Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Strategy:

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College:
  • "Disrupting Threat Finances: Utilization of Financial Information to Disrupt Terrorist Organizations in the Twenty-First Century", October 2007. As the author explains, "this monograph focuses on the ways the U.S. Government can effectively fight terrorist organizations beyond simply trying to deny terrorist access to financing. Specifically, the U.S. Government can use financial information as the 'string' that leads to all aspects of terrorist operations. By disrupting access to financial resources and, more importantly, following its trail, the U.S. Government through coordinated intelligence, investigations, prosecutions, sanctions, and diplomacy within the Interagency, private sector, allies, and partner nations, can enhance U.S. security, disrupt terrorist operations and mitigate terrorist effects on U.S. strategic interests."
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA):
  • "Al-Qa'ida: Railways a High Priority Target", April 2004. This Unclassified/For Official Use Only document, which has been leaked to the public, states that "reporting points to attacks on railways and subways as a means to hurt the US economy and incite mass hysteria. Al-Qa‘ida reportedly considered planning attacks against US railways after observing the economic impact of the 11 September attacks on the US airline industry."
  • "Al-Qa'ida Remains Intent on Defeating US Immigration Inspections", May 30, 2003. Following up on NEFA Senior Investigator Doug Farah's Counterterrorism Blog post on the threat of terrorists crossing the Mexican border, the NEFA Foundation is highlighting a previously leaked, Unclassified/For Official Use Only, Central Intelligence Agency report from 2003, which states that "recent information demonstrates al-Qa’ida’s ongoing interest to enter the United States over land borders with Mexico and Canada—although it is unclear whether operatives have been advised to present credentials to border authorities or sneak across. The information obtained includes: Downloaded internet articles discussing difficulties the United States has in securing its northern and southern borders," as well as "instructions on how to avoid suspicion when traveling and questions to expect from immigration inspection officials." Further, "as a final backstop, al-Qa’ida members are told, if possible, to recruit immigration officials with access to databases to ensure the passports were not watchlisted."
Central Intelligence Agency Office of the Inspector General (CIA OIG):
  • "CIA Accountability with Respect to the 9/11 Attacks" - Executive Summary and Statement by CIA Director Michael Hayden, June 2005; Released August 2007. The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) team concluded that "the Agency and its officers did not discharge their responsibilities in a satisfactory manner." Further, "the findings of greatest concern are those that identify systematic problems where the Agency's programs or processes did not work as they should have, and concerning which a number of persons were involved or aware, or should have been." 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
  • "National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism", February 2006. This Department of Defense document asserts that "it is of supreme importance that the United States Military understand the nature of the threat and the nature of this war. This understanding is critical to the implementation of this strategy. Integral to the National Military Strategic Plan for the GWOT is the concept of 'supporting mainstream efforts to reject violent extremism.' All military members need an understanding of this critical element of the strategy. We must be aware of the culture, customs, language and philosophy of affected populations and the enemy, to more effectively counter extremism, and encourage democracy, freedom, and economic prosperity abroad."
Congressional Research Service (CRS):
  • "Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness", Updated March 2007. This report is based on the premise that "the potential for terrorist attacks against agricultural targets (agroterrorism) is increasingly recognized as a national security threat, especially after the events of September 11, 2001."
  • "Combating Terrorism: The Challenge of Measuring Effectiveness", Updated March 2007. According to the Congressional Research Service, "this report is designed to support efforts of the 110th Congress to understand and apply broad based objective criteria when evaluating progress in the nation’s efforts to combat terrorism."
  • "International Terrorism: Threat, Policy, and Response", Updated January 2007. This Congressional Research Service report "examines international terrorist actions, threats, U.S. policies and responses. It reviews the nation’s use of tools at its disposal to combat terrorism, from diplomacy, international cooperation, and constructive engagement to physical security enhancement, economic sanctions, covert action, and military force."
  • "Bioterrorism Countermeasure Development: Issues in Patents and Homeland Security", Updated November 2006. Congressional Research Service analysts addressed bills pertaining to bioterrorism countermeasures that were considered, but not enacted by the 109th Congress, that "proposed reforms to current policies and practices associated with intellectual property, particularly patents, and the marketing of pharmaceuticals and related products."
