Responding to the Intelligence and Security Committee report, the government wrote, "Given the current high terrorist threat and volume of reporting, the Government believes it is important to strike a balance between causing alarm to the public and providing it with adequate warning. As the Prime Minister said in his speech to the Lord Mayor’s Banquet on 11 November: 'If, on the basis of a general warning, we were to shut down all the places that Al-Qaeda might be considering for attack, we would be doing their job for them. The dilemma is reconciling warning people with alarming them; taking preventive measures without destroying normal life.'"
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- Metropolitan Police Service (England):
- "Scotland Yard Report into Assassination of Benazir Bhutto" (Added 2/8/08) After the December 27, 2007 assassination of Benazir Bhutto in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, the Metropolitan Police Counter Terrorism Command joined the investigation. According to the U.K., "the primary focus of the Scotland Yard team was to assist the Pakistani authorities in establishing the cause and circumstances of Ms Bhutto's death. The wider investigation to establish culpability has remained entirely a matter for the Pakistani authorities." The Met Police report was released today and it concluded that "Ms Bhutto’s only apparent injury was a major trauma to the right side of the head. The UK experts all exclude this injury being an entry or exit wound as a result of gunshot. The only X-ray records, taken after her death, were of Ms Bhutto’s head. However, the possibility of a bullet wound to her mid or lower trunk can reasonably be excluded. This is based upon the protection afforded by the armoured vehicle in which she was travelling at the time of the attack, and the accounts of her family and hospital staff who examined her."
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- "EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report: 2009" (Added 5/10/09) Europol has released its third annual "Terrorism Situation and Trend Report," which provides an overview of terrorist activity in the European Union in 2008. According to the report, "Although the majority of EU member states have not been targeted by Islamist terrorists, some report that the perceived threat remains high or even estimate that the risk of an attack has increased for reasons that include military presence in Afghanistan or Iraq..." It also notes that "Information from member states and open sources indicates that the role of mosques in the radicalisation and recruitment of Islamist terrorists is declining. This is due, to a large part, to the fact that Muslim communities have become more vigilant and willing to confront extremism. Although some mosques continue
to be used for radicalisation, Islamist terrorist recruitment efforts have largely been driven underground, with little overt propagation and recruitment now occurring at mosques. The main players in Islamist terrorist recruitment are no longer ‘radical imams’, but ‘activists’, i.e. members of terrorist cells acting outside the organisational framework of mosques. Prisons and other places in which individuals are likely to be vulnerable, lack orientation or experience personal crises (‘places of vulnerability’) continue to be a cause of concern. Sources in member states point out the risk of radicalisation in prisons."
- "EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report: 2008" (Added 4/8/08) Europol has released its second annual "Terrorism Situation and Trend Report," which provides an overview of Islamist terrorist activity in the European Union in 2007. According to the report, "two failed and two attempted attacks were reported for 2007. As in 2006, failed or attempted Islamist terrorist attacks took place in the UK, Denmark and Germany. Police investigations into the attempted attacks in Denmark and Germany have shown that the intended targets were likely to be located on their national territory. The failed and attempted attacks mainly aimed at causing indiscriminate mass casualties." Additionally, "concerning Islamist terrorism, the number of arrested individuals decreased compared to 2006. In 2007, 201 persons were arrested for Islamist terrorism, compared to 257 in 2006."
- "EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report: 2007" This Europol report summarizes Islamist terrorist activity in the European Union in 2006. In the "Key Findings and Trends" section, the report notes that "the majority of the arrested suspects were born in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia and had loose affiliations to North African terrorist groups, such as the GICM and the GSPC."
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- "Dossier on Mumbai Attacks", January 2009. (Added 1/12/09) The Indian government has released a dossier on the Mumbai terror attacks that includes a chronology of events, pictures of items discovered on the boat used by the operatives to reach Mumbai, explanations of code words utilized, and transcripts of intercepted conversations during the assault.
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- "Interpol Orange Notice for 85 terrorist suspects wanted by Saudi Arabia", February 2008. (Added 3/12/2009) Interpol has issued an international security alert, known as an Orange Notice, for 85 terrorists suspected of plotting attacks against Saudi Arabia from abroad. According to Interpol, "the 83 Saudis and two Yemenis are wanted at the national level by Saudi Arabia on terrorism-related charges, including links to al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, as well as in Iraq and Afghanistan." (For more, see NEFA Senior Investigator Evan Kohlmann's Special Report titled, “The Eleven: Saudi Guantanamo Veterans Returning to the Fight.”)
- "Interpol's Forensic Report on FARC Computers and Hardware Seized by Colombia", May 2008. (Added 5/15/08) On March 1, 2008, Colombian authorities seized laptops, hard disks and thumb drives from a FARC camp in the Ecuadorian border region with Colombia. Rejecting rumors that the material had been tampered with by Colombian authorities, Interpol analyzed the computers/hardware and concluded that "no user files have been created, modified or deleted on any of the eight FARC computer exhibits following their seizure..." Interpol also released a number of images that were found on the FARC computers.
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- General Intelligence and Security Service (The Netherlands):
- "The Radical Dawa in Transition: The Rise of Islamic Neoradicalism in the Netherlands", October 2007. In this report, the Director-General of the General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands reveals that "the AIVD has established that the non-violent version of radical Islam is being evangelised on an ever increasing scale in the Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe, and that that activity is becoming more and more organised. Despite its non-violent form, this ideology is still disrupting the relationships within and between ethnic groups. This can result in radicalisation, polarisation and social isolation."
- "Violent Jihad in the Netherlands: Current Trends in the Islamist Terrorist Threat", April 2006. In this report, the AIVD "charts the phenomenon of Dutch-based jihadist networks which represent the terrorist threat currently confronting us. The paper provides insight into the emergence of these networks and their development over the past few years. The most important trend observed by the AIVD is the fact that the jihadist threat is increasingly rooted in our own society. The principal causes are the processes of radicalisation and recruitment among young Muslims. In addition to peerpressure, the internet plays an increasingly important role."
- "From Dawa to Jihad - The Various Threats of Radical Islam to the Democratic Legal Order", March 2005. As the introduction notes, "this paper starts from the premise that radical Islam is a multiform phenomenon. Radical Islam consists of many movements and groups that, although related (in particular concerning faith and anti-Western sentiments), may harbour very different views on aims and means. This means that various kinds of threats can emanate from radical Islam, one of which is terrorism. In addition to radical Islamic organisations and networks which concentrate on the Jihad (in the sense of armed combat) against the West, there are other groups, which principally focus on 'Dawa' (the propagation of the radical-Islamic ideology), while some groups and networks combine both."
- "Saudi Influences in the Netherlands: Links between the Salafist Mission, Radicalisation Processes and Islamic Terrorism", January 2005. In this report, the AIVD investigates "the other side of the religious-ideological manipulative activities and financing flows from Saudi Arabia. At issue in this context are in particular the role that these possibly play in the Netherlands in the propagation of anti-integration views, the increase of sentiments aimed at a confrontation with Dutch society among small segments of the Muslim communities in our country, and in the long term even the development of endogenous, violent tendencies (which, for example, may lead to terrorism) among some groups of Muslims in the Netherlands."
- "Radical Views of Imams in the Netherlands Less Public", January 2005. This press release, which accompanied the release of the AIVD report "Saudi Influences in the Netherlands," stated, "Imams and mosque administrators who follow the puritanical form of Islam known as salafism are adopting a less radical and anti-Western stance in public than in the past. The change is mainly a response to external pressure, and it is too early to say whether their new attitude will last...The AIVD also concludes that radical Imams and recruiters today increasingly meet and operate behind closed doors."
- "Background of Jihad Recruits in the Netherlands", March 2004. As explained in the introduction to this document, "this memorandum gives a brief characterisation of persons in the Netherlands who are going through a process of recruitment for the violent jihad. The complexity of the phenomenon makes it is very difficult, if not impossible, to provide a complete profile of these persons. The AIVD has established that the people who fall under the spell of the ‘holy war’ against the supposed enemies of Islam have wide-ranging backgrounds and that the circumstances under which this takes places are equally wide-ranging. Consequently, recruitment rather involves individual development paths than a group process. For this reason this memorandum is mainly a general description of the processes and circumstances in which potential Islamist terrorists in the Netherlands find themselves. It gives an outline of the latest state of affairs in circles of radical Muslims in the Netherlands."
- "Counterterrorism in the Netherlands", June 2003. E.S.M. Akerboom -- Director, Democratic Legal Order, for the AIVD -- wrote that "we have been painfully confronted with the fact that also some Muslims raised in the Netherlands are receptive to radical-Islamist ideas and manipulation. A number of them underwent a radicalisation process and were successfully recruited for the jihad, with the ultimate prospect of martyrdom."