  • "Treatment of 'Battlefield Detainees' in the War on Terrorism", Updated November 2006. This Congressional Research Service report "provides an overview of the law of war and the historical treatment of wartime detainees, in particular the U.S. practice; describes how the detainees’ status might affect their rights and treatment; and summarizes activity of the 108th and 109th Congresses related to detention in connection with the war against terrorism."
  • "U.S.-EU Cooperation Against Terrorism", Updated October 2006. This report asserts that "a salient issue for Congress will be whether the U.S.-EU agreements on extradition and mutual legal assistance add value to the existing bilateral accords on these issues that Washington already has with most EU member states."
  • "Trends in Terrorism", July 2006. The author of this document argues that "emerging trends that may require enhanced policy focus are (1) attacks that aim to cause economic damage such as attacks on transportation infrastructure, tourism, and oil installations, (2) the growing  number of unattributed terrorist attacks, and (3) the growing power and influence of radical Islamist political parties in foreign nations."
  • "Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment", August 2005. This paper "focus[es] on the Al Qaeda organization and its major affiliates, but not the full spectrum of like-minded Islamist cells or groups that might exist."
  • "Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology", June 2005. This Congressional Research Service "report reviews Al Qaeda’s use of public statements from the mid-1990s to the present and analyzes the evolving ideological and political content of those statements. The report focuses primarily on statements made by Osama Bin Laden..."
  • "Islam: Sunnis and Shiites", February 2004. The Congressional Research Service offers "a historical background of the Sunni-Shiite split and the differences in religious beliefs and practices between and within each Islamic sect as well as their similarities."
  • "Terrorists and Suicide Attacks", August 2003. This document "focuses on the following questions: What are suicide attacks? What have been the patterns and motivations for terrorist organizations using suicide attacks in the past? What terrorist groups and other organizations are most likely to launch such attacks? How great a threat are terrorist suicide attacks to the United States, at home and abroad? How can the United States counter such a threat? It analyzes the key lessons of the international experience with suicide attacks and examines their relevance to the United States."
  • "Terrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign Policy", April 2003. The author of this document notes that "this issue brief examines international terrorist actions and threats and the U.S. policy response. Available policy options range from diplomacy, international cooperation, and constructive engagement to economic sanctions, covert action, physical security enhancement, and military force."
  • "Islam: A Primer", February 2003. The Congressional Research Service provides "short descriptions of the historical background, the tenets of Islam, jihad, the status of women in Islam, and other aspects of Islam."
Customs and Border Patrol (CBP):
  • "Securing the Global Supply Chain: Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) Strategic Plan", February 2006. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) explains that its "priority mission is to prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States." Further, "In protecting our borders against the threat of terrorism and promoting global supply chain security, CBP applies a 'layered defense' strategy. This multi-layered approach includes using information analysis and targeting, employing advanced inspection technologies, engaging the private sector to increase supply chain security and expanding our borders by pre-screening shipments that pose a potential terrorist risk prior to arrival in the United States."
Department of Defense (DOD):
  • "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq", March 2008. In a March 2008 report to Congress titled "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq," the Department of Defense states that "terrorists and foreign fighters continue to find safe haven, border transit opportunities and logistical support in Syria, despite increasing Syrian counterterrorism efforts. Estimates suggest that Syria is the entry point for 90% of all known foreign terrorists in Iraq. Former Iraqi regime elements opposed to the GoI also find sanctuary in Syria." Further, "it is not clear that Syria has
    made a strategic decision to deal with foreign terrorists using Syria as a transit point into Iraq."
  • "Changes in Espionage by Americans: 1947-2007", March 2008. This report, authored by the Defense Personnel Security Research Center, "documents changes and trends in American espionage since 1990...Findings include: since 1990 offenders are more likely to be naturalized citizens, and to have foreign attachments, connections, and ties. Their espionage is more likely to be motivated by divided loyalties." Interestingly, "since 1990, money has not been the primary motivation for espionage."
  • "Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents, Volume 1 (Redacted)", March 2008. Researchers from the Joint Advanced Warfighting Program (JAWP) at the Institute for Defense Analyses, a Department of Defense entity, "screened more than 600,000 original captured documents and several thousand hours of audio and video footage archived in a US Department of Defense (DOD) database called Harmony" in order to "report on the inner workings...of the Saddam Hussein regime." The review "uncovered strong evidence that links the regime of Saddam Hussein to regional and global terrorism. Despite their incompatible long-term goals, many terrorist movements and Saddam found a common enemy in the United States." However, "this study found 'no smoking gun' (i.e., direct connection) between Saddam's Iraq and al Qaeda. Saddam's interest in, and support for, non-state actors was spread across a variety of revolutionary, liberation, nationalist, and Islamic terrorist organizations. Some in the regime recognized the potential high internal and external costs of maintaining relatiosnhips with radical Islamic groups, yet they concluded that in some cases, the benefits of association outweighed the risks."
  • "Ex-Guantanamo Detainees Who Have Returned to the Fight", July 2007. In April 2008, Abdallah Salih al-Ajmi, a Kuwaiti who had been detained at Guantanamo Bay for over three years, reportedly carried out a suicide bombing in Mosul, Iraq. In a July 2007 report, the Department of Defense revealed "that at least 30 former GTMO detainees have taken part in anti-coalition militant activities after leaving U.S. detention." According to DOD, "these former detainees successfully lied to US officials, sometimes for over three years. Many detainees later identified as having returned to fight against the U.S. with terrorists falsely claimed to be farmers, truck drivers, cooks, small-scale merchants, or low-level combatants." 
Department of Homeland Security:
  • "Terminology to Define the Terrorists: Recommendations from American Muslims", January 2008. In a leaked January 2008 For Official Use Only memo, which has become the subject of considerable controversy, the Department of Homeland Security's Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties argues that "words matter" and thus "terminology should...be strategic" to "avoid helping the terrorists by inflating the religious bases and glamorous appeal of their ideology." The memorandum "outlines recommendations from a wide variety of American Muslim leaders regarding the difficult terrain of terminology." For example, "the experts counseled caution in using terms such as, 'jihadist,' 'Islamic terrorist,' 'Islamist,' and 'holy warrior' as grandiose descriptions."
  • "Potential Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Information Infrastructure", June 2007. In a June 2007, Unclassified/For Official Use Only bulletin titled "Potential Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Information Infrastructure" that has been leaked to the public, the Department of Homeland Security writes that "DHS assess that Islamic terrorist groups such as al-Qa'ida, HAMAS, and Hizballah have a growing appreciation of information technology to support their operations, and could parlay their cyber knowledge into attacks on homeland information infrastructure." Further, "Islamic extremists have expressed interest in developing the capability to exploit cyber vulnerabilities to disrupt the provision of services, exact economic costs, and undermine public confidence. DHS I&A lacks information on al-Qa'ida's ability to mount a cyber attack against U.S. infrastructure targets." Notably, "an al-Qa'ida operational planner in 2002 explored the possibility of hacking to  destabilize banking communications, infrastructures, and power. The development of a specific plan, however, has not been confirmed." 
  • "Increasing Threat of Keyloggers to Computer Security", May 2007. This Unclassified/For Official Use Only "Homeland Security Assessment" has become public. It warns that "keyloggers and associated spyware have evolved into one of the most prevalent and potentially harmful threats to U.S. information infrastructure. Users of these intrusive software programs and hardware devices have targeted personally identifiable information, corporate intellectual property, government classified information, and critical infrastructure data repositories."
  • "Strategic Sector Assessment: Commercial Facilities", January 2007. This leaked Unclassified/For Official Use Only "Strategic Sector Assessment," produced by DHS' Homeland Infrastructure Threat & Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC), states that "DHS has specific and credible reporting from multiple sources indicating al-Qa‘ida’s historical interest in attacking specific elements of the CFS. DHS is not aware of any specific imminent threat to critical infrastructure in the sector, but an attack against a sector asset likely would meet al-Qa‘ida’s strategic targeting criteria, which are to inflict American casualties, cause psychological damage to the U.S. population by attacking symbols of U.S. culture or symbolic value, and damage the national economy."
  • "Strategic Sector Assessment: Government Facilities", December 2006. Authored by DHS' Homeland Infrastructure Threat & Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC), this Unclassified/For Official Use Only "Strategic Sector Assessment" has become become public. ctober of 2005. According to the report, "DHS continues to receive information on terrorist threats to the government facilities sector (GFS); however, there is no recent information to suggest terrorist operational planning may be underway in the United States...an attack against government facilities would fit al-Qa‘ida’s targeting strategy of causing mass casualties, panic, and economic losses and would further the group’s strategic goals." 