- "Recruitment for the Jihad in the Netherlands: From Incident to Trend", December 2002. This AIVD report concludes that "the recruitments for the Islamic war which took place in the Netherlands over the past year, can therefore not be seen as mere isolated incidents. They are rather the first tangible illustrations of a tendency, closely related to a stealthy entrance of a violent radical Islamic movement in Dutch society, which is also taking place in the rest of the western world. The outlined development is a significant threat for the Dutch society. People who can be included in this radical Islamic movement are positioning themselves explicitly outside and opposite the democratic legal order."
- "AIVD Warns of Gap Between Muslims and Non-Muslims", December 2002. This press release, which accompanied the release of the report "Recruitment for the Jihad in the Netherlands, stated, "According to a conservative estimate by the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), in the Netherlands some dozens of young Muslims are being prepared for the jihad, the holy Islamic war. This recruitment is an expression of a violent radical-Islamic (Islamistic) movement that has crept into the Dutch society." Further, "most of the youths who are recruited in the Netherlands at the moment - but definitely not all - are young men of Moroccan origin who were born in the Netherlands or grew up there from early childhood. Practically all of them have Dutch nationality. These youths are often going through an identity crisis and find something to hold on to in a very radical perception of Islamic faith."
- AIVD: Annual Report 2005. This is the AIVD's 2005 Annual Report.
- AIVD: Annual Report 2004. This is the AIVD's 2004 Annual Report.
- AIVD: Annual Report 2002. This is the AIVD's 2002 Annual Report.
- AIVD: Annual Report 2001. This is the AIVD's 2001 Annual Report.
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- National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (The Netherlands):
- "Salafism in the Netherlands: A Passing Phenomenon or a Persistent Factor of Significance?", July 2008. In a report titled "Salafism in the Netherlands: A passing phenomenon or a persistent factor of significance?", the Dutch National Coordinator for Counterterrorism writes "the foundations of salafism are at odds with the basic principles of the Dutch constitutional state. Without a doubt, salafist forces in the Netherlands have in the past expressed views which, quite simply, clash with the Dutch democratic legal system." Moreover, "since 2002 the (a)political salafists have – at least in public - taken a moderate stance. The General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), however, regards this moderation as a political façade. According to the Service, the political salafists present themselves to the outside world as much more moderate than they are in reality."
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- Ministry of Home Affairs (Singapore):
- "The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism", January 7, 2003. (Added 3/30/08) This lengthy report, published by Singapore's Ministry of Home Affairs, provides extensive detail on Jemaah Islamiyah's historical background, objectives and strategy, and links with other organizations, including the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and Al-Qaida. It also sheds considerable light on the JI network disrupted in Singapore in 2001.
- "Jemaah Islamiyah Organizational Chart" (Added 3/30/08) This chart maps the organizational structure of Jemaah Islamiyah (the leadership has changed since this chart was released).
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- 2009 Annual Report on Afghanistan (Added 6/11/09) This Annual Report on Afghanistan produced by NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division offers a general look at progress in each of the three main lines of effort in which NATO-ISAF is involved: security, governance and development. It goes beyond setting out only what NATO-ISAF has done; it attempts to provide the reader with a broader and more balanced picture, including both elements of progress and those areas in which more needs to be done.
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- United Nations Al-Qaida/Taliban Monitoring Team:
- Report: November 2007 The United Nations team concludes: "There may have been fewer major operations than Al-Qaida leaders would have liked, but the arrest or death of suspected Al-Qaida-related terrorists in more than 40 countries around the world since the Team last reported in November 2006 (S/2007/132) suggests a high volume of terrorist planning."
- Letter to President of the Security Council: September 2006 (Added 1/13/08) The United Nations team writes: "Over the last six months Al-Qaida, Usama Bin Laden and the Taliban have made some gains and suffered some losses. The violence in Afghanistan has increased considerably, and there has been no let up in Iraq, with Al-Qaida’s contribution remaining disproportionate to its size. Elsewhere, there have been many attacks that promoted Al-Qaida objectives, even if mounted by unconnected groups or individuals with narrower sectarian or political aims...But there have also been deaths and arrests. Ahmad Fadil Nazal Al-Khalayleh (also known as Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi), killed in Iraq in June, and Shamil Basayev, killed in Ingushetia, Russian Federation, in July, both on the Consolidated List, were key leaders, and there have been other significant losses, including in Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia. There have been many arrests and disrupted plots, only some of which have been announced publicly. Despite warnings by Al-Qaida of major imminent attacks against Western countries, none has occurred, at least not yet."