  • "The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Commercial Passenger and Freight Rail System", May 2006. This "Strategic Sector Assessment" was produced by DHS' Homeland Infrastructure Threat & Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC). According to the assessment, "the most likely targets considered by al-Qa‘ida or affiliated extremists are passenger trains loaded to capacity during peak ridership periods, underwater rail tunnels, and heavily used stations in large metropolitan areas. Within the United States, heavily used stations include Pennsylvania Station...and Grand Central Station in New York, and Union Station in Washington, D.C." Assessing the freight rail threat, the document states, "a terrorist attack against the freight rail system is possible, but less likely because it would require more complex planning and execution to achieve substantial casualties or economic damage."
  • "Strategic Sector Assessment: U.S. Aviation", May 2006. This Unclassified/For Official Use Only "Strategic Sector Assessment" was distributed by DHS' Homeland Infrastructure Threat & Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC) and has become been released with redactions. The report notes that "in the summer of 2003, al-Qa'ida planned to use camera flash attachments as stun guns. They also intended to use cameras to disguise bomb components in order to hijack commercial airliners and crash them into targets in Western countries, including along the U.S. East Coast and in Australia, Britain, and Italy." Further, "as of early July 2005, al-Qa'ida reportedly had planned to attack military and civilian airports in Los Angeles and San Diego in September or October of 2005. The possible tactics included the hijacking of an airliner on the way from India to the United States, or a flight from Mexico."
  • "DHS Intelligence Enterprise Strategic Plan", January 2006. The plan's primary goal is to "ensure all Homeland Security intelligence-related information is gathered, collected, reported, and disseminated to those who need it." 
  • "False Hospital Inspections", April 25, 2005. This leaked Unclassified/For Official Use Only, Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Bulletin reveals that "over the past year, there have been several reported cases of personnel falsely representing themselves as Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO). These said individuals were attempting to gain public health service information from hospital personnel, and behaved in a manner inconsistent with legitimate inspection professionals." DHS adds that "while these suspicious activities may exhibit characteristics of criminal activity or even possible pre-operational planning activity, DHS has no information indicating that they are tied to a specific and credible threat of an al-Qaida-associated terrorist attack against hospital facilities inside the United States."
  • "How Terrorists Might Exploit a Hurricane", September 15, 2004. This now-public, Unclassified/For Official Use Only, Department of Homeland Security document was produced by the Analytic Red Cell Program, which brought together "more than 35 experts from intelligence, industry, military, and academia" and asked them "to speculate on possible terrorist exploitation of a high category hurricane." According to the report, "one opportunity would be for a group like al-Qaida to capitalize on the hurricane—and its strain on emergency response and security personnel—to launch a strike elsewhere in the region or country. Moreover, organized groups, splinter cells, or lone wolf terrorists might observe security measures to help planning for a future event, target evacuation routes and emergency shelters, or even impersonate emergency responders to attempt to gain access and cause destruction."
  • "Remotely Piloted Vehicle Threat", June 7, 2004. This now-public, Unclassified/For Official Use Only, Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Bulletin states that "recent intelligence reporting confirms terrorist interest in the use of Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV). RPVs fall into two categories; Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), which are military hardware, or Remote Controlled Aircraft (RCAs), which are hobby model aircraft or commercial remote controlled aircraft. We have no specific information to indicate an imminent attack in the United States using such vehicles, but it is important to ensure that the above-named recipients are fully aware of these capabilities."
  • "Maintaining Awareness Regarding Al Qaeda's Potential Threats to the Homeland", September 4, 2003. This Department of Homeland Security advisory warns that "a growing body of credible intelligence indicates Al-Qaeda continues to develop plans for multiple attacks against  targets in the US involving commercial aircraft, with some plans calling for hijacking airliners transiting near or flying over the continental United States - but not destined to land at US airports." The document also cautions about critical infrastructure threats, CBRN threats, and threats against soft targets.
  • "Swimmer Attack Indicators and Protective Measures", August 22, 2003. According to this Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Bulletin, "although there is no evidence of international terrorist groups planning to utilize scuba divers to carry out attacks within the United States, there is a body of information showing the desire to obtain such capability. During the past two years there have been numerous incidents that have occurred involving suspicious individuals possibly conducting surveillance of port facilities, cruise ship docks, naval bases, dams, bridges and power facilities in the United States. Also, there has been law enforcement reporting of suspicious individuals having queried marine shops and schools concerning equipment and training."
  • "Potential Terrorist Use of Official Identification, Uniforms, or Vehicles", July 22, 2003. This Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Bulletin states that "Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups likely view the theft or other illegal acquisition of official identification, uniforms, or vehicles as an effective way to increase access and decrease scrutiny in furtherance of planning and operations. Although we possess no information that Al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups are systematically pursuing the illegal acquisition of the above referenced items, there is indeed precedence for the use of official identification, uniforms, or vehicles in the execution of terrorist attacks. Terrorist groups have utilized police or military uniforms to mask their identities and achieve closer access to their targets without arousing suspicion."
  • "Potential Indicators of Threats Involving Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs)", May 15, 2003. This Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Bulletin is "intended to provide general information to assist in efforts to recognize potential VBIED-related threats or incidents based on the recent Riyadh bombings."
    •
  • "Possible Indicators of Al-Qaeda Surveillance", March 20, 2003. This Department of Homeland Security Information Bulletin states, "Al-Qaeda operations have been characterized by meticulous planning, a focus on inflicting mass casualties, and multiple, simultaneous suicide attacks...Recent information and analysis point to surveillance practices that traditionally have been utilized by Al-Qaeda-affliliated operatives." The Bulletin then lists a number of those indicators, such as "prolonged static surveillance using operatives disguised as panhandlers, demonstrators, shoe shiners, food or flower vendors, news agents, or street sweepers not previously seen in the area."
  • "Potential Terrorist Use of Pressure Cookers". This Department of Homeland Security Information Bulletin seeks "o alert frontline border inspectors and agents, state and local officers, and other first responders that there is continued interest by terrorist organizations to use innocuous items to package improvised explosive devices (IEDs.) A technique commonly taught in Afghan terrorist training camps is the use/conversion of pressure cookers into IEDs."
  • "Homeland Security Threat Overview". This Unclassified/For Office Use Only, Office of Intelligence and Analysis briefing, which has been made public, provides an overview of terrorist trends and targeting strategies. 
Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General (DHS OIG):
  • "The Removal of a Canadian Citizen to Syria", March 2008. On September 26, 2002, Maher Arar - who held joint Canadian and Syrian citizenship -- flew into JFK Airport in Queens, New York from Tunisia (via Zurich). After being "identified as a special interest alience who was suspected of affiliations with a terrorist organization," he was removed from the U.S. on October 8, 2002. He was flown to Amman, Jordan and eventually taken into custody by Syria. "After Arar returned to Canada in October 2003, he alleged that he was beaten and tortured while in the custody of the Syrian government." This report examines DHS' conduct throughout the proceedings.
  • "DHS Challenges in Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information", August 2004. "The objectives of the review were to: (1) determine DHS’
    role in working with other federal agencies to consolidate terrorist watch list systems and operations in response to recent legislation and executive branch direction; (2) evaluate the effectiveness of plans and activities to standardize and consolidate the watch lists to address the new requirements; and (3) identify any obstacles or challenges encountered and determine whether changes to the interagency systems integration approach are needed."
Department of Justice (DOJ):
Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (DOJ OIG):
  • "Audit of the U.S. Department of Justice Terrorist Watchlist Nomination Processes", March 2008. Examining the Department of Justice (DOJ) terrorist watchlist nomination process, the DOJ Inspector General determined that the "the FBI was not always providing updated nominations when new information became known about a nominated individual." The IG "also found that the FBI was not always removing records from the watchlist when it was appropriate to do so." Further, the IG was "informed that FBI field offices had, at times, bypassed FBI headquarters and submitted nominations directly to NCTC. This could result in the watchlisting of individuals without an FBI quality review and could also affect the completeness of the FBI’s records that are maintained to support its watchlist nominations."
  • "A Review of the FBI's Use of National Security Letters", March 2008. Reviewing the FBI's use of National Security Letters, the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General [OIG] determined that "the FBI and the Department [of Justice] have evidenced a commitment to correcting the problems we found in our first NSL [National Security Letter] report and have made signficant progress in addressing the need to improve compliance..." Nonetheless, errors were found; for example, when examining "in detail the FBI's field review," the OIG "determined that it did not capture all NSL-related possible intelligence violations in the files it reviewed...."