- Letter to President of the Security Council: March 2006 (Added 1/13/08) The United Nations team reports that "the second half of 2005 saw serious attacks in London; Bali; Nalchik, Russian Federation; Delhi and Amman and many more elsewhere. These atrocities took place against a background of constant violence in Iraq, where Al-Qaida claimed the grim milestone of its 800th suicide bombing. A string of threatening statements from Al-Qaida leaders, and many warnings of imminent attacks from security authorities, further suggested that the threat from Al-Qaida-related terrorism remains as persistent as ever, despite the enormous effort of the international community to combat it."
- Letter to President of the Security Council: September 2005 (Added 1/13/08) According to the United Nations team, "if little has changed in the substance and delivery of the Al-Qaida message, much has changed in its operational reach. Al-Qaida terrorism now comprises three distinct but interlinked groups: first, the old leadership whose names are well known; second, the fighters who attended the camps in Afghanistan and graduated as experienced terrorists; and third, a new and growing generation of supporters who may never have left their countries of residence but have embraced the core elements of the Al-Qaida message."
- Letter to President of the Security Council: February 2005 (Added 1/13/08) Analyzing Al-Qaida's financing, the United Nations team assesses that "Al-Qaida, the Taliban and their associates continue to raise most of the money they need from the donations of knowing and unwitting benefactors and through local crime. The Team believes that when money crosses borders it does so most commonly by cash couriers and through informal remittance systems, though electronic transfers may be made between operatives who are thought not to have come to the attention of the authorities."
- Letter to President of the Security Council: August 2004 (Added 1/13/08) Summarizing the terrorist threat, the United Nations team writes: "Five years after the Security Council adopted resolution 1267 (1999)...the threat from Al-Qaida-related terrorism remains as great as ever. But the nature of the threat has changed. The Taliban have been removed from power and the Al-Qaida leadership is dispersed. But if the leadership is less able to direct, plan and execute attacks, they have many supporters who are eager to do so. These terrorists form groups that do not wait for orders from above but launch attacks when they are ready, against targets of their own choosing. Using minimal resources and exploiting worldwide publicity, they have managed to create an international sense of crisis."
- Letter to President of the Security Council: December 2003 (Added 1/13/08) In this letter, the United Nations team suggests that "that States become more proactive in proposing the names of persons known to have been recruited and trained for terrorist-related activities, and entities known to be associated with the network. The Group continues to believe that all persons who have been trained by Al-Qaida for terrorism-related purposes should be identified to the Committee and should be presumed to be Al-Qaida associates for the purposes of the list."
- Letter to President of the Security Council: July 2003 (Added 1/13/08) The United Nations team points out that "since the Group’s last report there have been some important arrests, giving rise to an impression in some quarters that the war against al-Qa`idah is being won. Certainly the arrests of key members of Osama bin Laden’s original 'command team', particularly Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Abu Zubayida, Yasir al-Jaziri and Waleed bin Attash and other senior lieutenants, have significantly dented the operational capability of al-Qa`idah and provided some useful intelligence concerning the network. This has led to the break-up of cells in a number of countries and the detention of substantial numbers of supporters and operatives belonging to the network. But, as the recent bombings in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Morocco and Saudi Arabia have demonstrated, Islamic extremist elements are still willing and able to strike at targets of their choosing, with devastating political and economic effect and appalling loss of life and injuries."
- Letter to President of the Security Council: December 2002 (Added 1/13/08) In this letter, the United Nations team argues: "Al-Qa’idah is an insidious mass movement, and no country or group of countries can handle the problem alone. Without broad information-sharing, police investigative cooperation and the application of international system-wide financial controls, al-Qa’idah will continue to be able to resist, recruit and rearm."
- Letter to President of the Security Council: September 2002 (Added 1/13/08) In this letter, the United Nations team highlights that: "the investigations following the attacks of 11 September 2001 have unearthed clear evidence regarding the extent to which al-Qa’idah has established itself in Europe. Al-Qa’idah cells in Europe provided logistic support and financing for the attacks and are in position to provide support and weaponry for other possible operations worldwide. This support includes fund-raising and the provision of finance; the supply of false, forged or stolen identity and travel documents; and safe houses. In addition, the recruiting of young men and women, inspired by a small number of extremist clerics preaching jihad, appears to be quite common in a number of locations in Europe, as in many other parts of the world."
- Letter to President of the Security Council: May 2002 (Added 1/13/08) Commenting on Al-Qaida's financing, this letter notes that Al-Qaida "and its associates appear to have diversified the movement and security of their finances by acquiring commodities such as gold and diamonds, and by using alternative remittance systems in addition to the formal banking system."
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