  • "Follow-Up Audit of the Terrorist Screening Center", September 2007. This audit concluded that the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) "has enhanced its efforts to ensure the quality of watchlist data, has increased staff assigned to data quality management, and has developed a process and a separate office to address complaints filed by persons seeking relief from adverse effects related to terrorist watchlist screening. However, we also determined that the TSC’s management of the watchlist continues to have weaknesses."
  • "The External Effects of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Reprioritization Efforts", September 2005. This Inspector General report argued that "the FBI has lessened its efforts to combat traditional crime even more than it had planned...our review identified specific crime areas, such as financial institution fraud and bank robberies, in which other law enforcement officials said the FBI’s reduced investigative activity has hurt their ability to address the crime problem in their area and has left an investigative gap."
  • "Federal Bureau of Investigation's Foreign Language Translation Program Follow-Up", July 2005. Although the FBI made progress in addressing the Inspector General's recommendations in a previous audit, the investigation concluded that "key deficiencies remain in the FBI’s foreign language translation program, including a continuing backlog of unreviewed material, some instances where high-priority material has not been reviewed within 24 hours in accord with FBI policy, and continued challenges in meeting linguist hiring goals and target staffing levels."
  • "Review of the Terrorist Screening Center's Efforts to Support the Secure Flight Program", August 2005. This audit asserted that "the TSC is trying to plan for a program that has several major undefined parameters. Specifically, the TSC does not know when Secure Flight will start, the volume of inquiries expected and the resulting number of resources required to respond, the quality of data it will have to analyze, and the specific details of the phased-in approach for taking the program from 'pre-operational testing' in September 2005 to full operational capability in FY 2007."
  • "A Review of the FBI's Actions in Connection with Allegations Raised by Contract Linguist Sibel Edmonds", January 2005. Sibel Edmonds worked as a contract linguist for the FBI and made a number of allegations about that program, including "about actions by a co-worker related to potential espionage." This report examines, among other topics, "the factual basis underlying Edmonds' allegations against the co-worker" and "the allegation that the FBI decided to stop using Edmonds as a linguist in retaliation for her allegations."
Director of National Intelligence (DNI):
  • "Background Briefing on Syria's Covert Nuclear Reactor and North Korea's Involvement", April 2008. In September 2007, the Israeli Air Force destroyed a Syrian target, which the U.S. government has publicly asserted was a nuclear facility. According to this background briefing by senior U.S. intelligence officials, the reactor "was constructed by the Syrians in the eastern desert of Syria along the Euphrates River on the east side. The Syrians constructed this reactor for the production of plutonium with the assistance of the North Koreans." Moreover, "shortly after the attack, the Syrians began...a massive effort to destroy the ruined reactor building and to remove all potentially incriminating nuclear-related equipment and structures. Much of the work was done at night or was hidden by tarps in an attempt to conceal it from our overhead observation."
  • "United States Intelligence Community: Information Sharing Strategy", February 2008. The document's introduction states, "the need to share information became an imperative to protect our Nation in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on our homeland. The Intelligence Community’s 'need-to-know' culture, a necessity during the Cold War, is now a handicap that threatens our ability to uncover, respond, and protect against
    terrorism and other asymmetric threats. Each intelligence agency has its own networks and data repositories that make it very difficult to piece together facts and suppositions that, in the aggregate, could provide warning of the intentions of our adversaries." Now, according to the document, the "need to know" has become a "responsibility to provide."
  • "The Terrorist Threat to the Homeland", July 2007. The Director of National Intelligence assessed that "Al-Qa’ida is and will remain the most serious terrorist threat to the Homeland, as its central leadership continues to plan high-impact plots, while pushing others in extremist Sunni communities to mimic its efforts and to supplement its capabilities. We assess the group has protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including: a safehaven in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), operational lieutenants, and its top leadership. Although we have discovered only a handful of individuals in the United States with ties to al-Qa’ida senior leadership since 9/11, we judge that al-Qa’ida will intensify its efforts to put operatives here."
  • "The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America", October 2005. The strategy seeks to achieve the following vision: "A unified enterprise of innovative intelligence professionals whose common purpose in defending American lives and interests, and  advancing American values, draws strength from our democratic institutions, diversity, and intellectual and technological prowess."
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA):
  • "Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation: 2000". This document, produced by the Federal Aviation Administration's Office of Civil Aviation Security, "compiles incidents that have taken place against civil aviation aircraft and interests worldwide. These incidents are summarized in regional geographic overviews."
  • "Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation: 1998". This document, produced by the Federal Aviation Administration's Office of Civil Aviation Security, "compiles incidents that have taken place against civil aviation aircraft and interests worldwide. These incidents are summarized in regional geographic overviews."
  • "Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation: 1997". This document, produced by the Federal Aviation Administration's Office of Civil Aviation Security, "compiles incidents that have taken place against civil aviation aircraft and interests worldwide. These incidents are summarized in regional geographic overviews."
  • "Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation: 1996". This document, produced by the Federal Aviation Administration's Office of Civil Aviation Security, "compiles incidents that have taken place against civil aviation aircraft and interests worldwide. These incidents are summarized in regional geographic overviews."
  • "Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation: 1995". This document, produced by the Federal Aviation Administration's Office of Civil Aviation Security, "compiles incidents that have taken place against civil aviation aircraft and interests worldwide. These incidents are summarized in regional geographic overviews."
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI):
  • "End of Ramadan Security Awareness", October 2006. This FBI Intelligence Bulletin, issued by the Counterterrorism Division, notes that "violent Islamic extremist groups...may view the last 10 days of Ramadan, especially Laylatu al-Qadr (the Night of Power), as a particularly opportune time to strike at the Homeland." However, "the FBI possesses no specific credible intelligence indicating that terrorists are planning to target the United States during the last 10 days of Ramadan."
  • "The FBI's Counterterrorism Program Since September 2001", April 2004. As the document's introduction explains: "During the past 31 months, the FBI has undergone a transformation in all areas of its operations. The transformation has involved both the institution of new functions and capacities as well as refinements of existing processes and programs to modernize our operations. This report provides an overview of that reform process." This report was produced for the 9/11 Commission. 
  • Press Release re: Al-Qaida Interest in Targeting U.S. Railways, October 2002. The FBI issued a press release on its website, stating that "information from debriefings of al-Qa'ida detainees as of mid-October indicates that the group has considered directly targeting U.S. passenger trains, possibly using operatives who have a Western appearance." Moreover, "recently captured al-Qa'ida photographs of U.S. railroad engines, cars, and crossings heighten the intelligence community's concern of this threat."
  • "Terrorism: 2000-2001". Unlike prior FBI "Terrorism" reports, this document "provides an overview of terrorist incidents and preventions taking place in the United States," and also "discusses FBI investigations overseas"; it "thus provides a more comprehensive picture of the totality of the FBI's response to international terrorism."
Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Homeland Security - Joint Assessments/Bulletins:
  • "Female Suicide Bomber Threat", February 2008. In an Unclassified/For Official Use Only bulletin titled "Female Suicide Bombers Threat" that has been leaked to the media, the Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation write that "continued use of female suicide bombers—the most recent example being a 3 February 2008 attack at the main railway station in Colombo, Sri Lanka— indicates that terrorists judge this tactic as effective in increasing defenses and thwarting security measures." However, the report also notes that "DHS and the FBI have no specific, credible intelligence indicating that terrorist organizations intend to utilize female suicide bombers against targets in the Homeland."
  • "Terrorist Use of Modified Footwear to Conceal Explosives Devices", October 2007. In an Unclassified/For Official Use Only bulletin titled "Terrorist Use of Modified Footwear to Conceal Explosive Devices" that has been leaked to the media, the Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation note that "a recent terrorist incident involving the international smuggling of electric blasting caps highlights the continuing use of modified footwear as a concealment method for explosive devices."
  • "Lax Login and Password Practices Increase Potential for Security Breaches", October 2007. In an Unclassified/For Official Use Only bulletin titled "Lax Login and Password Practices Increase Potential for Security Breaches" that has become public, the Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation write that "hackers amass computer login and password information from compromised computers around the world."
  • "Al-Qa'ida Media Campaign, Ramadan Highlight Need for Increased Awareness", September 2007. In an Unclassified/For Official Use Only bulletin that has become public, the Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation write, "recent messages from al-Qa‘ida marked the anniversary of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks and immediately precede the annual Islamic holy month of Ramadan, which begins this week...Al-Qa‘ida and other terrorist groups previously have not singled out Ramadan specifically as an occasion to launch attacks, but in conjunction with the propaganda videos, DHS and the FBI urge continued heightenedvigilance by U.S. authorities at all levels."
  • "Glasgow Airport Illustrates Varied Terrorist Tactics to Attack Transportation Infrastructure", July 2007. In an Unclassified/For Official Use Only bulletin that has become public, the Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation write, "the 30 June 2007 car crash at the Glasgow International Airport in Scotland demonstrates the varied tactics terrorists have at their disposal to attack commercial aviation. The majority of previous aviation-related terrorist plots involved attempts to destroy aircraft and harm passengers, whereas others focused on other elements of aviation infrastructure such as jet fuel storage and passenger terminals. Such incidents emphasize the need to consider all aspects of commercial aviation as potential targets."
  • "Improvised Explosive Initiators", July 2007. In an Unclassified/For Official Use Only bulletin that has become public, the Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation write, "government controls for safety and security instituted over the past several years are making the procurement of commercial or military initiation devices to detonate explosives more difficult. Incidents in the United States and abroad indicate that terrorists and other criminals are instead improvising initiators. These improvised initiators are easy to assemble and can be made from commonly available materials." Further, "law enforcement officials and Homeland security personnel should be aware of unconventional methods that terrorists could use to initiate explosives. Recognizing improvised detonators could be a key in preventing an attack."
  • "Fraudulent Identification: Terrorist and Criminal Intent", March 2007. In an Unclassified/For Official Use Only Joint Homeland Security Assessment that has become public, the Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation point out that "terrorists and criminals seek fraudulent U.S. identification documents in an effort to enter and exit the country, use financial institutions, and create aliases to mask their true identities." According to the document, "terrorists and criminals use a number of methods to acquire fraudulent identification. Stolen blank or insider-derived original documents such as birth certificates are a means to create a fictitious identity or to legitimatize a person’s status in the United States. Identification documents and cards can be created with off-the-shelf computer software and printed on high-resolution printers; this technique makes visual detection more difficult for law enforcement and border security officers."
  • "Terrorist Threats to the U.S. Homeland: Reporting Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource Owners and Operators", January 7, 2005. This leaked Unclassified/For Official Use Only, DHS/FBI document seeks "to leverage the vast information resources of our critical infrastructure partners to assist in recognizing activities or conditions that may be indicative of terrorist activity." The guide identifies "common indicators and patterns that may be associated with terrorist threats to the nation’s critical infrastructure. This guide also encourages reporting of relevant indicators and patterns to law enforcement and homeland security officials."
  • "Terrorist Chemical Device", Updated November 18, 2004. In an Unclassified/For Official Use Only bulletin leaked to the media, DHS and the FBI write that "terrorists have designed chemical dispersal devices fabricated from commonly available materials which are designed to asphyxiate victims. The device, in its simplest form, produces hydrogen cyanide (HCN) gas; however, it can be modified to produce both HCN and cyanogen chloride (ClCN) gas. Little or no training is required to assemble and deploy such a device, due to its simplicity. This improvised chemical device...consists of a pierced container or canister, such as a large milk container or paint can. The holes would presumably allow the toxic gas to escape." This bulletin was spurred by the discovery that a Bahrain-based terrorist cell was planning to launch a cyanide gas attack on the New York City subway system. For more information, see the NEFA Foundation "Target: America" report "The New York City Subway Poison Gas Plot."
  • "Compressed Gas Cylinders as Components of IEDs", September 10, 2004. In an Unclassified/For Official Use Only bulletin that has become public, the Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation write that "recent intelligence reporting indicates terrorists may be interested in devices using compressed, flammable gas cylinders to destroy buildings. However, these devices will not produce pressure waves equivalent to those from an explosive device. Instead, they tend to create large fireballs where most of the damage is a result of thermal (heat) effects."
  • "Potential Vulnerabilities of U.S. Drinking Water and Wastewater Treatment Facilities to Insider Terrorism", August 11, 2004. In an Unclassified/For Official Use Only bulletin that has become public, the Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation reveal that "information recently brought to the attention of DHS and FBI indicates that prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks; terrorists discussed possible attacks against U.S. facilities and systems to disrupt drinking water supplies serving major urban areas, which include large-capacity water reservoirs and water treatment facilities. Although no specific targets were selected, one specific site in the Northeastern United States was mentioned as an example." Moreover, "terrorists mentioned inserting a poison (not further identified) into the chlorination section of the water t